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NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR
This Article is part of a "twin series." The "twin series" con-
sists of two case studies representing two major types of interna-
tional business transactions ("IBTs") in the capital-intensive petro-
leum and energy sector. Case One explores and critiques the
current patterns of "Third World" economic development in the
exploration for, development and production of petroleum re-
sources.' Case Two, to be published in the forthcoming issue of
this Journal, focuses specifically on the development of energy re-
sources once petroleum has been extracted. Case Two dissects an
Independent Power Project ("IPP") and then re-evaluates the role
played by Multilateral and Project Financing in such a project. The
overall purpose of these two case studies is to raise the level of
awareness in the international and legal academic communities
with respect to special issues in the negotiation of foreign direct in-
vestment ("FDI") contracts 2 in this important sector, in hopes of
spurring further studies and dialogues.
Although each case study is presented under separate title and
published independently in two consecutive issues of this Journal,
All terms capitalized and/or italicized in this twin series are legal concepts and indus-
try jargon that have evolved into legal concepts; generally established defined terms in in-
vestment contracts, which have become legal norms by customary usage; and/or acronyms
and shorthand terms adopted by the author for the convenience of reference.
1 The term "petroleum industry" is used herein to include all integrated
companies that specialize in, inter alia, the exploration and discovery of petro-
leum, including both Crude Oil and Natural Gas. For Crude Oil and Natural Gas
legal definitions in petroleum agreements, see infra note 293. The term "energy,"
when used to describe the sector, includes companies whose business is in the
generation and trading of energy as a commodity, whether or not the source of
that energy is petroleum.
2 The phrase "foreign direct investment" ("FDI") refers to the type of transac-
tion that generates a direct flow of capital, labor, and services across borders. FDI
is distinguishable from "portfolio" investment, such as ownership of shares in a
mutual fund or passive stock ownership. RALPH H. FOLSoM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (6th ed. 2003); see also George Thomas Ellinidis, Foreign
Direct Investment in Developing and Newly Liberalized Nations, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC.
299 (1995) (defining FDI and assessing the risks inherent in it); cf Enrique R.
Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and Controlling Port-
folio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Cri-
sis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, n.3 (1996) (defining portfolio investment as
investment that results in no managerial responsibilities despite investment in fi-
nancial assets). Before the beginning of the new millennium, as of 1998, FDI vol-
ume in the industrialized nation-members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") reached $465 billion. OECD, Recent Trends




both titles should be considered part of one single comprehensive
study and analysis, with the second case study serving as a con-
tinuation of the first. Both cases together represent the full cycle of
petroleum resources development -they describe what happens
when gas is found offshore and then transported onshore to be
used as fuel for the generation of electricity in the host country.
Only when readers examine both cases together and consecutively
will the author's objective be fully achieved -to offer the academic
and legal community a comprehensive and critical examination of
the patterns of economic development in a developing economy.
The final conclusions offered by the Author are based on both case
studies and will be included in the next issue of this Journal.
Both cases use the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as the repre-
sentative deal and factual context.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Preliminary Remarks
For decades, the developing nations have served as the new
frontiers for multinational corporate expansion, as U.S. big busi-
nesses took their activities abroad in search of new consumer mar-
kets, new discoveries of natural resources, and drastically cheaper
labor.3
The 1980s and 1990s represented a major transitional period for
the global economy. During this period of time, Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe transitioned into market economies following the col-
lapse of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union.4 The
3 See, e.g., WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN & JEAN-PIERRE BtGUIN, JOINT
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971) (giving spe-
cific examples of joint international business ventures in the developing world);
see also Aaron Bernstein, Welch's March to the South, Bus. WK., Dec. 6, 1999 at 74, 78
(stating that from 1986 to 1999, General Electric's U.S. workforce fell by nearly
fifty percent, while its foreign workforce nearly doubled); cf Ellinidis, supra note 2
(explaining the risks inherent in FDI). For the view that the world's resources are
returned to the northern industrialized nations to feed the need of consumerism,
see Tony McAdams, Globalization: New Demands for the Legal Environment of Busi-
ness Course, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. EDUC. 239, 263 n.159-60 (explaining that the northern
industrialized nations, with twenty to twenty-five percent of the world's popula-
tion, use about eighty percent of world resources). See also Michael Casey, Emerg-
ing Markets Re-emerge as Attractive Places to Invest, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2002 (not-
ing the return of investors to emerging markets such as those in Southeast Asia).
4 See, e.g., Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of For-
eign Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L LAW 1 (1995) (discussing the effect of legal rules on development in
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European Union approved new memberships and continued to
harmonize national laws as part of its regional integration policy.5
China actively sought membership in the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO") and, after much controversy, succeeded.6 Small
countries geographically distant from Europe such as Cambodia
and Vietnam initiated economic reforms, actively soliciting West-
ern investment. The developing markets, especially Asia (prior to
the currency crises of the late 1990s),7 were believed to have grown
faster than the developed nations.8 Trends of privatization and de-
Central and Eastern Europe).
5 The European Union's ("EU") efforts to harmonize national laws and
strengthen the common market as a unified trade bloc could be seen in regional
legal measures such as (i) the European Community ("EC") Merger Control Law,
see Patrick Thieffry, The New EC Merger Control Regulation, 24 INT'L LAW. 543 (1990)
(discussing the December 12, 1989 EC laws on merger control); Michael Reynolds,
The Future of Merger Control in Europe, 26 INT'L Bus. LAW. 100 (1998); and (ii) the
enactment of the European Company Statute to create a new corporate form for
doing business in the EU, the Societas Europeae ("SE"), to be implemented in 2004.
See, e.g., Council Regulation 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a
European Company (SE), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1; see also Kenneth J. Hamner, Com-
ment, The Globalization of Law: International Merger Control and Competition Law in
the United States, the European Union, Latin America and China, J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 385-405 (2002) (discussing the convergence of antitrust laws on an interna-
tional level).
6 See, e.g., Anyuan Yuan, China's Entry into the WTO: Impact on China's Regu-
lating Regime of Foreign Direct Investment, 35 INT'L LAW. 195 (2001) (discussing the
concessions China must make in entering the World Trade Organization
("WTO")); Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga, 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1469 (2000) (discussing China's entry into the WTO as a
worst-case scenario); Gretchen Harders-Chen, China MFN: A Reaffirmation of Tradi-
tion or Regulatory Reform? 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 381 (1996) (discussing China
Foreign Trade Law Article 6, the "most favored nation" designation for foreign
countries); Press Release, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China's
Accession (Nov. 10, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/presOl-e/
pr252_e.htm; Press Release, WTO, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on
China's Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.
7 For a specific example of the impact the Asian currency crisis has produced
on Southeast Asian oil-producing countries, see Jed Friedman & James Levinsohn,
The Distributional Impacts of Indonesia's Financial Crisis on Household Welfare: A
"Rapid Response" Methodology, 16 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 397 (2002).
8 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration for
the Asian Century: An Early Look at New Approaches, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 187 (1994) (discussing new possibilities for the development of an Asian-
Pacific trading bloc); Harold Dichter, Legal Implications of an Asia-Pacific Economic
Grouping, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 99 (1995) (discussing considerations regarding
the development of an Asian-Pacific trading bloc); see also Dennis Unkovic, Doing
Business in China and the Pacific Rim, 15 INT'L Q., 189, 190 (2003) (attributing $13
trillion of estimated gross national product ("GNP") to Pacific Rim economies, ex-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
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regulation in the former centralized economies offered U.S. busi-
nesses a lesser-regulated environment where the strength of the
U.S. dollar also increased the investor's economic power. Overall,
because the transitional economies needed technology, infrastruc-
tures, and new commodity markets (by way of both imports and
exports), the investment horizon there was most suited for large-
scale and capital-intensive investments by the multinational corpo-
rations ("MNCs"). 9 The economic prosperity of the Clinton era
cluding the United States, for the year 2002, even with the economic crises of the
late 1990s.)
9 Although the worldwide conduct of Multinational Corporations ("MNCs")
has been a focal point for the international legal community, there is no univer-
sally accepted legal definition of the term MNC, even if such definition is critically
needed for regulatory purposes. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003) (discussing defini-
tional issues for enterprises governed by U.N. initiatives attempting to regulate
MNC conduct).
Rather than propose a legal definition, Professor Mark Baker described MNCs
as "entities [that] potentially [are] more economically powerful than Stalin's So-
viet Union, and with more broad-based political influence than the Third Reich."
Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American Mul-
tinational Enterprise, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 89, 89 (2001). But see McAdams, supra note 3,
at 244 (attempting definitions for "international company," "multinational com-
pany," and "global company," observing that most multinational firms are more
national and regional in nature, rather than truly global). Some efforts at a loose
definition developed for the convenience of discussion and consensus building
have been made by authors. For example, a MNC is defined as an entity who
"owns (in whole or in part), controls, and manages value-adding activities in
more than one country," and who "engages in production and/or service activi-
ties across national boundaries, financed by [FDI]." THOMAS L. BREWER & STEPHEN
YOUNG, THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT SYSTEM AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
11 (1998); see William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory v. Quantitative
Analysis, 18 HuM. RTs. Q. 369 (1996) (defining MNCs simplistically as corporations
with affiliates or business establishments in more than one country); see also PETER
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12-15 (1995) (considering
the problems in defining MNCs).
For a representative sample of legal scholarships regarding MNCs' conduct,
see REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000) (comparing
regulatory enforcement styles in the United States, Japan, and Europe); Sidney A.
Shapiro, Book Review, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (2002) (reviewing REGULATORY
ENCOUNTERS: CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM, supra, and fo-
cusing on the benefits of cooperation in international regulatory resources, as op-
posed to the adversarial nature of regulatory measures in the United States); Beth
Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45 (acknowledging the difficulty of regulating MNCs and ex-
amining the philosophy of "corporate amorality"); Detlev F. Vagts, The Multina-
tional Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970)
(discussing the rise of multinational enterprises, a new phenomenon at the time);
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(with its restoration of balance to the global market after the Asian
and Latin American currency crises in the late 1990s) reinforced the
United States' position as an economic superpower, fortifying the
dominance of corporate America in the global economy.10
In particular, because domestic reserves have been depleted or
otherwise off-limits due to environmental restrictions, U.S.-based
oil and gas companies continued to expand their exploration ac-
tivities to the "frontier" land that previously was closed to the
West. The international petroleum and energy industry has al-
ways spoken the language of tremendous wealth, and with wealth
has come power and leverage. Petroleum resources often domi-
nate a national economy, constituting the "crown jewels" of a
country. Major international oil and gas companies ("IOGCs"),
therefore, have quickly partnered with petroleum-producing gov-
ernments.11 Yet, the "crown jewels" of the "Third World" 12 may, or
Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibil-
ity: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075 (2002)
(suggesting cooperation between nation-states and MNCs as the most effective
means of achieving corporate accountability); Cynthia Williams, Corporate Social
Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 705 (2002)
(examining "the relationship between society and the protypical large, transna-
tional public corporation").
10 Recent economic studies challenge the conclusion that economic integra-
tion among the developed economies has fundamentally raised the correlation
between U.S. growth and growth in other G-7 nations (Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom). See, e.g., Brian M. Doyle & Jon Faust, An
Investigation of Co-movements among the Growth Rates of the G-7 Countries, 88 Fed.
Res. Bull. 427, 427 (2002) (arguing that shocks to economic growth may cause a
simultaneous fall in output in many countries "even in the absence of any linkage
across borders.").
11 In this Article, just as the acronym MNCs is used to refer to "Multinational
Corporations," IOGCs will refer to "International Oil and Gas Companies" as a
specific type of MNC.
12 I ask for my readers' indulgence and tolerance with my use of this term.
The term "Third World" is used herein for convenience only, referring collectively
to the newly industrialized economies, the transitional economies, the developing
economies, the lesser-developed economies, and the least-developed economies.
Terminologies such as "developing country" and "least-developed country" have
been used in the GATT-WTO framework to grant exemptions, preferences, or
transitional grace periods to nations that need economic help in order to achieve
parity with the developed nations of North America and Western Europe. See,
e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the WTO [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, THE
LEGAL TEXTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS 143 (1999), 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement] (explaining
that "[ojn request, the Council ... may extend the transition period ... for a de-
veloping country Member."), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
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may not have brought about a better life for the average "Third
World" citizen.13 To date, many developing nations with petro-
leum resources are still struggling with poverty, corruption,14 and
docs.e/legal-e/18-trims_e.htm. In this Article, "Third World" simply refers to
any and all countries that do not belong to Western Europe or the developed
North America, both of which exemplify the Anglo-American common law and
civil law traditions.
In the 1980s, the term "Third World" was still used to refer to "a collection of
disparate nations which may have some similarities in their relative poverty and
in their aspirations; but their economies are careening in different directions at a
bewildering rate." Anatole Kaletsky, A Dismal Outlook - For Some, FIN. TIMES, May
25, 1984. In more recent scholarly literature, the term "Third World" has been
used in phraseologies such as "Third World poverty, violence, and lack of re-
sources," in connection with challenges made against the common characteriza-
tion of non-European societies as "backward and inferior." See, e.g., Antony
Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical Perspec-
tive, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887, 911 (2000) (using terms such as "Third World state" and
"Third World poverty" to discuss race, history, and international law) (emphasis
added); see also, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Locating the Third World in Cultural Geog-
raphy, THIRD WORLD L. STUD. 1, 7-11 (1998-1999) (arguing that stereotypes of impu-
rity and backwardness are essential to all understandings of "Third World");
Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Dis-
course, 16 WIS. INT'L L. J. 353, 361-62 (1998) (observing the challenge posed by the
"Third World" to accepted Western notions of history and international law).
Recently, the term "Fourth World" has emerged, referring to the collective
grouping of indigenous peoples or "nations" whose cultural properties, tradi-
tions, territories, and right of self-determination have been at risk or historically
displaced, such that the conventional notion of "statehood" can no longer
squarely apply to them under traditional concepts of international law. See JULIAN
BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 11 (1987) (noting that the conventional term of "statehood" cannot be ap-
plied since "[ilndigenous people number over 200 million and ... live in all the
five continents .... ); SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN & HASSAN BIN TALAL, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR JUSTICE 36 (1987) ("All indigenous nations have the
right of self-determination."); FRANZ SCHURMANN, THE LOGIC OF WORLD POWER
(1974); JACQUELINE STEVENS, REPRODUCING THE STATE (1999) (discussing the types
of personal relationships that lead to political association); see, e.g., Ward Chur-
chill, The Law Stood Squarely on Its Head: U.S. Legal Doctrine, Indigenous Self-
Determination and The Question of World Order, 81 OR. L. REV. 663, 700 (2002) (de-
scribing the "Fourth World" as being comprised of indigenous nations possessing
the least right to genuine self-determination; referring to the "Fourth World" as
being a "Host World" upon which the other three have been constructed).
13 See Baker, supra note 9, at 102-05 (describing how industrialized nations are
draining the resources of the "Third World" and consequently enlarging the gap
between the rich and the poor); see also Roger D. Billings, Jr., Why Business Fails in
Russia, 35 INT'L LAW. 123 (2001) (discussing social and legal problems in post-
Yeltsin Russia as an example that natural resources and an attempt at democracy
did not guarantee economic or societal success).
14 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests:
International Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 174
(2002); Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform
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the social turmoil often associated with the unhealthy economic
gap between the rich and the poor within their own populace. For
example, both Chad and Nigeria offer examples that rich petro-
leum reserves have not cured poverty issues or otherwise helped
stabilize society.
15
Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397, 399 (2002) ("There was corruption! ...
everywhere and all the time!"); Clifford D. May, Ousted Rulers' Nigeria Called
Garden of Graft, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1984, at Al; see also Transparency Int'l,
Corruption Surveys & Indices (Transparency International ("TI") is a Non-
Governmental Organization ("NGO") specializing in fighting corruption, due
notably to the efforts of, among others, a former corporate counsel of General
Electric), at http://www.transparency.org/surveys/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
For the latest scandals regarding bribery in the "Third World," see Jeff Gerth, U.S.
Businessman Is Accused of Oil Bribes to Kazakhstan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at A10
(reporting on corruption scandal prosecuted under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act involving the President of Kazahkstan, the Kazahk government and
its U.S. agent, in conjunction with an oil-producing project then acquired by the
now defunct Mobil Corporation); Nigeria in Probe of Halliburton, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2004, at A3; Halliburton Co.: Nigeria Will Probe Accusations that Subsidiary Offered
Bribes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2004; Russell Gold & John R. Wilke, Data Sought in
Halliburton Inquiry, U.S. Bus. NEWS, Feb. 5, 2004; Dow Jones Newswires,
Halliburton Unit Probed Over Bribery Claims in Nigeria, Feb. 4, 2004 (alleged
corruption scandal involving payments made to Nigerian officials by a
Halliburton subsidiary for a gas plant contract), available at http://www.prophet.
net/quotes/stocknews.jsp?symbol=TKP&article20040204460_0774001662565109.
15 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 9, at 102 (discussing the disparity in income and
the gap between the rich and poor in developing nations, as well as the gap in
economic power between North and South).
Chad has recoverable reserves estimated at one billion barrels. At various
times the following multinationals have been in Chad: Chevron, Conoco, Exxon-
Mobil, and Shell. MBendi, Chad: Oil and Gas Industry Overview, at http://
www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/ch/p0005.htm. (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
Major Petroleum Activities in connection with oilfield and pipeline projects began
as of 2000. CIA, Chad: Economy, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ print/cd.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2004). Approximately eighty percent of Chad's population is reportedly living
below the poverty line. The infant mortality rate is at 95.75%. The average life
expectancy from birth is approximately 48.51 years. Id.
Nigeria is the twelfth largest overall producer in the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"), the tenth largest oil producer in the world,
the third largest in Africa, and the most prolific oil producer in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica. The estimated proven oil reserves are 22.5 billion barrels with production at
two million barrels per day ("bbl/d"). The estimated proven natural gas reserves
are 124 trillion cubic feet. Nigeria also has four refineries with a total capacity of
445,000 bbl/d. MBendi, Nigeria: Oil and Gas Industry Overview, available at http://
www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/ng/p0005.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). Ni-
geria has continuously been listed by TI as the most corrupt country in the world.
See Transparency Int'l, TI Corruption Perceptions Index 1996, at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/1996/cpi1996.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2004);
see also Transparency Int'l, supra note 14 (comparing corruption among different
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The dawn of the new millennium has borne witness to signifi-
cant events that further impact the global economic landscape: the
atrocities of September 11, 2001, the creation of the U.S.-led global
coalition for fighting terrorism, and the unilateral approach of the
United States (and its United Kingdom ally) in striking preemptive
war against Iraq.16 These events provide at least two new opportu-
nities for corporate America to engage itself, again, in the economic
reconstruction of remote countries such as landlocked Afghanistan
and oil-rich Iraq.17 While geopolitical factors and local or regional
countries). As of 2000, approximately sixty percent of Nigeria's population was
reportedly living below the poverty line. The infant mortality rate was approxi-
mately 71.35%. Life expectancy at birth was approximately fifty-one years. CIA,
Nigeria, in THE WORLD FACTMOOK, available at http://www.cia.gov/ cia/publica-
tions/factbook/print/ni.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
16 See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, The Bush Foreign Policy 2001-2003: Unilateralist
Theory in a Multilateral World, and the Opportunity for Change Offered by Iraq, 2
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 221, 225 (2003) (discussing the United States' "us
versus them" mentality and unilateral approach to foreign affairs); see also RANETA
LAWSON MACK & MICHAEL KELLY, EQUAL JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE, ASSESSING
AMERICA'S LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE EMERGING TERRORIST THREAT (2004).
17 With respect to the U.S.-U.K. political and military alliance and occupation
of Iraq (in contrast to France's vehement objection), the following facts suggest a
similar (perhaps coincidental) alliance between U.S.- and U.K.-based IOGCs (as
opposed to French interests) in the petroleum and energy industry:
1) In the late 1990s, prior to the Exxon-Mobil merger, Mobil Corporation sold
many of its downstream assets (refineries and service stations) in Europe to Brit-
ish Petroleum ("BP"), and the two companies formed alliances for the European
market. See, e.g., Peggy Hollinger, BP and Mobil in European Fuels Merger: Annual
Sales of Joint Operation to Exceed $20bn, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at 1 (describing the
success of the BP and Mobil joint venture); David Lascelles, BP and Mobil Aim to
Get in Front and Stay There, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at 21 (describing a partnership
between BP and Mobil); see also Martha M. Hamilton, 3 Big Oil Firms Weigh Joint
Venture: Merger of Refining, Marketing Operations Could Redefine Industry, WASH.
POST, Oct. 8, 1996, at D1 (discussing merger trends and Mobil-BP and Shell-
Texaco-Saudi Arabia's Armaco alliances).
2) In 1998, BP acquired U.S.-based Amoco. BP, Drive Towards Innovation and
Efficiency, at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2010124&content
Id=2001153 (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); see also Bhushan Bahree et al., British Petro-
leum to Aqcuire Amoco in Huge Deal Spurred by Low Energy Prices, WALL ST. J., Aug.
12, 1998, at 1; Virginia Marsh, BP-Amoco Pledge to Challenge Industry Leaders, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998, at 19.
3) As explained below, the Royal Dutch-Shell group's subsidiaries and affili-
ates have substantial presence in both the United States and the United Kingdom
and occupy substantial shares of those national markets. In support of this
proposition, see Shell in the U.K. -An Overview, at http://www.shell.com/home/
Framework?sited=uk-en&FC2=/uk-en/html/iwgen/leftnavs/zzz-lhn2 l1l.html&
FC3=/uk-en/html/iwgen/about-shell/shellinukoverview_09100930.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2004); see also Shell Oil Co., 10K Annual Report (1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/89629/0000950129-99-000930.txt;
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interests may be different, the reconstruction and development of
Afghanistan and Iraq will bear similar characteristics to patterns
that have been observed in the transitional economies during the
1980s and 1990s. 18
1.2. Summary of Objectives
This "twin series" Article establishes two propositions:
(1) Confidential negotiation between MNCs and governments
of the developing economies has long shaped the pattern of "Third
World" economic development. Quite often, the host government
of a developing nation, or its instrumentality, acts as the MNC's
business partner. A stern cynical critic may exclaim that a substan-
tial part of global economic development has remained the pre-
rogatives of corporate moguls and "Third World monarchs." 9
Their contractual arrangements demonstrate ways in which MNCs
seek, inter alia, to reduce Political Risks and to form long-term gov-
ernment-foreign investor partnerships. As an example, the Produc-
tion Sharing Contract ("PSC") or its variation-a cooperative model
between IOGCs and host governments-has evolved into a
Shell Oil, at http://www.shellus.com/welcome/who/shell.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2004).
Thus, an observer may say that as of today, the dominant international play-
ers in the petroleum industry are U.S. and U.K. interests. In contrast, France's To-
talFinaElf (a combination of two Western European interests, TotalFina and Elf
Aquitaine) today stands alone against its U.S.-U.K. competitors such as Exxon-
Mobil, Texaco-Chevron, and BP-Amoco. The French integrated oil and gas com-
pany was created through two successive mergers: 1) The former Total joined
with Belgian oil company Petrofina to form Totalfina, and 2) Totalfina combined
with French oil company Elf Aquitaine to create TotalFinaElf. Total -Corporate
Website, at http://www.totalfinaelf.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
18 The terms "reconstruction" and "development" are used herein as lay-
man's terms. The Articles of Agreement of the two International Financial Institu-
tions within the World Bank Group, the International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development ("IBRD") and the International Development Association ("IDA"),
do not define "reconstruction" or "development." Compare Dexter Filkins, Iraqis
Receive U.S. Approval of Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at Al, with Yochi J.
Dreazen, How a 24-Year-Old Got a Job Rebuilding Iraq's Stock Market, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 28, 2004, at Al (describing the appointment of an inexperienced recent college
graduate to help the development of Iraq's new stock exchange); see also Andrew
Higgins, U.S. Ambitions Run into Reality on an Afghan Road, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6,
2004, at Al (describing obstacles in the early steps of infrastructure construction in
Afghanistan).
19 The term "monarch" was first used in this context by N.E. Maryan, for-
merly senior counsel for Exxon-Mobil and adjunct professor of law at Georgetown
University. See N.E. Maryan, Jr., Negotiating with the Monarch: Special Problems
When the Sovereign Is Your Partner, 745 PLI/Comm. 117, 130 (1996).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
PARTNERSHIPS WITH MONARCHS
standardized model for petroleum exploration all around the
world, and has dominated startup FDI in the petroleum industry
for the past three decades. An IOGC-host government partnership
such as the PSC model presents special legal issues, due not only to
the unique nature of multinationals doing business in the develop-
ing nations, but also to the special status and sovereign powers of
governments, well-supported in international law and political
philosophy. 20 This "twin series" Article explores these unique is-
sues in the context of petroleum and energy FDI transactions typi-
cally supported by a complex, "non-recourse" method of third-
party funding called "Project Financing," and/or funding pro-
vided by the Multilateral Organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the World Bank Group, called "Multi-
lateral Financing." 21 The petroleum and energy sector is selected
because of its global workforce and its vast economic power, both
of which have physically changed the face of the world. (After all,
it is the U.S. petroleum and energy sector that has accumulated a
multimillion-dollar foreign asset base and dispatched U.S. expatri-
ates to handle transactions and projects in remote parts of the
world such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Chad.)
(2) The nuts and bolts of the negotiation between MNCs and
"Third World" governments are veiled from the general public.
The legal and business issues involved in "Third World" economic
20 See, e.g., MARK W. JANS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 157-59
(3d ed. 1999) (exploring international legal rules and process, and examining how
these affect international relations); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Every-
man's Library ed. 1987) (1651) (celebrating the sovereign state).
21 After the global depression of the 1930s and the Second World War, dele-
gates of some forty-four participating nations met at the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence in New Hampshire in 1944 and fashioned two multilateral institutions of the
then new economic order: the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the IBRD
(also "Multilaterals," "Multilateral Agencies," "Multilateral Organizations," or
"Multilateral Institutions"). See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS 143 (2001) (attempting to establish a framework for understanding
international law). These two institutions, comprising some 183 state-members,
are the grandest and most established Multilaterals. Multilaterals also include the
regional institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asia De-
velopment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as
well as other World Bank affiliates such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency ("MIGA") and the International Finance Corporation ("IFC"). These Mul-
tilaterals are also called the "International Financial Institutions" ("IFIs"). See, e.g.,
Margaret Hanson, The Global Promotion of Transparency in Emerging Markets,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 9, 63-79 (2003) (discussing roles of IFIs). The term "Multi-
lateral Financing," therefore, refers to funding provided by these Multilateral
Agencies.
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development often remain the esoteric domain of a handful of sec-
toral lawyers and business executives, further obscured by indus-
try jargon and technological nuances. As a result, the job of exam-
ining the conduct of MNCs tends to become a cry from the ivory
tower, which studies the pivotal role of MNCs from a non-industry
perspective. Although there is abundant literature calling atten-
tion to, and challenging the conduct of MNCs,22 there exist at least
two "gaps" in the stream of scholarly literature seeking to analyze
the impact of MNCs' conduct. (By "gaps," I don't mean a total ab-
sence of well-crafted literature; rather, I refer to the scarcity of in-
depth scholarly literature written from an industry's critical per-
spective.) These gaps are explained below.
The first gap is the kind of legal academic literature that identi-
fies and analyzes certain transactional patterns representing
MNCs' behaviors, as these transactional patterns become part of
the "law of the contract" (lex contractus) governing the parties'
conduct.23 When these transactional patterns are repeatedly used,
22 See, e.g., John G. Scriven, Corporate Responsibility and Regulating the Global
Enterprise, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 153 (2002) (presenting the Symposium: The Glob-
alization of Corporate and Securities Law in the 21st Century); see also Weisbrodt
& Kruger, supra note 9 (providing an inventory of scholarship discussing MNCs'
conduct).
23 1 identify the following sources of law as governing MNCs' conduct:
(i) lex loci, the national laws of the home jurisdiction (where the MNC is in-
corporated) and the host jurisdiction (where the MNC does business and builds or
acquires assets); lex loci can be divided into lex loci contractus (the law of the place
of contracting) and lex loci solutionis (the law of the place of performance);
(ii) lex situs (the law of the place where the investment project is located);
(iii) lex fori (the law of the forum that adjudicates disputes involving MNCs'
conduct);
(iv) lex mercatoria, the body of international economic law that represents the
universal and customary norms of commerce observed by an international "mer-
chant" community; and last, but not least;
(v) lex contractus, the body of contract law selected as the choice of law gov-
erning the investment contract, including all provisions of the investment contract
resulting from the parties' negotiation, so long as such provisions do not conflict
with the governing contract law.
The transactional patterns conducted by MNCs in connection with their FDI
projects (as examined here) become part of lex contractus, as well as lex mercatoria,
potentially.
Of these sources of applicable law, lexfori is the least influential and the least
invoked, unless it is the law of the more developed jurisdiction that serves as the
situs for dispute solution. See generally Donald C. Dowling, Forum Shopping and
Other Reflections on Litigation Involving U.S. and European Businesses, 7 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 465 (1995) (emphasizing the importance of forum selection for international
contractual disputes). This is due to the fact that the norm of dispute resolution in
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
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they are elevated to legal norms that help shape international eco-
nomic law, or modern lex mercatoria.24 In-depth scholarly litera-
international business transactions ("IBTs") has been either institutional or ad hoc
arbitration, rather than a full-blown judicial resolution in a court of law. See GARY
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 11 (1994)
(discussing the various respective strengths of institutional and ad hoc arbitra-
tion); Daniele Favalli, Survey of Recent Developments in International Arbitration,
TEX. TRANSNAT'L L.Q. 14-18 (2001) ("By most appearances, the popularity of arbi-
tration as a means of resolving international commercial disputes has increased
significantly over the past several decades.").
24 Modern international commercial law (as well as the broader category of
"international business law" or "international economic law") is rooted in the an-
cient lex mercatoria (the "law merchant"), a medieval body of customary legal rules
used in international trade to supplement the often incomplete commercial laws
of nation-states. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship
and the New Law Merchant, 28 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 487 (1995) (discussing rules of de-
cisions applied by international arbitrators); Karyn S. Weinberg, Equity in Interna-
tional Arbitration: How Fair is "Fair?" A Study of Lex Mercatoria and Amiable Com-
position, 12 B.U. INT'L L. J. 227, 229-30 (1994) (describing lex mercatoria). Lex
mercatoria was common, at least to European nations, but obviously Asian coun-
tries, the Arab world, the Americas, and Africa also observed customary rules of
commerce. Ancient creative literature originating from non-Western European
traditions, such as the anonymously authored Arabian Nights, made endless refer-
ences to traveling merchants trading transnationally, in regions such as the Mid-
dle East, Asia Minor, the Far East, and Africa.
For a discussion of lex mercatoria from the Western perspective, see, for exam-
ple, FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 15-20 (1992);
JANIS, supra note 20, at 275-79 (narrating the emergence of modern international
commercial law from lex mercatoria); Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR): Market-Based Remedies for International Human Rights Violations? 40
WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 103 (2004) ("Medieval lex mercatoria ... was fundamentally a
private law of contract and arbitration. Lex mercatoria concerned only private
parties, was binding, and was a result of voluntary agreement .... ); John Hon-
nold, The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Development and Character
of English and American Commercial Law, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 70 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1964).
The phrase "international economic law" or "transnational economic law" has
broader meaning than "international commercial law," which governs interna-
tional sales, export-import transactions, and the shipment and distribution of
goods and services. The concept of a broader body of "international economic
law" was envisioned by Jessup to denote the equivalent of "customary interna-
tional law" in the domain of economic and commercial relations. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956); see BEDERMAN, supra note 21 at 141; Hazel Fox, The
Definition and Sources of International Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Hazel Fox ed., 1992) (reviewing the develop-
ment of international economic law literature); cf Michael W. Gordon, A Comment
on the Recent Change of the Name of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Interna-
tional Business Law to Journal of International Economic Law, in RALPH H. FOLSOM ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A READER 25 (3d ed.) (providing satire
on the emerging use of the phrase "international economic law"). On Jessup, see
Oscar Schachter, Philip Jessup's Life and Ideals, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 878 (1986).
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tures in this category are few and far between. Existing literatures
are either practitioners' succinct contributions to law review dis-
course, or are often practice guides written by, and designed for,
sectoral specialists in the private bar as a source of continuing legal
education material to enhance their practice experience. Between
the two ends of the spectrum-from specialty law textbooks to the
practice guides-there exists a vacuum, a demand for a more
abundant and meaningful scholarly literature focusing on the
transactional patterns that drive trends in global economic devel-
opment and help form modern lex mercatoria and lex contractus.
Accordingly, I perceive a great need for the legal community at
large to examine the dynamics involved in the formation of these
multimillion-dollar MNC-government partnerships. With this
"twin series" Article, I hope to meet that need by unveiling and
explaining the esoteric and technically complex international pe-
troleum and energy transactions. The explanation hopefully will
dispel myths and provide a general understanding of the processes
and some of the key legal issues involved.
The second gap in legal literature concerns the need for the sci-
entific gathering of empirical data and their interpretations, reflect-
ing or pointing to any correlations between "Third World" pov-
erty, "Third World" governments' behavior, and MNCs' corporate
behavior as well as their FDI business strategies, in order to prove
or disprove general notions that may have been taken for
granted.25 Without such interpretation and established linkage, the
task of analyzing or monitoring MNCs' conduct or fashioning poli-
cies and relief for effective "Third World" economic development
may run the risk of becoming cich, mere rhetoric, and even
euphemism. So far, any such empirical undertakings have been
the exclusive province of economists, international think-tanks,
25 For example, the international law debates continue as to whether foreign
investment is highly beneficial to the developing states (the "neo-classical the-
ory"), or whether FDI as practiced by MNCs is generally detrimental to "Third
World" development (the "dependency theory"). T.J. BIERSTEKER, MULTINATION-
ALS, THE STATE AND THE CONTROL OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 3-51 (1987); see also
James D. Nolan, A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law on Foreign Investment, the
World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, and Normative
Rules of International Law on Foreign Direct Investment, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
659 (1998) (outlining the debate as to FDI's beneficial or detrimental nature);
Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Depri-
vation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 460 (1981) ("[Alt this stage in
history the achievement of a world economy of human dignity requires at least
some kinds of [FDIJ.").
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and the Multilateral Institutions in support of their own missions.
2 6
Legal academia should undertake similar inquiries, as they are the
premier group to voice critical and interpretative analyses of pre-
scriptive standards and normative behaviors, especially when law,
politics, and cultures collide and intertwine, as in the case of
"Third World" economic development. Specifically, questions
must be raised by way of objective data establishing the linkage be-
tween "Third World" poverty and FDI patterns, the cause-effect
relationships between trade and FDI, "Third World" inhabitants'
cultural norms, "Third World" governments' political behaviors
and macroeconomic policies (or lack thereof), MNCs' profit-driven
26 See, e.g., MARTIN DENT & BILL PETERS, THE CRISIS OF POVERTY AND DEBT IN
THE THIRD WORLD (1999); CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC ISSUES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (John Baffoe-Bonnie & Mohammed Khayum eds., 2003) (collecting
economists' analyses of developing nations' economic performances); see also
OECD, WORKING PARTY OF THE TRADE COMMITTEE, CODES OF CONDUCT - EXPLORING
THEIR ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE, TD/TC/WP(2001)10/FINAL (2001) (reporting on
a survey of codes and policy statements among 100 leading multinational
enterprises and their economic significance), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/0/15/2681579.pdf; PERSISTENT POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
DETERMINING THE CAUSES AND CLOSING THE GAPS (Nancy B. Dyke ed., 1998);
WORLD BANK GROUP, PREM ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP AND DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS GROUP, DOES MORE INTERNATIONAL TRADE OPENNESS INCREASE WORLD
POVERTY? (2000) (presenting evidence suggesting that more international trade
openness has a positive effect on per-capita income and thus should tend to
reduce poverty), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/
globalization/ag02.html.
For an individual effort at drawing correlations between free trade under
NAFTA and "Third World" poverty using Mexico as an example, see Richard C.
Williams, Globalization and Its Effects on the Developing World, Hand-Out Ac-
companying Address Before the Rocky Mountains Harvard University Club (Apr.
27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Richard C. Williams,
Ph.D., concludes that since the execution of NAFTA, poverty statistics have be-
come worse, based on data taken from websites for the Alliance for Responsible
Trade, the London School of Economics, the International Labor Organization
("ILO"), the World Bank and its affiliates. Id. For example, since the implementa-
tion of NAFTA, the percentage of the Mexican population living in poverty (i.e.,
below $7.30 a day) increased from 58.5% to 79%. Id. At the beginning of global-
ization (approximately the 1960s), the rate of world unemployment, underem-
ployment, and incomes under one dollar per day was less than twenty percent.
Id. As of 2003, this percentage stood at approximately forty percent, according to
ILO data. Id. These conclusions represent Dr. Willliams' views and work, and
sources supporting Dr. Williams' conclusions have not been verified for purposes
of this Article. Interestingly, other interpretations of World Bank data contradict
Dr. Williams' conclusion-the global poverty rate did fall from twenty-nine per-
cent to twenty-four percent, according to 2000 World Bank factsheets. See
McAdams, supra note 3, at 254 n.100 (citing WORLD BANK GROUP, supra). The same
World Bank data support the conclusion that globalization and free trade have
increased the gap in income between the rich and the poor. Id.
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behaviors and corporate policies, and last but not least, the interna-
tional relations and global economic policies of MNCs' home coun-
tries.27 This mammoth task can either be the solitary effort of legal
academia, or better still a joint project for the interdisciplinary
scholarly community, the think-tanks, and the international or-
ganizations (including the Multilaterals). It is hoped that this
"twin series" Article will spur further studies conducted by the le-
gal academy, thereby firmly establishing the need to draw empiri-
cal data and make meaningful conclusions.28 In other words, better
27 Cf Charles E. Mueller, Mhy Is Islam So Poor? From Wealth to Poverty in 900
Years (II), ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Vol. 31, No. 4, 2002, at 1 (attributing the pov-
erty of some fifty-seven Islamic nations or twenty percent of world citizens to the
lack of pluralism and the linkage between monopoly and poverty in Islam culture,
rather than to lack of resources or capital); Dmitriy N. Podosyonov & Charles E.
Mueller, Why is Russia Still So Poor 10 Years After the Fall of Communism?,
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Vol. 31, No. 4, 2002, at 41 (attributing poverty of the
twenty-five-nation post-Soviet bloc to the demoralization and corruption associ-
ated with the clash between capitalism and the remnant austerity of former com-
munist indoctrination- the "severed nerves" aftermath; suggesting full private
ownership of land and a return to agricultural growth). These allegations, how-
ever, are without empirical support or documented with case studies. Gene R.
Nichol, Poverty and Equality: A Distant Mirror, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1671 (2002)
(reviewing JOEL SCHWARTZ, FIGHT POVERTY WITH VIRTUE: MORAL REFORM AND
AMERICA'S URBAN POOR (2000) and ELLIOTT J. GORN, MOTHER JONES: THE MOST
DANGEROUS WOMAN IN AMERICA (2001) (discussing twenty-first century democ-
racy and poverty in America: 11.3% of Americans (31 million people) live in pov-
erty; approximately 22% of black and Latino youths are impoverished)). Compare
Raj Bhala, The Third World, the Muslim World, and the New Trade Round: Part 1, INT'L
TRADE L. & REG., July 2002, at 118-127 (examining the "Doha Development
Agenda" of the new WTO trade round and discussing issues of poverty in the Is-
lamic World and the "Third World"), with Ved P. Nanda, East Trade Rules to Help
Developing Nations, DENY. POST, Sept. 19, 2003, at B7 (detailing the break-down of
the Doha WTO talks).
28 For example, Tamara Lothian and Katharina Pistor have argued:
Today there is much more empirical support for the claim that law mat-
ters for foreign investment. Nevertheless, new law and development ini-
tiatives that use these data ... are as problematic today as they were in
the early 1960s. There are three main problems: (A) the data are poorly
specified; (B) the concepts are incoherent; and (C) the promise of new re-
forms is rarely realized in practice .... A further gap in the current un-
derstanding of investment patterns arises from the lack of detailed case
studies ... . Given this lack of useful data, new insights likely could be
drawn from the experiences of practical people in real-world investment
projects located in countries at the forefront of market reform.
Tamara Lothian & Katharina Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and Alter-
native Strategies of Development: Some Views from Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 101, 103-06 (2003). They also acknowledged the need for "an agenda for further
research," and the lack of information describing investment patterns due to lack
of first-hand knowledge. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
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studies and statistics are needed to support causative claims.29
1.3. Summary of Arguments
This Article will proceed as follows: Section 2 describes a real-
life situation, using the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as an exam-
ple where an MNC-IOGC partnered with a "Third World mon-
arch." This real-life situation becomes the context for the discus-
sion in Section 3. Section 3 dissects and explains the principal legal
and business issues, as well as the dynamics of negotiation, in two
types of FDI transactions: (i) the international "upstream" petro-
leum project, and (ii) the international "midstream" IPP in which
natural gas that is discovered is used to generate electricity. The
discussion in Section 3 encompasses the followingfour unique legal
and business issues, together with my specific recommendations
for improvement:
(1) The transfer and sharing of risks among dominant corporate play-
ers in the international petroleum and energy sector. I argue that this
pattern may create de facto monopolistic cartels, precluding and
suppressing the embryonic growth of a true entrepreneurial mid-
dle class in the native population, notwithstanding the govern-
ment's open-door economy policy that invites the MNC to be in
the country in the first place! These de facto cartels foster, pro-
mote, and fortify the power base of the host government's ruling
elites, who become the "monarchs" of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. This monopolistic pattern defeats the ultimate ob-
jective of free enterprise: the spreading of wealth and attainment
of prosperity, based on a level playing field and individual innova-
tion and creativity, toward the creation of a healthier and larger
middle class in those places that need it the most.
(2) The payment of bonuses by MNCs to governments, and the need
to substitute cash bonuses and payments with industry-sponsored social
29 For example, one such causative claim that needs to be examined is
whether the "shareholder's wealth maximization" model of U.S. corporate laws
and its underlying philosophy has occasioned more economic inequality in the
United States compared to other nation-members of the OECD. OECD statistics
since 1996 seem to support this conclusion. See, e.g., Mark Roe, Political Precondi-
tions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control: The Incompatibility of the Ameri-
can Public Firm with Social Democracy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 541 (2000) (arguing
"shareholders' core problems in the public firm cannot be readily resolved in a
strong social democracy."). To the best of my knowledge, the impact of the U.S.
model upon global economic inequality has not been tested, challenged, or other-
wise examined or re-examined by way of empirical sampling.
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programs. These bonus payments may create an opportunity for
legitimized corruption under the guise of discretionary exercise of
sovereign power, and may turn global economic development pro-
jects into auctions, thereby feeding more "grease"3 0 into a govern-
mental apparatus that may already be plagued by abuse of gov-
ernmental power.31 Accordingly, I suggest that major industry
players should join efforts to lobby "Third World" governments
for the abolishment of cash bonuses required as a means for the na-
tion-state to capture Economic Rents in PSCs or similar investment
contracts. Cash bonuses should be replaced with social programs
designed to contribute directly to the local community of "Third
World" inhabitants.
(3) The popular Stabilization Clause as a risk-management tool and a
negotiated contractual restriction upon a nation-state's legislative or rule-
making sovereign power. While the Stabilization Clause serves the
purpose of eliminating and controlling Political Risks, it may help
perpetuate the close-knit and collaborative nature of certain eco-
nomic partnerships between governments and MNCs. Both sides
to the deal may be motivated to solidify the MNC's long-term pres-
ence or elitist foothold in the country. Further, the very nature and
purpose of the Stabilization Clause makes it inherently incon-
gruent and legally problematic. The Stabilization Clause also evi-
dences the lack of bargaining power in "Third World" economic
negotiations, cloaking the MNC as the preferred, desired business
partner of a poor country's ruling elites. Finally, the Clause (to-
gether with all other contractual provisions supporting it) demon-
strates the paradoxical negotiating objective of the MNC in struc-
turing the contracting capacity of the host government or its State-
Owned Enterprises ("SOEs") -the MNC needs to recognize the
30 Interestingly, the United States' anti-corruption law in international busi-
ness, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), creates an exception from liabil-
ity commonly described by lawyers and corporate executives as the "grease pay-
ment" exception. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (1998). Payments to expedite the
performance of routine governmental action are permitted under the Act, pro-
vided that all statutory criteria constituting the exception are met. United States
v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) ("grease payments" are legal under the FCPA
because they are considered part of the custom of doing business in certain for-
eign countries); United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 833 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); see
also Toral Patel, Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.
REV. 389 (1998) (discussing routine "grease payments" made in India).
31 See, e.g., Helena Kolenda, One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's
Republic of China and Attempts to Control It, 4 J. CHINESE L. 187 (1990) (discussing




sovereignty's power, yet, at the same time, must limit and de-
nounce such sovereign power when the "monarch" is engaging in
commercial activities.
(4) Project Financing as a means to isolate MNCs' corporate assets
from Political Risk exposures in the developing economies. Project Fi-
nancing has poured billions of dollars of funding into the "Third
World," 32 either separately or as piggybacks of Multilateral Financ-
ing. (In this regard, Multilateral Financing serves as a "step-up"
credit enhancement tool for Project Financing.) For the corporate
investor, both financing structures -Project Financing and Multi-
lateral Financing- operate as a risk-allocation mechanism that ul-
timately puts risks of loss upon the taxpayers of the developed na-
tions, as well as the poor inhabitants of the "Third World." Both
financing techniques can also operate to preclude participation by
smaller or medium-sized entrepreneurships, in favor of mega-
MNCs who typically join forces to share risks among themselves,
thereby reinforcing the existence of de facto cartels dominating the
sector and the region. Further, Project Financing should no longer
be the "privileged" financing method exclusively for elitist mega-
projects. Neither "brand-name" recognition of project participants
nor the existence or availability of Multilateral Financing should
serve as a "step-up" credit enhancement tool for private bankers in
assessing Project Financing eligibility for "Third World" develop-
ment projects. Funding from smaller-sized banks should be made
available to smaller or medium-sized entrepreneurships, including
native businesses, so long as the income-producing nature of the
project can be verified and contractually assured under Project Fi-
nancing concepts.33
As a conclusion, Section 4 raises the need for reflection and fur-
ther reassessment of the current patterns, including the following
32 Although the post-Enron federal legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15
and 18 U.S.C.), has changed the requirements for the reporting of "off-balance
sheet" transactions for the protection of the investing public, the new law does not
change the principal characteristic of Project Financing-that "Project Financed"
loans are non-recourse and, hence, help shield the borrower and its corporate as-
sets from collateral risks or otherwise from contractual obligations beyond project
tasks and revenues.
33 The potential harm of one important benefit of Project Financing, the "off-
balance sheet" treatment of debts popularly enjoyed by corporate project sponsors
in the past decades, may have incidentally been lessened or corrected by the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002. Id.
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recommendations: 34
(1) The role played by MNC counsel, IBT lawyers and execu-
tives in the shaping of global economic development should be ex-
amined and reassessed. Even transactional lawyers should be
made keenly cognizant of their role, not only as zealous counsel
advancing the interest of their clients, but also as members of an
international legal community advocating an "international rule-
of-law" system built upon "general principles of law common to the
major legal systems of the world,"35 or "the general principles of law rec-
ognized by civilized nations."36 This concept should expressly be
34 Further development of these recommendations is reserved for subsequent
articles after this twin series.
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(1)(c), (4) (2004)
("[Dlerivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world"
constitutes a "source" of the rule of international law (the "doctrine of sources");
"General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or re-
flected in customary law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary
rules of international law where appropriate") (emphasis added).
36 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). While legal
norms representing the consensus of "civilized nations" as both "source" and
"evidence" of customary international law are well-rooted in modern interna-
tional jurisprudence, the danger of legal favoritism toward Anglo-American juris-
prudence should be guarded against. This has caused divergence in the North-
South dialogue. Cf., e.g., RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., LAW AND FINANCE (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5661, 1996) (examining legal rules covering
protection of corporate shareholders and creditors and the quality of enforcement
in forty-nine countries), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ w5661 (last
visited Nov. 21, 2004); Rudi Dornbusch, Check the Laws Before you Invest Abroad,
Bus. WEEK, Oct. 28, 1996, at 34 (discussing report published by the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research characterizing the world's legal traditions into two
major systems: Anglo-American common law and French civil law; concluding
that the rest of nations followed either of the two major systems as a result of co-
lonialism. This conclusion ignores the hybrid nature of the legal systems of the
diverse developing world, as well as their own native legal heritage, and, in par-
ticular, omits traditional Islamic Law (the Shari'a)). NOELJ. COULSON, COMMERCIAL
LAW IN THE GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION (1984); S.E. RAYNER, THE
THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW (1991); see also PARVIZ OWStA, FORMATION OF
CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY UNDER ENGLISH, FRENCH, ISLAMIC AND IRANIAN
LAW (1994); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW: THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW (Tony Weir trans., North-Holland Publ'g
Co. 1977). The diversity of legal and cultural traditions among the developing
economies should receive recognition, and the approach universally accepted by
modern anthropologists- that cultural diversity and cultural relativism contrib-
utes to the study of normative and prescriptive behaviors -should become part of
the foundation for international law. See, e.g., MARGARET MEAD, AND KEEP YOUR
POWDER DRY: AN ANTHROPOLOGIST LOOKS AT AMERICA (1942) (looking at American
society and its changes over the years); MARGARET MEAD ET AL., A WAY OF SEEING
(1970) (looking at society in a different cultural light); MARGARET MEAD, COMING
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added to various state bar codes of professional responsibility to
reflect and meet the demand of a global economy. The imposition
of this "double hat" function upon international corporate counsel
and IBT lawyers -both as zealous advocate and as watchdog of the
public interest-has legal support because: (i) in most national le-
gal systems, the doctrine of social responsibility has helped write
public interest concerns directly into the role of profit-making cor-
porations; 37 and (ii) in modem societies governed by the rule of
law such as the United States, lawyers are often described as "offi-
cers of the court." 38 Correspondingly, the IBT lawyer, regardless of
her transactional specialty or employment, should be considered a
member of the global legal community- a community guided and
inspired by the rule of law recognized by "civilized nations."39
OF AGE IN SAMOA: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF PRIMITIVE YOUTH FOR WESTERN
CIVILIZATION (1928) (studying Samoan adolescents); MARGARET MEAD, NEW LIVES
AND OLD: CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION-MANUS, 1928-1953 (1956) (following societal
changes in New Guinea); MARGARET MEAD & RHODA M9TRAUX, WORLD ENOUGH:
RETHINKING THE FUTURE (1975) (examining the future by looking at society's past);
THE STUDY OF CULTURE AT A DISTANCE (1953) (Margaret Mead & Rhoda M~traux
eds., 1953) (studying various cultures through media and focus groups).
The incorporation of multiculturalism into customary international law com-
ports with the emerging trend to reassess "development" as an economic, politi-
cal, legal, and cultural concept. For example, the European Union has vowed to
promote "the [African, Caribbean and Pacific States' ("ACPs")] efforts to achieve
self-reliant and self-sustained development based on ... social values, their human
capacities, their natural resources and their economic potential .... " The Fourth
ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990) [hereinafter
Lome Convention] (emphasis added). The Lom( Convention is an agreement
based on "a residual sense of responsibility for the colonial past," intended to aid
the evolution of former dependent territories into the world economy. See Chal-
lenges and Options for a New Partnership: Green Paper on Relations Between the
European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century from the
Commission to the European Council, COM(96)570 final (aiming to "pave the
way" for dialogue between those concerned with the expiry of the Lom6 Conven-
tion) at http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/1-vert/lv_
en.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004 ). Now, it is a question of whether this com-
mitment is merely lip service or may lead to negative consequences notwithstand-
ing the best intentions.
37 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, § 3.02(13) (2002) (empowering corporations
to "make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educa-
tional purposes"); see also A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
38 See Wendy N. Duong, Partnerships With Monarchs - Two Case Studies: Case
Two: Partnerships With Monarchs in the Development of Natural Resources: Dissecting
an International Power Project and Re-evaluating the Role of Multilateral and Project
Financing in the International Energy Sector, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. (forthcoming
Spring 2005) (manuscript n. 406, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Jour-
nal of International Economic Law).
39 See LA PORTA, supra note 36 (discussing the general principles of law recog-
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(2) The regulation of MNCs' global conduct should be initiated
by the national jurisdiction where the MNC is incorporated and
headquartered, by way of "enforced self-regulation" or "manage-
ment-based regulation," a regulatory model that compels the regu-
lated entities to improve or disclose their internal management to
achieve public goals.40 Mandatory periodic disclosure of voluntary
corporate compliance policies and programs, which should include
multiculturalism training for international executives and lawyers,
should be part of this regulatory model.
(3) Existing legal principles common to "civilized nations" that
can serve a prophylactic function against corporate ills such as fi-
duciary duties, third-party beneficiaries, the principal-agency rela-
tionship, and the public trust doctrine in property law should for-
mally be injected into modem international economic law and
implemented through the existing mechanism of real-life com-
merce. In order to achieve this goal, practical modifications to the
negotiation and dispute resolution of publicly or quasi-publicly fi-
nanced international contracts should be considered and imple-
mented. The voices of independent public interest and advocacy
groups and Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") should
be injected into the negotiation and dispute solution process. This
is what I call "a public-interest approach" to the formation and in-
terpretation of investment contracts between MNCs and "Third
World" governments, in which property of the "people" is imme-
diately at stake.
2. NEGOTIATING WITH THE "MONARCH" - A TYPICAL SCENARIO
The following real-life scenario, constructed based on public in-
formation,41 is used as a hypothetical to set the stage for discussion
nized by civilized nations).
40 MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM
(2002); John Braithwaite, Enforce Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime
Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1467-74 (1982); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer,
Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public
Goals, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 691, 704 (2003); Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, In-
dustry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 LAW & POL'Y 363, 363-66
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613-18 (1999); see also Ronald Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 1-44 (1960).
41 See, e.g., R. THOMAS COLLINS, JR., BLUE DRAGON: RECKONING IN THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA (2002) (describing the effort by Mobil Oil Corporation to return to




and to provide the context for legal analysis. All names of private
parties have been omitted.
2.1. The Case of Vietnam and the Petroleum Sector
In the heat and humidity of an April day in Hanoi, the dancing
tropical sunshine in the courtyard of the Defense Guesthouse com-
plemented the spirit of festivity. It was a special day for PetroViet-
nam, the state-owned oil company of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, which had approval authority over all petroleum-related
investment projects in the country. PetroVietnam's chairman re-
ported directly to the prime minister.42 In a deal-closing ceremony
to take place that evening, PetroVietnam would officially be grant-
ing a U.S.-based IOGC exploration rights in a Contract Area off the
Vietnamese coast (the "Vietnam Deal"). 43
For the first time in Hanoi, the national flags of the United
States, Russia, Japan, and Vietnam stood together, forming the
backdrop for the signing table. (Historically, the United States
used to be at war with North Vietnam, Japan used to occupy Viet-
nam, and the Soviet Union was North Vietnam's ally in its war
against the United States.) Ironically, nineteen years ago, it was
also during an April afternoon that U.S. ambassador Graham Mar-
tin escaped Vietnam on the last helicopter out, carrying with him
the folded American flag, leaving behind broken ideals and the de-
spair of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese collaborators
facing the prospect of communist "reeducation" camps.44 Almost
twenty years had passed since then, but in April, 1994, no U.S. am-
42 Luat Dau Khi [Petroleum Law] (1993) (Vietnam); see also PetroVietnam,
About Us (describing the company's history and activities), at http://www.pidc.
com.vn/about-org.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
43 As of Jan. 2002, Vietnam reportedly has oil-proved reserves of 1.4 billion
barrels per day, and natural gas reserves of 1.3 billion per cubic meter. CIA, Viet-
nam, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/print/vm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). Vietnam has no refinery.
Accordingly, although it exports Crude Oil in volumes as high as nine million
tons, it also imports processed oil products in volumes as high as 9.5 million tons.
The import value of oil and gas products was estimated at $1 billion for 1997.
Plans for refinery constructions are aimed for the early part of the twenty-first
century. See STAT-USA, Market Research Reports (providing links to various coun-
tries' research reports), at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/dd75600e.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2004).
44 See FRANK SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL: AN INSIDER'S AccouNT OF SAIGON'S
INDECENT END (1977) (describing the fall of Saigon from the perspective of a CIA
analyst assigned to Vietnam).
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bassador to Vietnam had been appointed. Under the Reagan-Bush
"roadmap" policy,45 the United States and Vietnam had not even
normalized diplomatic relations. President Clinton had just lifted
the trade embargo, once implemented against Vietnam under the
Trading With The Enemy Act.46 For the deal-closing ceremony, the
display of national flags was PetroVietnam's choice of a symbolic
gesture, representing the mutual economic interests that served to
alleviate old-time hostility. Vestiges of that prolonged, notoriously
devastating war between the United States and communist North
Vietnam, once making international headlines daily, was surely a
creature of the past.
In 1994, Vietnam was looking forward to its 10 year anniver-
sary of "Doi Moi" ("Renovation"), a market economic policy para-
doxically implemented under a Leninist, single-party political
structure. Heated territorial disputes spearheaded by China over
the Spratley Islands were looming over Vietnam's sovereignty
claims to deep-water offshore drilling projects in the South China
Sea. Yet, the political tension in the region had not deterred IOGCs
from pouring their technology and capital into the Vietnamese con-
tinental shelf.47 For three reasons, the deal had great significance to
45 See ROBERT G. SUTiTER, VIETNAM-U.S. RELATIONS: THE DEBATE OVER
NORMALIZATION, CRS Issue Brief, May 12, 1992 (The "roadmap" policy used a
"phased-in" approach and conditioned normalization of diplomatic relations with
Vietnam on step-by-step accomplishments, among which was the resolution of
various MIA (veterans Missing-In-Action) issues.)
46 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1. The initial embargo against communist North Viet-
nam was entered into in 1954. In 1975, President Ford issued another embargo
against South Vietnam under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
50 U.S.C. § 1701, following the fall of Saigon.
47 To date, the territorial dispute over the groups of islands in the South
China Sea has never been resolved, although claimants signed the "Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," a mechanism to ease tension yet
falling short of a code of conduct. CIA, Vietnam, supra note 43; see also Jonathan I.
Charney, Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 724 (1995) (discussing three developments that have impacted maritime
boundary delimitation in Central East Asia); Wendy Duong, The Long Saga of the
Spratlys Island: An Overview of the Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea Among
Vietnam, China, and other ASEAN Nations, 13 TEx. TRANSNAT'L L.Q. 56 (Nov. 1997)
(discussing various legal theories underlying territorial disputes over the Sprat-
lys); Brian K. Murphy, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and International Law,
1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 187 (1995) (analyzing arguments made by six states
claiming ownership of the Spratlys). The oil-related South China Sea disputes
have spanned over two decades, involving not only the interest of the ASEAN na-
tions, but also of more economically powerful states such as China and Japan. See
Henry Scott Stokes, Oil Riches Off China's Shores, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1982 at D1
(detailing oil disputes in the South China Sea).
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Vietnam, both figuratively and economically. First, the exploration
Block was named after a Vietnamese folktale about a holy dragon
reigning in the South China Sea, representing the forefather of the
nation. Second, the deal, closed immediately after the United
States' lifting of the trade embargo, could be construed as Viet-
nam's welcome-back gesture for U.S. companies. Third, the deal
supposedly benefited the "people," who, under the Vietnamese
Constitution, 48 collectively owned all land, sea surfaces, minerals,
and natural resources. PetroVietnam was simply an agent of the
Central Government,49 which constitutionally represented the
"people" of Vietnam.
The deal was equally significant to the IOGC, not only for
profit-making reasons and successful financial engineering, but
also for historical pride and perhaps even institutional nostalgia.
One reason why the private sector is not deterred by territorial disputes is the
relative success of the "Joint Development Zone" ("JDZ") as a method of resolv-
ing sovereign claims over competing economic interests. See, e.g., Ernst Willheim,
Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint Development
Zone in the 'Timor Gap', 29 NAT. RES. J. 821 (1989) (outlining background to
boundary negotiations and identifying issues that need to be addressed); see also
Stokes, supra note 47, at D1. The JDZ concept allows private investors to develop
the Contract Area economically, and then bring all sovereign interests together to
negotiate joint use or sharing in production. This technique has been used to settle
boundary disputes between Australia and Indonesia, Libya and Tunisia, North
Yemen and South Yemen, Thailand and Malaysia, and others. David M. Ong,
Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: "Mere" State Practice or
Customary International Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 771 (1999) (addressing techniques
used to resolve boundary disputes over petroleum); Symposium, Energy and In-
ternational Law: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, 36 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1 (2001)
(looking at the legal disputes over petroleum and other energy sources). In par-
ticular, the Timor Gap dispute between East Timor, Indonesia, Australia, and Por-
tugal has recently been resolved politically, with the United Nations recognizing
East Timor as an independent state. See, e.g., Treaty Between Australia and the
Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indone-
sian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Dec. 11, 1989, Austl.-Indon.,
1999 Aust. T.S. No. 10 (entered into force July 17, 1999); see also S.C. Res. 1392,
U.N. SCOR, 4463rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1392 (2002); Kym P. Livesley, The
Timor Gap Treaty, 90 ENERGY L. 61 (1990); Tania Voon, Closing the Gap Between Le-
gitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kos-
ovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 31, 52-58 (2002).
48 VIETNAM CONST. pmbl., art. 17, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/
documents/ VN-cons.htm.
49 Petroleum Law (1993) (Vietnam) (designating PetroVietnam as a state-
owned oil company); Wendy N. Duong, Overview of the Institutional and Legal
Framework, the Petroleum Law, and Relevant Matters in the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam (1993) (unpublished country report written for Mobil E. Exploration &
Dev. Inc., on file with author, released with client's permission).
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In 1994, the IOGC was returning to Vietnam, only to claim the fruit
of its work by resuming what it had started nineteen years ago.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the IOGC had purchased seismic
data gathered on the continental shelf offshore South Vietnam and
had begun interpretation. In the spring of 1973, South Vietnam in-
vited the IOGC and some twenty-six other oil companies to submit
bids on some thirty offshore Blocks. In June 1973, the IOGC was
awarded exploration rights on two of the thirty Blocks. By the end
of 1973, the IOGC had sold thirty percent of its interest to a Japa-
nese partner. This U.S.-Japan joint venture was awarded more
Blocks in February 1974, and continued to "farm out" its interest to
other international partners. Just before Christmas of 1974, the
well reached its target depth, and the IOGC declared an oil discov-
ery. But things were changing drastically in South Vietnam back
then. In March 1975, the North Vietnamese army was mobilized to
advance along the Ho Chi Minh Trail toward Saigon. On April 30,
1975, a North Vietnamese tank crashed through South Vietnam's
Presidential Palace in the heart of Saigon, ending the two-decade
war. The IOGC's expatriate staff had barely had time to copy
seismic data surveys and well logs, to suspend drilling operations,
and then to sail the drilling ship to Thailand. The IOGC's oil dis-
covery later became the property of a joint venture between the
new Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The U.S. oil and gas giant had
lost the fruit of its work to the Soviets.50
But things changed again, and in 1994, the IOGC was begin-
ning a new chapter of commerce with the same government that
had chased it out of Vietnamese waters some nineteen years ago.
By virtue of a PSC, the IOGC would be conducting petroleum ex-
ploration as a contractor of the Socialist Republic's Central Gov-
ernment. For its technological Work Programs, advancement of
costs, and investment in the country's subsoil, the IOGC would be
compensated by way of a share in the production of the resources
found. In this "Production Sharing" scheme, PetroVietnam (as the
government's agent) would be receiving the "people's" share of
the oil, and the sales proceeds of such oil share would supposedly
be used for the "people's" good. Yet, outside Vietnam, various
Vietnamese-American activists and the handful of NGOs advocat-
ing liberal democracy in East and Southeast Asia5' had focused on
50 COLLINS, supra note 41, at 21-23.
51 For reports on political oppression in East Asian and Southeast Asian
countries, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, at http://
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Vietnam's poor human rights record, although the country had
signed on to the majority of the U.N. human rights conventions.
52
The indirect implication of their allegations was that perhaps the
billions of "Third World" inhabitants were often disregarded in
these commercial deals. While such public outcries arguably may
create a "shaming" or "moral stigmatization" effect and, hence,
may contribute to shareholder activism movements 53 or scholarly
web.amnesty.org/report2003/Mys-summary-eng (Malaysia) (last visited Nov. 15,
2004); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT http://web.amnesty.org/
report2003/Mmr-summary-eng (Myanmar) (last visited Nov. 15, 2004); AMNEsTY
INTERNATIONAL, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Vnm-
summary-eng (Vietnam) (last visited Nov. 15, 2004); AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL,
2003 ANNUAL REPORT http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Lao-sunmary-eng
(Laos) (last visited Nov. 15, 2004); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT
http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Chn-summary-eng (China) (last visited
Nov. 15, 2004). See also CNN.com, Rights Group Says Vietnam Repressing Religious
Freedoms, Nov. 14, 2000 (discussing Freedom House's discovery of Vietnamese
documents revealing the suppression of growing Christian movements in
Vietnam), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/southeast/11/
13/vietnam.religion/index.html; NewsMax.com, Stress Vietnam Rights, Clinton
Told, Nov. 10, 2000 (quoting Human Rights Watch on Vietnam's arrests and
imprisonment of political and religious dissidents), at http://www.newsmax.
com/archives/articles/2000/11/10/91827.shtml.
52 Vietnam has become a signatory to eight U.N. human rights conventions.
See Wendy N. Duong, Gender Equality and Women's Issues in Vietnam:: The Vietnam-
ese Woman-Warrior and Poet, 10 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 191, 222 (2001) (listing U.N.
human rights conventions signed by Vietnam).
53 As early as the 1970s, Georgetown law student shareholders of General
Motors, aided by their corporate law professor, submitted extensive shareholder
proposals to the giant corporation. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social
Responsibility Redux, 76 TuL. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (2001-2002) (discussing Power-to-
the-People initiatives and the expanded use of shareholder proxy proposals and
public interest directors); Janis Sarra, Convergence Versus Divergence, Global Corpo-
rate Governance at the Crossroads: Governance Norms, Capital Markets & OECD Prin-
ciples for Corporate Governance, 33 OTTAWA L. REV. 177 (2002) (observing the emer-
gence of shareholder activism in various developed jurisdictions beyond the U.S.
traditional "shareholder paradigm" of wealth maximization); see also SEC Orders
Review to Identify Changes to Shareholder Proposal Rules, BNA CORP. COUNS. WKLY.,
Apr. 23, 2003, at 129 (explaining an SEC proposal to change proxy regulations);
SEC Proposes Groundbreaking Rules on Shareholder Nomination of Directors, BNA
CORP. CouNs. WKLY., Oct. 15, 2003 (explaining that the SEC proposed rule allows
shareholders to make nominations for directorship); Securities Regulation & Law
Report, SEC Proposes Groundbreaking Rules on Shareholder Nomination of Directors,
Oct. 13, 2003 (discussing further SEC rule proposals to give shareholders greater
participation), at http:/ /corplawcenter.bna.com/pic2/clb.nsf/id/BNAP-5S6U8Q?
OpenDocument&PrintVersion=Yes&Click=. For the final SEC rule on shareholder
proposals, see Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-40018, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/34-40018.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). See also Engle, supra note 24,
at 103; Martha McNeil Hamilton, Player in the Proxy Wars; HP-Compaq Merger Has
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literatures debating corporate social responsibility in the IOGC's
home base,54 such shaming or stigmatization hardly impacts the
negotiation between "Third World" governments and MNCs,
which quite often take place in faraway lands, conveniently tucked
away from the American collective conscience.55 In those faraway
lands, freedom of speech, freedom of information, and freedom of
choice can be luxuries rather than a matter of right.56
On the other hand, those who believe in government-private
sector partnerships as free enterprise's solution to global economic
development may take a different stance. In the Vietnam Deal, if
petroleum was found, a long-term relationship between the IOGC
and the "people" would commence, creating jobs, stimulating the
Vietnamese economy, and eventually raising citizens' standards of
living via the creation of a healthy middle class. It is hoped that
this middle class will cry out for a taste of liberal democracy, which
will ultimately result in campaigns for political freedom, forcing
the single-party state to change. If no petroleum in commercial
quantity was found during the term of the PSC, the IOGC could
withdraw from the country and write off its loss, and the question
would become whether the interests of the other group of "people"
across the ocean, the IOGC's shareholders, would have been
served by such an unprofitable business endeavor.
From both a business and policy perspective, the poor people
Brought a Shareholder-Services Firm Out of Obscurity, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2002, at
El; Alan MacDougall, Shareholder Activism Needs Support of a Public Body, FIN.
TIMES, May 6, 2002, at 6; What Price Merger?, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at A36.
54 Stephens, supra note 9, at 45; Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Respon-
sibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 705 (2002); see also
Andrew Van Alstyne, Al Gedicks' Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and
Oil Corporations, 15 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 862 (2002) (book review) (explaining
the relationship between free trade and economic repression); Westfield, supra
note 9, at 1075 (considering the human rights impact of multinational enterprises'
conduct and suggestions to inject human rights concerns into MNCs' agendas);
Branson, supra note 53. But see Morton Winston, NGO Strategies for Promoting Cor-
porate Responsibility, 16 ETHICS AND INT'L AFF. 71, 86 (2002) ("NGOs cannot really
force corporations to do anything and their attempts to influence corporate behav-
ior by means of any combination of strategies and tactics are unlikely to be suc-
cessful in the long run unless they are able to mobilize two other important con-
stituencies: consumers and governments.").
55 JESWALD SYLACUSE, MAKING GLOBAL DEALS: NEGOTIATING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE (1991); Baker, supra note 9.
56 Vietnam's 1992 Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, but only "in
accordance with the provisions of law." It protects religious freedom, but also de-
clares that no one "can misuse beliefs and religions to contravene the law and
State policies." VIETNAM CONST. arts. 17, 68-70.
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of the host country may be sitting over possible petroleum reserves
worth billions, while having no technology or capital to develop
them. They need the IOGC's technology, know-how, and capital,
which, if properly used, would lead to a more equitable distribu-
tion of energy resources, and hopefully a better life for "Third
World" inhabitants. Since IOGCs are in the business of looking for
petroleum reserves, their investor-shareholders bear the invest-
ment risks inherent in share ownership, should IOGCs hit "dry
holes" 57 during exploration expeditions. The standard of conduct,
therefore, should be whether the IGC duly complies with Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Standards and Practices
("GAAS/GAAP") in the proper disclosure of their material FDI.
Sophisticated disclosure legal regimes such as U.S. federal securi-
ties laws (as strengthened by the post-Enron Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002) should adequately safeguard the interest of the IOGC's
shareholder public.58
Parties to the Vietnam Deal considered it a phenomenal suc-
cess. The IOGC and PetroVietnam closed the deal worth almost
hundreds of millions of dollars in record time. The IOGC even
successfully brought into the deal the Russians and the Japanese to
share investment risks, 59 and to satisfy the political agenda of the
Vietnamese Communist Party's Politburo. Since the deep-water
Block was adjacent to the waters subject to sovereignty disputes
among China and the ASEAN nations, Vietnam naturally desired
to position, in the Contract Area, the most impressive cast of char-
acters representing powerful international interests. The deal was
accomplished under the most extenuating and difficult circum-
stances because of geographical, cultural, linguistic, and political
differences. For example, Vietnam had a history of warfare and
revolutions. Its legal system was either in disarray or at best primi-
tive.60 The IOGC's behind-the-scenes counterparts from the host
57 "Dry holes" is a colloquial expression in the oil and gas industry, referring
to unsuccessful exploration endeavors. See Duong, supra note 47 (discussing "dry
hole" as a real politik solution to offshore territorial disputes spurred by oil and gas
exploration activities).
58 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.); BNA CORP. COUNS. WKLY., Sept. 17, 2003,
at 281-288 (reporting on SEC comments emphasizing the need for accurate Man-
agement Discussion and Analysis and textual disclosure to accompany corporate
financial statements in post-Enron era).
59 The non-U.S. interests were represented and publicly announced at the
closing ceremony for the Vietnam Deal in Hanoi, 1994. COLLINS, supra note 41.
60 Edward R. J. Neunnuebel, Vietnam: An American Lawyer's Perspective, in
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country were die-hard former revolutionary leaders and Party
members indoctrinated in the ABCs of Leninism. In the words of a
senior international lawyer representing an IOGC, his client might
successfully have negotiated with a new form of post-Cold War
"monarchy."61
2.2. Mapping the Scenery: The "Monarchs" of the Twentieth and
Twenty-First Centuries
In the case of Vietnam, the new monarch is the Politburo, the
real ruler of the nation, viewed by Vietnamese-American activists
as a nucleus of highly ranked party members not necessarily moti-
vated by free enterprise or liberal democracy as those concepts are
understood in Western political philosophy.62 In the words of an-
other IOGC executive, the "people" of Vietnam may "deserve a
better government,"63 but age-old sovereign power and the sanc-
tity of "statehood" conceptually rooted in customary international
law 64 preclude outsiders or other nations from intervening in the
country's political processes. 65 The country's populace, on the
VIETNAM L. YEARBOOK 1995, at 21 (Stuart Allen ed., 1995); Mark Sidel, Law Reform
in Vietnam: The Complex Transition from Socialist and Soviet Models in Legal Scholar-
ship and Training, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 221 (1993).
61 Maryan, supra note 19.
62 Vietnamese activists in exile claim that communist indoctrination, perva-
sive misuse of justice, corruption, and political oppression pose obstacles to the
development of a truly free enterprise system responsive to market forces, thereby
impeding Vietnam's growth. VIETNAM DAN CHu [DEMOCRACY FOR VIETNAM], Sept.
2003; compare Pham Van Thuyet, Legal Framework and Private Sector Development in
Transitional Economies: The Case of Vietnam, 27 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 541 (1996) (ad-
dressing the process and implementation of a market economy in Vietnam).
63 Interview with former Vice President for Negotiation, Texaco International
(Sept. 2000) (on file with author).
64 Under international law, a nation-state is created upon the existence of
three elements: 1) territory, 2) people, and 3) government. NEIL C. BLOND ET AL.,
BLOND'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (John Marafino ed., 1991); see also CHARTER OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361,
119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6487, 721 U.N.T.S. 324 (recog-
nizing that the purpose of the Protocol was to strengthen these three elements);
Inter-American Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 3 Bevans 145 [hereinafter Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States] (enumerating qualities of nation-state);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (Tentative Final Draft
1985); L'Institut de Droit International, at http://www.idi-iil.org (explaining no-
tions of nation-states affirmed in dispute resolution and other processes) (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2004).
65 Modern international jurisprudence outlaws territorial conquest or the use
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other hand, has shown much yearning for the United States' afflu-
ence and laissez-faire spirit. Any anti-Americanism attributed to
the "people" of Vietnam as the aftermath of war was at best an un-
substantiated myth. In 2000, the Clintons' entourage to Vietnam
was enthusiastically received as a highlight of Vietnamese modem
life, especially among youths.66
of force to invade a nation for economic gains or to control its political processes.
The coming into force of the U.N. Charter made illegal the acquisition of territo-
rial title by military conquest. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States, supra note 64; LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 101, at 87-88 (1932), re-
printed in DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1932, at 284-86 (John W.
Wheeler-Bennett ed., 1933); Churchill, supra note 12, at 680-86 (2002); Identic
Notes from Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of State, to the Chinese and Japanese
Governments (January 8, 1932), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 1932, supra, at 262 (announcing the Stimson Doctrine, a policy of non-
recognition of title to territory seized by armed force); see also ROBERT LANGER,
SEIZURE OF TERRITORY: THE STIMSON DOCTRIJE AND RELATED PRINCIPLES IN LEGAL
THEORY AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (1947) (explaining the right to the use of force
in history); GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 367-76 (6th ed. 1992) (discussing the illegality of in-
voluntary cession of territory by conquest); Allan Gerson, War, Conquered Terri-
tory, and Military Occupation in the Contemporary International Legal System, 18
HARV. INT'L L. J. 525 (1977) (addressing the past realities of conquered territory).
66 See, e.g., Chan Tran, The Meaning of President Clinton's Trip to Vietnam, 5
HARV. ASIA Q., (2001) (remembering Clinton as U.S. president who reached out to
Vietnam); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Analysis; Clinton Witnesses Two Sides of Vietnam;
Leaders Indifferent, Youth Enthusiastic, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2000, at All (reporting
public reactions to Clinton's visit); CNN.com, Clinton Makes Groundbreaking Viet-
nam Speech, Nov. 17, 2000 (reporting public reactions to Clinton's speech in Viet-
nam), available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/east/11/17/clinton
.vietnam; CNN.com, Tumultuous Crowd Welcomes Clinton to Hanoi, Nov. 17, 2000
(assessing Vietnamese crowds awaiting Clinton's visit and speech), available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/southeast/11/16/clinton.vietnam.02;
Jodi Enda, In Vietnam, Clinton Straddles Painful Past, Hopeful Future, KANS. CITY
STAR, Nov. 17, 2000 (citing Clinton publicly commenting on Vietnam War in
Vietnam), available at http://www.kcstar.com/item/pages/home.patlocal/
3774ed5a.b17,.html; Ilene R. Prusher, Good Morning, Vietnam, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 17, 2000 (assessing the mood of Vietnam on day of Clinton's
speech), available at http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?/durable/
2000/11/17/pls2.htm; Alejandro Reyes, From Our Correspondent: After the Visit,
ASIA WK., Nov. 21, 2000 (assessing effects of Clinton's visit to Vietnam), available at
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/foc/ 11/22/.
The following anecdote exemplified the Vietnamese public's indifference to
past war matters and their lack of any harbored anti-American sentiments. Dur-
ing my business travels in Asia in the mid-1990s, I interviewed, at random, Viet-
namese villagers in the outskirts of Hanoi and peddlers in the inner-city
neighborhoods of Ho Chi Minh City. All interviewees could not tell the differ-
ence between France, America, Cuba, and Russia. All these countries were
lumped together in the generic label of "West" (local term: "Tay"). The opposite
of "West" is not "East," but "Us" (local term: "Ta"). "West" or "Tay" also in-
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Perhaps the "monarch" analogy is especially appropriate for
Vietnam because, notwithstanding the population's earnest zeal
and healthy appetite for freedom and entrepreneurship, 67 the Viet-
namese Communist Party holds on to its political supremacy, its
exclusive state ownership over key industrial and economic sec-
tors, as well as the licensing authority of its bureaucracy, generally
criticized as corrupt and ineffective. 68 According to Vietnamese-
American activists, the fruits of FDI projects in Vietnam serve the
self-interest and political agenda of the Politburo or government-
connected elitists, unchecked by principles of liberal democracy or
sound macroeconomic management.69 The effect of FDI has not
sufficiently "trickled" down to the mass public despite economic
reform, thereby widening the gap between those elites and the
poor public, occasioning even more seeds for discontentment and
disintegration of the social fabric. If this is empirically true, the
cluded Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. When asked whether they considered me a
"West" (Tay) or an "Us" (Ta), the interviewees replied that I was probably a
"West" although I was Asian and spoke the local language fluently. China was
neither "West" nor "Us," but was referred to as "China" in the local language (lit-
eral translation for the word "China" in the local language: "Center of the Uni-
verse"). The North Vietnamese villagers had a vague understanding that Amer-
ica, rather than "West," once bombed North Vietnam. The South Vietnamese
peddlers, however, had some intellectual distinction between America and
France, and enthusiastically claimed that they once were "friends" with, worked
for, serviced, or knew someone in America.
67 See, e.g., Pham Van Thuyet, supra note 62.
68 See Duong, supra note 52, at 295-96 (discussing corruption and the ineffec-
tiveness of law in Vietnam, together with oppression in the form of banning dissi-
dent fiction); see also supra note 15 (discussing corruption in "Third World" coun-
tries).
69 MNCs' "entanglement" with repressive regimes for profit-making in infra-
structure development, security arrangements, labor utilization, or environ-
mental-impact projects has become the basis for a number of lawsuits brought by
inhabitants of the "Third World" in U.S. courts, thereby testing the limit of appli-
cable U.S. laws such as the Alien Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Doe I v. UNOCAL
Corp, 248 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2001); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226
F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, Inc. 157 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 1998); Doe I
v. UNOCAL Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Aguinda v. Tex-
aco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 2000 W.L. 122143 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000); Bowoto v.
Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Doe I v. UNOCAL
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Aquinda [sic] v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp.
625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
11, 1994); Bennett Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, Remarks to the Third Warwick Corporate Citizenship
Conference (July 10, 2000); see also Doe I v. UNOCAL Corp., No. 00-56603, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept.18, 2002) (status of the Doe decision in the 9th
Circuit).
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utility of free enterprise and government-MNC partnerships as ve-
hicles to prosperity and liberal democracy appears to be just a no-
tion of idealism. In this pessimistic view, even goals of the multi-
lateral General Agreement on Trade and Tariff ("GATT") and its
WTO framework can be a fallacy, although these multilateral sys-
tems are symbols of free trade,70 a concept supported by David Ri-
cardo's "comparative advantage" economic theory.71 Viewed this
way, the government-private sector partnership is simply a bridge
to legitimize the return of colonialism.
72
70 See, e.g., Press Release, WTO, Renato Ruggiero, Director General of the
WTO, Managing a World of Free Trade and Deep Interdependence (Sept. 10,
1996) (addressing challenges to free trade).
71 See, e.g., Gray & Jarosz, supra note 4 (relating David Ricardo's "comparative
advantage" theory to trade context, and contrasting it to investment context); see
also DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1911)
(critiquing advocation of free trade policies for Europe).
72 See, e.g., JOSHUA KARLINER, THE CORPORATE PLANT: ECOLOGY AND POLITICS IN
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 221 (1997) (considering measures to control MNCs);
Raj Bhala, Assessing the Modern Era of International Trade, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1647 (1998) (book review); McAdams, supra note 3, at 249 (noting that the North-
South division suggests to critics the re-emergence of colonialism).
Even in the past era of colonialism, when conquest was the accepted mode of
territory annexation, nation-states still observed the display of sovereign powers
and protocols, at least as lip service in diplomatic relations. For example, territo-
rial accession by the weaker countries was still the result of formal treaties. More-
over, as in the case of Vietnam, colonialism was viewed by France as a "civiliza-
tion mission" ("mission civilisatrice") and France's occupation of Vietnam
illustrated the well-intentioned extension of sovereign power by France. See, e.g.,
Ho TAM HUE TAI, RADICALISM AND THE ORIGIN OF THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION
(1992); NGUYEN VAN TRUNG, CHU NGHIA THUC DAN PHAP 0 VIET-NAM: THUC CHAT
VA HUYEN THOAI [FRENCH COLONIALISM IN VIETNAM: TRUTHS AND MYTHS] (1963);
Duong, supra note 52, at 313; Vinh Sinh & Nicholas Wickenden, Phan Boi Chau and
His Autobiography, VIETNAM REV., Autumn-Winter 1996, at 206. During the years
that preceded the negotiation of the 1884 Patenotre Treaty, which solidified
French colonialism in Vietnam, a Vietnamese envoy was dispatched by the King
of Vietnam to Paris, during which proceeding the Emperor of France was quoted
as stating to the Vietnamese mandarins who led the envoy: "La France est beinveil-
lante pour toutes les nations et proteger des faibles, mais ceuz qui l'entravent dans sa
marche ont a craidre sa severite!" [Translation by Colonel Aubaret: "France is com-
passionate toward all nations and toward the protection of the weak, but those who stand
in the way of France's marche will know the severity of its action."] See NGUYEN XUAN
THO, LES DEBUTS DE L'INSTALLATION DU SYSTtME COLONIAL FRANCAIS AU VIETNAM
(1858-1897), at 413-462 (2002); DEMOCRACY FOR VIETNAM, supra note 62 (recounting
notes from the personal collections of certain descendants of the last royal family
of Vietnam, which record the Nov. 5, 1863 proceedings in Paris); THE LITERATI OF
VIETNAM 100 (1969) (edition no longer in print, on file with author); see also SHAWN
FREDERICK MCHALE, PRINT AND POWER: CONFUCIANISM, COMMUNISM, AND
BUDDHISM IN THE MAKING OF MODERN VIETNAM (2003) (one of the latest titles as-
sessing Vietnamese culture and history against the influence of imported ideo-
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The image of the new or renewed "monarchy," however, does
not just apply to Vietnam. Whether the host country is a ravaged
country in the aftermath of war, a lesser-developed country ruled
by a dictatorship, or a formerly Marxist society ready to embrace
free enterprise, it is no surprise that host countries overall have
been reluctant to give up state control over natural resources and
in major industries such as the petroleum or energy sector. The
scarcity, potential, and impact of petroleum on a country affect the
core of its economic and political strength. Accordingly, govern-
ment ownership or control is typically the scenario facing an
IOGC, regardless of differences in national, political, or legal re-
gimes.
At the onset, to make certain that the forthcoming analysis is
not slanted with preconceived notions of corporate conduct, I will
premise my focus on the petroleum and energy sector on the fol-
lowing two observations:
(1) The political, economic, and business risks of petroleum and
energy projects abroad far exceed those associated with other ven-
tures. This is due to the following factors:
* Petroleum resources worldwide as well as in the United States
have declined, leaving the explorationist with little choice but
to reach out for potential reservoirs in certain parts of the
world plagued with both geological difficulties as well as dif-
ferences in legal and political systems.73
" An IOGC's investment in the petroleum and energy sector is
long-term, requiring decades of investment of cash, human
capital, and technology.
" Petroleum exploration and development is heavily influenced
by geopolitical factors. The existence of the Organization of Pe-
troleum-Exporting Countries ("OPEC") as an international oil-
producing cartel is an example of economic and political influ-
ences on the petroleum market. The international contractual
logical doctrines).
73 Known petroleum reserves are typically located in the Middle-East, the
North Sea, Africa, Latin America, Australia, Southeast Asia, and Canada.
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 44-148 (1998); Alan S.
Miller, Symposium on Clinton's New Land Policies: Energy Policy From Nixon to Clin-
ton: From Grand Provider to Market Facilitator, 25 ENVTL. L. 715 (1995); see also Sara
N. Pasquinelli, To Drill Or Not To Drill: The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge v. The
"Need" For U.S. Energy Independence, 33 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 503 (2003) (dis-
cussing the complexity of Artic drilling issues, from official agency positions to




mechanism has helped achieve a certain degree of stability in
the market notwithstanding these geopolitical dynamics. Thus,
the partnership between an IOGC and the host government is
not just a reality, but also a global economic necessity. The
concept of injecting public interest consideration or a global
watchdog function into these partnerships (other than through
the host government as allegedly representative of the "peo-
ple") presents the most challenging and perplexing task. Such
a task should take into account all interests and policy consid-
erations, and hence cannot be accomplished overnight.
(2) The human search for natural resources to better life is not a
phenomenon of modem technology. It is an age-old, ongoing en-
deavor rooted in world history. 74 This endeavor parallels techno-
logical progress, and transcends national borders because of the
natural geographical groupings of mankind. The United States,
because of its technological, economic, and political power, has be-
come the headquarters of several petroleum and energy multina-
tionals.75 The lawyer and the executive who handle cross-border
petroleum and energy transactions encounter legal and business
dynamics that are succinctly different from oil, gas, and mining ac-
tivities in the United States. In fact, in most petroleum-producing
countries, a constitutional framework based on the U.S. model of
rights may completely be alien (the Vietnam Deal is but one exam-
ple).76 The dissimilarities in legal systems and constitutional rights
models are so varied that any attempt to classify countries for such
a purpose may be fraught with error.77 I will use this as a caveat to
the following simplified typology, developed only to map the
74 James E. Horrigan, Foreign Natural Resource Investment, in 1 THE LAW OF
TRANSNATIONAL BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS VOL. 1 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1981).
75 Approximately ninety percent of all transnational corporations are head-
quartered in the northern hemisphere. KARLINER, supra note 72, at 6; McAdams,
supra note 3 at 249. Recent business trends include successful mergers between the
top integrated oil and gas companies, thereby concentrating economic powers in a
handful of giant MNC-IOGCs. Examples are mergers that created Texaco-
Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, and BP-Amoco. See Hamilton, supra note 17 (discussing
merger trends).
76 Under the Vietnamese Constitution, explicit in the provision of rights is the
imposition of citizens' duties owed to the State. See VIETNAM CONST. art. 51 ("The
citizens' rights are inseparable from his duties. The State guarantees the rights of
citizens; the citizen must fulfill his duties to the State and society."), available at
http://www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/learn/gov-constitution5.php
3. The clear
consequence of this constitutionally imposed "citizen's duty" is the sacrifice of
individual liberty for state interests, as declared by the government.
77 Horrigan, supra note 74, § 7.01.
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scenery for discussion.
2.3. Simplified Typology of Today's "Monarchs"
The following typology categorizes today's "monarchs," based
partly on their political structure, but primarily on the extent of
governmental power and involvement in the national petroleum or
energy sector. Since the degree and type of government involve-
ment is the principal factor to distinguish the following seven clas-
sifications, there may be overlaps among the groups. For example,
a developing country that exercises all types of ownership or con-
trol specified in this typology may fall under all of the seven
groups.
Group One: The Single-Party and "Marxist-Remnant" Dictator-
ships. (By "dictatorship," I am referring to the fact that the country
has only one political party, which is the ruling party; opposition is
prohibited.) This category consists of the remaining "gang-of-
four" nations that still adhere to Marxist ideology (Vietnam, China,
Cuba, and North Korea). 78 In these countries, the Communist
Party is the gatekeeper of the national economy, notwithstanding
any "open door" policy, economic reform, or investment incen-
tives. The degree of civil liberty oppression or governmental eco-
nomic domination varies, depending on the country or a particular
ruler in power.
Group Two: The "U.S.-Embargoed" and "Economically Sanctioned"
"Monarchs." This group may overlap with group one above, be-
cause Marxist countries such as Cuba and North Korea are offi-
cially on the United States' "economically sanctioned" list.79 This
group also includes countries such as Iran or Libya, sanctioned by
act of Congress, 0 and countries such as Sudan and Myanmar, sanc-
78 Out of those four nations, only Cuba and North Korea remain on the U.S.'s
embargo list. China has opened to the West since the 1970s after President
Nixon's visit to Beijing, and Vietnam followed China's example in 1985 with its
"Renovation" national economic policy and its 1987 Foreign Investment Law
modeled after China's original Foreign Investment Law. See, e.g., Luat Dau Tu
Nuoc Ngoai [Foreign Investment Law] (1987) (Vietnam); cf. New Investment Guide-
lines, NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, June 29, 1995.
79 See, e.g., Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2003) (regard-
ing Cuba); Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500 (2003) (regarding
North Korea).
80 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 Note (2000)); see also Exec. Order No.
12543, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1987); Exec. Order No. 12544, 3 C.F.R. 183 (1987) (blocking
Libyan government property in the United States); Libyan Sanctions Regulations,
1206 [Vol. 25:4
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tioned by Executive Orders.81 U.S.-based nationals and businesses
(and at times their owned or controlled foreign subsidiaries) 82 are
banned from economic relations with these countries (including
some countries in group one and all of group two). Some of the
United States' economic sanctions, such as the Cuba boycott, raise
unresolved questions challenging U.S. foreign policies.
83
Group Three: Modified Democracy: The Single-Party, So-Called
"Laissez Faire" Economies. This group of "monarchs" paradoxically
combine economic laissez-faire philosophy with a single-party,
non-Marxist political regime. One such example is Singapore,
which has long referred to its single-party political philosophy as
"modified or Asian-styled democracy."8 4 In Singapore, although
31 C.F.R. § 550 (2003) (prohibiting various imports to, exports from, and transac-
tions with Libya); Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61
Fed. Reg. 66,067 (Dec. 16, 1996) (promulgating sanctions on Iran and Libya).
81 With respect to Sudan, see Exec. Order No. 13,067, 31 C.F.R. § 538 (2003).
With respect to Myanmar, see Exec. Order No. 13,047, 31 C.F.R. § 537 (2003). For a
specific example of state ownership and control over the petroleum sector in a
country economically sanctioned by the United States, see SUDAN CONST. art. 9,
available at http://www.sudan.net/government/constitution/english.html.
82 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(3) (2003); see also
Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(1); Cuban Assets Con-
trol Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.204, 515.559(a)-(b) (2003).
83 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 730; see also Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, (codified
as amended in various sections of 22 U.S.C.); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (expressing Congressional intent regarding democ-
racy goals for Cuba); cf Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consis-
tent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (1996); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419 (1996); John W.
Smagula, Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving
the Stalemate, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 65 (1995).
84 Senior Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore is a proponent and ad-
vocate of Asian-style modified democracy. See Senior Prime Minister Lee Kwan
Yew, Democracy, Human Rights and the Realities, Speech to the Create 21 Asahi
Forum (Nov. 10, 1992), in 16 SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL SPEECHES (1993); see also Frank
Ching, Eye on Asia: Is UN Declaration Universal?, FAR. E. ECON. REV., Aug. 28, 1997,
available at 1997 WL-FEER 11441604. Lee Kuan Yew's approach to Singapore's po-
litical economy is economic determinism. The Cambridge-educated Senior Prime
Minister believes that a prospering economy and social order are the major com-
ponents for success, and he uses political authoritarianism to achieve this end re-
sult, trading off democracy or individual liberty for economic prosperity. See HAN
FOOK KWANG ET AL., LEE KUAN YEW: THE MAN AND HIS IDEAS (1998); LEE KUAN
YEW, THE SINGAPORE STORY: MEMOIRS OF LEE KUAN YEW (Times Editions 1998); see
also Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual And The Col-
lective, A Comparison, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 739 (1998) (pointing out shortcomings
of Yew's economic determinism-although Singapore's economic success fulfilled
Prime Minister Yew's economic vision, the small nation already reached its height
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private ownership of economic sectors is permitted, only SOEs are
allowed to engage in certain types of industry. The utility sector in
Singapore, for example, has traditionally been subject to such gov-
ernmental ownership and control.8 5
Group Four: Non-Marxist State Ownership of Natural Resources.
The analogy of MNCs doing business with "monarchs" is also ap-
propriate in most developing economies that, at some point and to
some degree, have declared state ownership over natural re-
sources, land, or surface use, regardless of political regime. 86 In the
developing nations falling under this group four, natural resources
are owned by the state, or by the "people" administered through
the state. 87 (Despite the economic dominance of countries such as
the United States, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, which
so far as output quantities were concerned, leaving the fostering of creativity to be
desired).
85 For example, Singapore Power, the state-owned utility company of Singa-
pore, controls the utility sector in this one-city country. Singapore, however, is in
the process of restructuring and privatizing its electric power sector, which will
transform the monopoly into a competitive market. Two subsidiaries of state-
owned Singapore Power, PowerSeraya and PowerSenoko, along with Tuas
Power, are currently generating electricity. PowerGrid, another subsidiary of Sin-
gapore Power, maintains and operates the country's electricity transmission and
distribution system. The Singaporean government currently owns majority stakes
in all of these firms through holding companies. The process of privatization has
repeatedly been delayed, and ongoing plans have called for the Singaporean gov-
ernment to divest its stakes in the electric utility sector as early as 2004. See
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, SINGAPORE COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF
(describing Singapore's energy use and resources), at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/cabs/singapor.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
86 Countries in Group Four may overlap with Group One, because Ggroup
Four's political structure may either be single-party or multiple-party-based, or
they can be multiple party-based in name and on paper, but single party-based in
reality (meaning that no one else but the incumbent party can afford to run in a
national election). This Group Four is distinguishable from Group Two, because
group Two is "off the limit" so far as U.S.-based MNC-IOGC's (and their foreign
subsidiaries, as the case may be) are concerned, due to economic sanctions im-
posed by the United States.
87 See, e.g., Michael P. Darden, Monograph Series No. 20: Legal Research Checklist
for International Petroleum Operations, 1994 A.B.A. SEC. NATURAL RESOURCES,
ENERGY, AND ENvTL. L. 1; Guillermo M. Yeatts, Why Argentina Has Lagged as an Oil
Nation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1996, at A7 (discussing Argentina's new hydrocarbon
law reaffirming state ownership of subsurface); see also "Ley Reglamentaria del
Articulo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petr6leo" [Regulatory Law of Constitu-
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recognize private ownership of natural resources,88 state owner-
ship of minerals is in fact the more common global regime.)89 State
ownership can be established by treaty or constitutional authority,
as in the case of Russia, Mexico, Albania, and Yemen,90 and/or by
specific petroleum legislation, as in the case of Russia, Kazakhstan,
Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, and Cambodia. 91 Governments may also
88 Although countries such as the U.S. and Canada give effect to private
ownership of underlying minerals, under specific factual circumstances, questions
concerning sovereign or private rights over certain minerals continue to arise in
both countries' national jurisprudence. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian
Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999) (resolving an ownership dispute over coal-bed methane
gas deposits).
89 More recently, countries such as Brazil and Venezuela have adopted new
statutory or constitutional provisions that open some limited upstream operations
to private companies, although ownership of hydrocarbons remains exclusively
with the state.
90 For Russia, see Treaty on Demarcation of Jurisdictions and Powers be-
tween the Federal Organs of State Power of the Russia Federation and the organs
of Power of the Republics within the Russian Federation, Mar. 13, 1992, art. II,
Ruslegisline (representing the agreement of the plenipotentiary representatives of
nineteen of the twenty-one Republics within the Russian Federation). For Mexico,
see MEX. CONST. art. 27. For Albania, see Law on Foreign Investments, No. 7764,
(1993) (Alb.) (discussing Freedom of Investment), available at http://
rO.unctad.org/ en/ subsites/dite/fdistats_files/pdfs/Albania-profile.pdf. See also
ALB. CONST., available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/alOO000
.html#A010. For Yemen, see YEMEN CoNST. art. 7, available at:
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ ym00000_.html.
91 For Russia, see Russian Federation Subsoil Act (as amended on June 26 and
Dec. 25, 1992), RF Act No. 2395-1; RF Supreme Soviet Decree No. 2396-1;
Amendments and Addenda to the RF Subsoil Act, RF Federal Act No. 27-FZ, 1995
WL 9700013. See also Ernest Chung, Petroleum Investment in the Russian
Federation -Russian Federation Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing
Agreements (December 30, 1995), 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 551 (1996); Dmitry Slobodanuk,
The State Determined to Own Oil and Gas, PRAVDA, Sept. 23, 2003, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/mergers/
2 00 3 / 09 2 3oil
lawrussia.htm. For Kazakhstan, see Press Release, U.S. Embassy Almaty,
Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan's New Investment Law, Feb. 3, 2003, available at http://
www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/country/030203KzInvestmentLaw.htm. For
Bolivia, see "Ley de Hidrocarburos" [Hydrocarbons Law], No. 1689, 30 de abril de
1996 (Bol.), Envtl. L. Alliance Worldwide, available at http://www.elaw.org/
resources/text.asp?ID=12 34 . For Peru, see "Ley Orgdnica Que Normas Las
Actividades de Hidrocarburos en el Territorio Nacional" [Law Governing
Hydrocarbon Activity on National Territory], No. 26221, 20 de agosto de 1993
(Peru), Ministerio de Energia y Minas, available at http://www.minem.gob.pe
/hidrocarburos/legislacion/leyorganica.pdf. Since its enactment on August 20,
1993, this law has regulated all of the hydrocarbons sectors and establishes the
types of contracts. For Guatemala, see "Decreto Ley Numero 109-83" [Law
Decree No. 109-83], D.O. No. 11, 16 de septiembre de 1983 (Guat.), Ministerio de
Energia y Minas, available at http://www.mem.gob.gt/documentos/LEYl.pdf.
For Cambodia, see Cambodian Investment Law (1994), Mekong Express, available
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mandate the type of contract or form of doing business in the pe-
troleum or energy sector, as in the case of Brazil, Mexico, and the
Philippines.92 Countries may also by law designate specifically (i)
the agency, ministry, or state-owned oil and gas company that has
the authority to enter into contractual arrangements with foreign
entities, as in the case of Vietnam,93 Ghana,94 Mexico, 95 or New Zea-
land,96 or (ii) as in the case of Cambodia, Australia, and Niger,97 the
at http://www.mekongexpress.com/cambodia/ general/caminvestlaw.htm.
92 For Brazil, see Leopoldo A. Taylhardat, Great Expectations for Brazilian Oil
Aperture, 5 ALEXANDER'S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS, Jan. 25, 2000, at http://
www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntlO0477.htm; Gustavo G. de Oliveira & Miriam
Mazza Quadros, Main Issues Impacting Oil & Gas in Brazil-Upstream, 12
NEWSLETTER (Bomchil Group, Rio de Janeiro, Braz.), Sept. 2002, at http://
www.bomchilgroup.org/brasep02.html. For Mexico, see Global Oil Giants Snub
Exploration Contracts, EL UNIVERSAL, Jan. 17, 2004, at 6, at http://www.el-
universal.com.mx/pls/impreso/version imprimir?id nota=2810&tabla=miami_
H. See also PEMEX Contracts Japan's National Oil for Study of Oil Deposits, 7
ALEXANDER'S GAS & OIL CONNEcrIONS, Jan. 23, 2002, at http://www.gasandoil.
com/goc/company/cnl20410.htm. For the Philippines, see National Oil
Exchange Act of 2001, H.R. 300, 12th Cong. (2001) (Phil.), available at
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/billtext/hb00300.pdf.
93 See Petroleum Law (1993) (Vietnam) (discussing authority of PetroViet-
nam, the state-owned oil company and representative of the Vietnamese govern-
ment in petroleum matters).
94 In Ghana, Petroleum Operations are governed by the Petroleum Law of
1984, which empowers "Ghana National Petroleum Corporation" ("GNPC") to
operate in all open acreage of the country on its own or in association with foreign
partners. The basic contract between the state, the GNPC, and the private compa-
nies is the Production Sharing Agreement. See MBendi, Ghana: Oil and Gas Indus-
try (explaining the oil and gas industry in Ghana), at http://www.mbendi.co.za/
indy/oilg/af/gh/p0005.htm (last modified July 12, 2000).
95 Petroleos Mexicanos ("PEMEX") of Mexico and PetroVietnam of Vietnam
are examples of how a government may entrust mineral resource development
entirely to state ministries or grant monopoly to state-owned enterprises
("SOEs"). See, e.g., Bob Williams, The Role of State Oil Companies, OIL & GASJ. (OGJ
Special), Aug 16, 1993, at 55 (describing the rise of state-owned oil companies).
96 The New Zealand Government owns the in-ground petroleum resources
and any company wanting to prospect or explore petroleum in New Zealand
must obtain a permit from the Government under the Crown Minerals Act.
Crown Minerals Act §§ 22-42 (1991) (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation.
co.nz/browse-vw.asp?content-set=pal-statutes. This includes petroleum on the
New Zealand continental shelf. Id.
97 For Cambodia, see supra note 91. For Australia, see States Grants (Petro-
leum Products) Act (1965) (amended May 5, 2003) (Austl.) (compiling amend-
ments up to the Industry, Tourism and Resources Legislation Amendment Act
(2003) (Austl.)), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/ download.cgi/
download/au/legis/cth/consol-act/sgpa1965396.rtf. For Niger, see MBendi,
Niger: Oil & Gas Industry, at http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/ni/
p0005.htm (last modified Mar. 27, 2001).
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procedure by which such contractual arrangements can be en-
tered- whether by international tender or bidding, or by informal
negotiation.
State ownership can also be exerted, not only over natural re-
sources, but also over land and surfaces, similar to such property
concepts existing in U.S. property law as rights-of-way or ease-
ments. 98 Governments, via their sovereign power, may charge a
fee for land-use or surface right-use for any investment project that
requires a local site. Finally, even if surface rights can be privately
owned or used, the host country may proclaim governmental au-
thority to acquire such rights via the process of eminent domain or
equivalent.99
Group Five: Various Degrees of State Control Over Natural Re-
sources, Particular Types of Industry, and Related Property Rights.
Other "monarchs" who do not proclaim state ownership nonethe-
less may exercise various degrees of state control over natural re-
sources, land use, and/or particular major industries such as tele-
communications, media, transportation, mining, energy, utility,
and defense technology. Or, a country may proclaim both exclu-
sive state ownership over specific types of natural resources, and, at
the same time, exert blanket state control over certain sectors or in-
dustries, regardless of whether those sectors or industries involve
natural resources. Further, the government may also declare cer-
tain protected areas as subject to state control due to environ-
mental, safety, or national security reasons.100 Finally, even if all
resources, land, and surface rights can be privately owned or ac-
quired, the government may still either own or control access
routes for transportation or use of seaports and other export or dis-
tribution outlets. All such title, access and usage must be negoti-
98 Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, § 2.6, rep. note (1999); Holbrook v.
Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1976); see also Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.
1950) (discussing implied easement).
99 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); United States v. 50 Acres
of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Rubano v. Dep't
of Transp., 656 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1995); see also Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
353 F.3d 1323 (2003) (discussing eminent domain law in Pakistan).
100 One such example is the case of Broken Hill Proprietary ("BhP"), an Aus-
tralian-based multinational, whose gold discovery and development in Corona-
tion Hill, Australia, was halted due to the government's designation of the area as
having aboriginal significance. BhP had already spent substantial efforts and en-
ergy exploring the area and evaluating commercial prospects of the gold deposit.
Darden, supra note 87, at 60.
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ated and specific government-private sector partnerships formed
as a result.
Group Six: "Monarchs" as Gatekeepers: Various Degrees of State
Control Over FDI Across the Board, Regardless of Sector or Industry.10
A country may also impose minimum state equity ownership over
FDI projects as a whole, regardless of the type of industry or sector
to which the FDI project pertains. This can be illustrated by the
history of local equity ownership requirements for FDI projects in
Mexico. 102 More importantly, at a national level, state control and
ownership can be part of a bigger political agenda, perhaps not
spelled out in the written law or in any publicly available gov-
101 See generally Jeffrey Atik, Fairness and Managed Foreign Direct Investment, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1, 3 (1994) (discussing "approaches for the international
coordination of investment access"). Certain countries falling within this group
may also be listed under the "Marxist-remnant" Group One discussed earlier. See
Provisional Measures on the Establishment of Sino-Foreign Joint-Venture Trading
Companies on a Pilot Basis, Decree No. 3 of Sept. 2, 1996, ChinaToday, available at
http://www.chinatoday.com/law/decree3.htm; cf. Henry J. Graham, Foreign In-
vestment Laws of China and the United States: A Comparative Study, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 253, 273-78 (1996) (analyzing and comparing foreign investment laws in
China and the United States); see generally Stephen M. Soble, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea: Joint Venture Law, 24 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 806 (1985) (explaining
North Korea's efforts to develop joint venture law).
102 See BRYAN, GONZALEZ VARGAS & GONZALEZ BA Z, NAFTA VADEMECUM:
SUMMARY OF THE NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (1994), reprinted in FOLSOM ET. AL.,
supra note 2, at 1107 (explaining how Mexico's Foreign Investment Law set limita-
tions on foreign investments); Michael W. Gordon, Observations on the Nature of
Joint Ventures in Mexico: Are They Involuntary and Transitory Institutions?, 2 B.C.
INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 337 (1979) (examining the nature of joint ventures between
Mexico and foreign investors); Michael W. Gordon, The Joint Venture as an Institu-
tion for Mexican Development: A Legislative History, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173 (tracing
development of joint venture laws in Mexico); Michael W. Gordon, The Contempo-
rary Mexican Approach to Growth with Foreign Investment: Controlled but Participatory
Independence, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 1 (1973) (examining how two Mexican laws con-
trol technology transfer and foreign investment); Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Access and
Protection for Foreign Investment in Mexico under Mexico's New Foreign Investment
Law and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 10 ICSID REVIEW: FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 54 (1995), reprinted in FOLSOM ET. AL., supra note 2, at 1110 (explaining differ-
ences between Mexico's 1973 and 1993 Foreign Investment Laws). Compare Jorge
Cervantes, et. al., Energy Reform in Mexico: New Opportunities for Energy Compa-
nies?, 16 TEX. TRANSNAT'L L.Q. 5 (2002) (interpreting the statement that "Articles
27 and 28 of the Mexican Constitution currently provide that the Mexican sover-
eign has the exclusive right to generate, transmit, distribute, and supply electric-
ity" for public service), with Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., So Near and So Far: Three Obsta-
cles to Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 16 TEX. TRANSNAT'L L.Q. 10 (2002)
("Unfortunately, aligning the energy elements of the North American economy
faces very formidable obstacles -political, legal, and fiscal-and the legal obsta-
cles are described quite clearly in the NAFTA agreement itself.").
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ernmental policy statements. On an ad hoc basis, at any point in
time and in the absence of contrary national laws, under its sover-
eign "jurisdiction to prescribe," 103 the government may rely on its
national interest to justify its role as gatekeeper of the economy or
of a particular industry or project, regardless of its political or eco-
nomic philosophy.
Group Seven: Countries That Exercise De Facto or Decentralized
State Control via Unwritten Custom and the Discretionary Power of
Town Lords and Village Chiefs. Regardless of political systems, it is
always the government, or its various offices or instrumentalities,
who can deny visas, travel documents, permits, licenses, and who
can engage in the use of force and police power, including the is-
suance or execution of search and arrest warrants. Ad hoc exercise
of sovereignty'0 4 will determine, on a real-life basis, whether a for-
eign investor has a right of entry to the local market, or whether lo-
cal entrepreneurs can master their own fate by seeking direct part-
nership with foreign investors outside of the host government's
control. Further, at the provincial, township, or village level, oral
traditions and cultural norms, including certain local governmental
practice and preferences not documented in the written laws, cre-
ate enormous discretionary power for various town lords, village
chiefs, neighborhood police commissars, or heads of governmental
instrumentalities or political subdivisions in the developing world.
(Professor Michael Gordon calls this body of unwritten law and
custom a country's real-life "Operation Code.") 105 The role of gov-
ernments ranges across a wide spectrum, and constitutes a major
influence in the pattern of "Third World" global economic devel-
opment.
The term "monarch" may not be just rhetoric, after all.
3. DISSECTING TWO TYPICAL PETROLEUM AND ENERGY FDI
TRANSACTIONS
In this Section, I will examine and dissect two types of major
FDI transactions:
(1) The upstream petroleum transaction like the Vietnam Deal,
103 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402-04 (1987).
104 Id.
105 See Michael Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations: The Governance of Mul-
tinational Enterprises by Third World Nations, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 301,
331-40 (1984) (discussing the unwritten "Operation Code" of "Third World" coun-
tries).
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in which the host country grants the MNC-IOGC the right to ex-
plore for oil and gas on national territory ("the Upstream Transac-
tion"); and
(2) The midstream IPP transaction, in which natural gas, dis-
covered as a result of the Upstream Transaction, will be used to
generate electricity to service the country and/or the region, as
part of the MNC-IOGC's strategy to develop a long-term gas sales
market ("the Midstream Transaction"). 0 6
Both transactions constitute the bread and butter of the inte-
grated IOGCs (entities such as ExxonMobil, Chevron-Texaco, Uno-
cal, ConocoPhillips, Royal Dutch/Shell Group, StatOil, Total-
FinaElf, BP-Amoco, or Mitsubishi Oil). The Midstream
Transactions, in particular, are the core business of the power de-
velopers such as El Paso Energy, Pacific Energy, Dynergy, Duke,
Coke Industries, Tractebel USA (a subdivision of Lyonnais des
Eaux of Europe), and the now bankrupt Enron.
107
106 This Article does not address classic Downstream Transactions. (There
are professionals who consider all Midstream Transactions to be part of the
downstream segment of the petroleum industry.) Downstream Transactions are
diverse in nature and may not always involve high capital or high risks. They can
be end-user-oriented and do not always result in large-scaled partnerships be-
tween MNCs and host governments. Examples of Downstream Transactions are:
1) a franchise agreement executed between the Marketing Division of the
IOGC and a gas station owner in a host country;
2) an agreement to distribute and sell petroleum products to a country exe-
cuted between the Marking Division of an IOGC and an individual distributor or
agent, who is a native of the host country. Depending on the language of this dis-
tributorship agreement, the IOGC may not need a presence within the host coun-
try, and may completely rely on its local distributor to market and sell the IOGC's
petroleum products; and
3) an agreement to supply parts or services to an oil refinery in Southeast Asia
executed between a major supplier company and the IOGC that owns the refin-
ery, involving millions of dollars and shipments across the world.
All three agreements are categorically part of the downstream segment of the
petroleum industry. For an overview of petroleum downstream and marketing
activities, see P.J. Ottino, Crude Oil Futures and Options in London, 7 OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N REV. 179,191 (1988-1989).
107 At one time, Enron Corporation was an energy developer and pipeline
company before it turned essentially to energy trading as its core business over
the course of several years prior to its financial collapse. Enron began trading
natural gas commodities in 1989. MSNBC News, Ex-Enron CEO Indicted, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4311642 (last visited Feb. 19, 2004); see also En-
ron, Annual Reports (showing changes in Enron's business practices), at
http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals (last visited Oct. 30, 2004). In
1999, Enron began to sell off large chunks of its power development services and
subsidiaries, and International IPP Transactions became part of Enron's Wholesale
Energy Services. Id. One of such transactions, Enron's sixty-percent-owned Dab-
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Both types of transactions also generate subcontractor relation-
ships between the above MNCs and (i) the oilfield service industry
(companies such as Baker Hughes and Schlumberger); (ii) the in-
ternational engineering and construction industry (companies such
as Halliburton, Raytheon, Fluor Daniel, and Bechtel); as well as (iii)
the heavy industry manufacturers (companies such as General
Electric, Westinghouse, or Carterpillar). The magnitude of these
projects is evident, both in terms of the amount of capital required,
as well as the brand names of the corporate players involved.
3.1. Case One: The Upstream Transaction08
In industry jargon, activities of the petroleum industry can be
categorized into three distinct segments: upstream (where the natu-
ral resources and raw material are found); downstream (the refining,
marketing, selling, distribution, and trading of energy products or
commodities--collectively the delivery of those products to the ul-
timate consumers); and midstream (infrastructure development,
processing, transporting, or converting raw material into energy
products or commodities, and/or any other processes that connect
the upstream segment to the downstream segment). Although the
upstream-midstream-downstream trichotomy may be unique to
the petroleum sector or to mining activities, the concept behind
these segment classifications is actually meaningful in any manu-
facturing business that involves the discovery and utilization of
raw materials to be uncovered from nature at the source, especially
when the business has developed a vertical expansion, whereupon
the same holding entity owns the entire chain of products and ser-
vices: from raw material discovery (upstream), manufacturing or
production activities using the raw material uncovered (mid-
stream), and ultimate consumer distribution (downstream).
Because the industry's technical and business issues typically
drive legal considerations, terms such as upstream, midstream,
and downstream have been built into the vocabulary of the inter-
national business lawyer servicing the petroleum and energy sec-
tor, and hence take on legal meanings. For example, an upstream
exploration contract (such as the Vietnam Deal) typically involves
high capital, and contains unique legal issues inapplicable to a
hol power project in India (discussed in Case Two of this twin-series Article), was
reported as an unconsolidated equity affiliate. Id.
108 The analysis of Case One applies only to the international petroleum sec-
tor. The analysis does not apply to the U.S. domestic oil and gas legal regime.
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downstream transaction (such as a franchise contract enabling a
gas station franchisee to sell gasoline to the ultimate consumers).109
In modem U.S. petroleum terminology, the upstream segment
is typically divided into three major functions or phases: the Explo-
ration for petroleum, the Development of such petroleum at the
wellhead, and the Production of such petroleum prior to transport
to a refinery or ultimately for end-user distribution. Between Ex-
ploration and Development, there may be a sub-phase called Ap-
praisal, during which the reserve discovered is appraised for tech-
nical development. These four phases constitute Petroleum
Operation or Petroleum Activities. From the U.S. oilman/woman's
perspective, these phases of upstream activities have replaced the
formerly popular word, the "exploitation" of petroleum resources,
which has taken on a negative connotation associated with the era
of colonialism, especially in international operation involving the
"Third World."110
3.1.1. History, Development, and Semantics
It has been said that petroleum exploration is a unique activity,
wherein the party with capital, technology, and know-how agrees
109 See supra note 106.
110 Today, the term "exploitation" is still used in academic discourse, as a le-
gal or business term in certain developing countries, or in earlier model form
agreements. See, e.g., KEITH W. BLINN ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLICY
ASPECTS 108-09 (1986) (using the term "exploitation" in connection with the use of
commercial reservoirs); Model Form International Operating Agreement (1990), re-
printed in ANDREW B. DERMAN, INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS JOINT VENTURES: A
DISCUSSION wrrH ASSOCIATED FORM AGREEMENTS 94, 96 (ABA Section of Natural
Res., Energy & Envtl. Law, Monograph Series No. 16, 1992) (using the term "ex-
ploitation" in its traditional, positive sense); see also "Decreto con Fuerza de Ley
Org&-ica de Hidrocarburos" [Decree With Force of Law Regarding Hydrocar-
bons], ch. 1, § I, art. 1 (Gaceta Oficial 2001, 37.323) (Venez.) (referring to explora-
tion, exploitation, collecting, transportation and storage as petroleum "primary
activities"), available at http://www.petroleumworld.com/oillaw.htm. "Exploita-
tion" in Venezuelan law means all upstream phases subsequent to exploration (or
what is known in the United States as "Development and Production"). It fol-
lows, therefore, that the division of upstream activities into the three phases (Ex-
ploration-Development-Production) is not necessarily universal. The three phases
represent modem American terminology. In the Russian Federation, for example,
the term "Development" is used to encompass both the Development phase and
the Production phase. The Russian terminology, therefore, consolidates petro-
leum "exploitation" activities into two phases: Exploration and Development.




to pay an owner of natural resources for the right to do work free
of charge."' This is not an overstatement or ironic expression, and
will make perfect sense if the capital and technological commit-
ment made by an IOGC is viewed as a fee for access to the natural
resources that may be found in some landowner's backyard. Sim-
ply stated, the landowner needs a contractual mechanism under
which the expert operator will be given access to "farm the field""
2
and uncover the natural resources for the benefit of both parties.
To achieve this goal, historically, governments and IOGCs have
negotiated their interests in one of two systems: Concessionary or
Contractual. The differences between the two systems are rooted in
the development of Anglo-American versus French legal concepts
of mineral resource ownership.
3.1.1.1. The Concessionary Model
In the Concessionary system, private ownership of mineral re-
sources is allowed.1 3 The term mineral is handily used here to re-
fer to all natural resources underground, although in geological
terms, petroleum may not qualify as a mineral. In most commer-
cial contracts and legal regimes, petroleum is defined as including
both oil and gas.
Like the term "exploitation," the term "concession" can be
dated back to colonial time and, hence, equally tainted due to po-
litical correctness. 114 Today, it can be used synonymously with a
country's petroleum fiscal regime called the "royalty/tax" system.
111 DANIEL JOHNSTON, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM FISCAL SYSTEMS AND
PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS (1994).
112 In the international petroleum sector, the legal expression "Farm-
In/Farm-Out" is used to describe an assignment of interest in a Contract Area.
For example, in the Vietnam Deal, after the IOGC and PetroVietnam have signed
the Production Sharing Contract ("PSC"), the IOGC may "farm out" part of its in-
terest in the PSC to another oil company to share risk and equity. See John S.
Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 Sw. L.J. 759, 763-64 (1987) (de-
termining origin of the term "farm out").
113 See generally GORDON H. BARROWS, WORLDWIDE CONCESSION CONTRACTS
AND PETROLEUM LEGISLATION (1983) (giving examples of concessionary laws that
allow private ownership of minerals); see also Ernest E. Smith & John S.
Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Agreements, 24 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 13 (1989) (discussing and comparing Middle Eastern concessions to U.S. oil
and gas leases).
114 The term Concessionaire may be used to refer to an IOGC operating in a
Concessionary System, but it is not part of the American terminologies, although
private ownership of minerals in the United States can readily serve as an exam-
ple of a Concessionary system. The term may still be used in academic discourse.
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Where the government (and not private landowners) owns miner-
als (as in the case of offshore reserves), under the Concessionary
system, the government will transfer title of minerals to the IOGC
that extracts and produces the resources, since private ownership
is allowed. The government will then charge (i) royalty, in its ca-
pacity as owner,115 and (ii) income or profit taxes upon the IOGC's
corporate income, in the government's capacity as taxing authority.
A Concessionary system may also be described as a licensing sys-
tem, in which the IOGC-contractor is required to obtain a license
for each phase of operation (Exploration, Appraisal, Development,
and Production). The IOGC-licensee can receive and claim title to
net proceeds of petroleum sales after it has paid tax and royalty to
the government. Despite the availability of petroleum private
ownership, the license in the Concessionary system denotes that
Petroleum Activities may heavily be regulated by the state. 1 6
In contrast, under various Contractual systems, the govern-
ment owns the minerals. An IOGC-contractor only has the right to
receive a share of production or revenues from petroleum sales in
accordance with contractual terms. Generically, there are two
types of contracts: a Service Contract and a PSC. A Service Contract
can be further divided into two categories: a Classic or Pure Service
Contract, and a Risk Service Contract.
3.1.1.2. The Service Contract Model
In a Service Contract arrangement, ownership by, or title trans-
fer to, the contractor is removed altogether.117  The IOGC-
contractor gets compensated for the performance of its technical
services. It can get a straight fee regardless of success or failure of
the exploration endeavor (a Classic or Pure Service Contract).
Where such fee is not paid unless and until petroleum is discov-
ered and produced, the contract is a Risk Service contract, because
the contractor is taking the risk of exploration failure. If there is no
115 See, e.g., Agreement between Petroleum Concessions, Ltd. and Sultan of Muscat
and Oman (1937), reprinted in SMITH ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
TRANSACrIONS (2000) (detailing an agreement whereby the Sultan of Oman and
Muscat received a royalty on production).
116 TERENCE DAINTITH & GEOFFREY WILLOUGHBY, UNITED KINGDOM OIL AND
GAS LAW, pt. 5 (2d ed. 1992); Peter Cameron, North Sea Oil Licensing: Comparisons
and Contrasts, 4 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REV. 99-106 (1984-1985).
117 A Service Contract may give the Service Contractor the right to purchase
petroleum from the government. In that case, the contractor may end up having
title to the petroleum it has purchased.
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petroleum discovery, the contractor loses its investment and does
not get paid by the government." 8 Thus the real difference be-
tween a Pure Service Contract and a Risk Service Contract depends
on whether the contractor's fee is contingent upon profit. Today, a
Classic or Pure Service Contract (where the contractor gets paid
regardless of exploration failure)" 9 is very rare. It may still be
found in the Middle East, where governments already have sub-
stantial capital and seek only certain expertise or technology from a
contractor for hire.1
20
3.1.1.3. The PSC Model
In the following discussion, the term Production Sharing and
the acronym PSC are used interchangeably.
Production Sharing concepts date back to French Napoleonic
traditions, under which mineral wealth was not owned by indi-
viduals, but rather by the state for the benefit of all citizens.121 (In
contrast, private ownership of minerals has its root in Anglo-
American legal traditions, as typified by the United States.) The
earliest use of the Production Sharing system occurred in agricul-
118 RAYMOND F. MIKESELL, PETROLEUM COMPANY OPERATIONS AND AGREEMENTS
IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 92-107 (1984) (discussing Risk Service Contracts);
Joao Santos Coelho Neto, Risk-Bearing Service Contracts in Brazil, 3 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 114, 114-16 (1985) (explaining elements of Brazilian Risk Ser-
vice Contracts).
119 Pure Service (risk-free) Contracts are the norms in the oilfield service in-
dustry. Examples of oilfield services are rig services, drilling services, helicopter
services, crew transportation services, emergency medical services, etc. These
subcontractors will get paid regardless of whether the exploration venture results
in an economically viable petroleum discovery. RON BAKER, A PRIMER OF OIL WELL
DRILLING 35-44 (5th ed. 1996).
120 A species of Pure Service Contracts is the Technical Assistance Agree-
ment, which allows a host country to take advantage of the MNC-IOGC's techno-
logical and managerial expertise without compromising the sovereignty's owner-
ship and control. See Technical Assistance Agreement Between Petroleos de Venezuela
(PETROVEN) and Creole Petroleum Corporation, Jan. 1, 1976, in 2 COLLECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONCESSIONS AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS 275, 280-82 (Peter Fischer
& Thomas Waelde eds., 1982) (discussing the relationship between the host coun-
try and the MNC subsequent to nationalization).
121 F. H. LAWSON ET AL., AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW
93-94 (3d ed. 1967); MARCEL PLANIOL, 1 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW §§ 2392-94 (La.
State L. Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1959). The French Civil Code originally gave owners
of property ownership of the subsurface estate. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 552 (Fr.).
However, Napoleon decided in 1810 that mines should be at the disposal of the
state, effectively depriving the surface owner of all control over the mineral estate.
The government then granted concessions to private property owners for mining.
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ture. Farmers, as tenant-sharecroppers, farmed the field, the title to
which was held by the government or landlords. Sharecroppers
were then compensated by a share of production.122 With the pas-
sage of time, the Production Sharing philosophy did not remain a
French Napoleonic product. (Ironically, the current French petro-
leum fiscal system is not PSC-based, but rather, is a royalty/ tax re-
gime in which private ownership of minerals is recognized.)
123
The first PSC was executed in Indonesia -a former Dutch col-
ony-in the early 1960s, under the authority of the Indonesian 1945
Constitution,124 when the country began to take on its status as an
oil-producing nation in the "Third World."125 The Production
Sharing scheme came about as the result of gradual changes in the
pattern of international petroleum exploration since the end of
World War I. The enhanced bargaining positions of petroleum-
producing countries throughout the years, as well as adverse ac-
tions taken by new regimes in places such as Libya and Iran,1
26 mo-
tivated U.S. oilmen (and women) to devise a new system more ap-
pealing to governments than the earlier Concessionary system.
Hence, the earlier Concessionary system modeled after the U.S. oil
122 See generally JEAN BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 308-11
(Rapeije Howell trans., 1912) (detailing development of land ownership in France
following French revolution).
123 CODE MINIER [C. MINIER] art. 31 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr; see also Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, How to Ob-
tain an Oil and Gas Exploration Permit in France (Jan. 24, 2002), available at
http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/energie/anglais/ang-guide-hydro.htm (detailing
the current procedure for obtaining and completing oil and gas permits through
the French government).
124 INDON. CONST. art. 33 (stating that all the natural wealth on land and in
waters are under the jurisdiction of the State and should be used for the benefit
and welfare of the people); see also AMERICAN EMBASSY JAKARTA, PETROLEUM
REPORT INDONESIA 2003, at 6 (2003), at http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/petro2003/
exsum2003.pdf.
125 The Republic of Indonesia, the world's largest archipelago, achieved in-
dependence from the Netherlands in 1949. The country's current problems in-
clude poverty, a strained relationship with the IMF, low investor confidence due
to lack of reliable legal recourse, corruption, political instability, and a general
lack of security in the region. As of 1999, approximately twenty seven percent of
the population lived below the poverty line. As of January 2002, the country re-
portedly has an estimated oil reserve of 7.083 billion bbl, and a natural gas reserve
of 2.549 trillion cu m. The country also has pipeline facilities for Crude Oil, natu-
ral gas, and petroleum products. CIA, Indonesia, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/id.htm (last visited
Oct. 27, 2004).
126 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 Note (2000)).
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and gas leases was replaced by a negotiated share of production, as
high as a fifty-fifty profit split between the IOGC and the host gov-
ernment, as in the case of Venezuela in 1948.127 Overall, the IOGC-
contractor is compensated for its working interest via a grant of a
negotiated percentage of petroleum production, which typically
consists of: (1) production representing its recovery of costs (called
"Cost Recovery Oil," if oil is discovered); and (2) production repre-
senting the contractor's profit (called "Profit Oil," if oil is discov-
ered). In a PSC system, the IOGC-contractor may still be required
to pay tax and royalty to the host government, depending on the
local law.
3.1.2. Comparison of the Three Systems (Concessionary, PSC, and
Service Contract)
The PSC is much akin to the Risk Service Contract, because un-
der both arrangements, the contractor is not compensated unless
and until she finds and produces petroleum. There is no Produc-
tion Sharing, nor fee for service, if the exploration venture fails. 28
Principally, the differences between the PSC system and a Service
Contract system depend on whether the contractor is compensated
in cash or in kind (for example, payment made in Crude OiJ29 is
payment in kind). In a Service Contract, the contractor may earn
only a fixed fee, whereas in a PSC, the contractor can participate in
the upside potential of production. If compensated in kind, the
PSC contractor receives a share of production and hence can take
title to the Crude Oil. In such a case, the PSC contractor enjoys
rights of private ownership just like in a Concessionary system.
So, essentially, the main difference between the PSC system and
the Concessionary system can be stated as follows: the point of ti-
tle transfer (from the owner to the IOGC-contractor) may shift
from the wellhead (as in a Concessionary system), to the point of
petroleum export (as in a PSC system).130 The PSC is simply an in-
127 Horrigan, supra note 74, § 7.03.
128 Failure does not necessarily mean that the Contract Area is devoid of po-
tential reserves. Failure simply means that under a set standard of "commerci-
ality," as defined by contract, exploration efforts have reached certain financial or
technological limits, and it is no longer economically viable for the IOGC-
contractor to continue its search.
129 For a definition of "Crude Oil," see PETER, infra note 293.
130 See, e.g., KAMAL HOSSAIN, LAW AND POLICY IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT 139
(1979) ("[I]f the title to the oil does not pass to the contractor till the point of ex-
port, then how could it be entitled to receive a price for the oil supplied by it to
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novative deviation of the Risk Service Contract, engineered by U.S.
independent oilmen/women to meet the demands of the oil-
producing countries.
It follows, therefore, that in a PSC system, the government, via
its instrumentality, will also receive a share of production by split-
ting profit with the IOGC-contractor, in addition to receiving tax
and royalty as sovereignty. This "share" formula is called the
Profit Split. (In contrast, in a Pure or Classic Service Contract, the
government bears the risk of exploration failure, or it may pass the
risk on to the contractor as in a Risk Service Contract.) Unlike the
Service Contract model, where the IOGC is simply a contractor and
the host government is a principal, the Production Sharing scheme
enables the government to become the IOGC's equity partner,
earning both a profit and sharing in costs, in addition to collecting
tax and royalties.
A PSC typically covers all upstream activities (Exploration,
Appraisal, Development, and Production). The Exploration phase
alone may typically cover a term of five years. Examples of the
PSC system include Egypt, Guyana, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
131
As of the mid-1990s, the number of PSCs outnumbered Service
Contract agreements by a ratio of five to one.132 It is fair to con-
clude that in various modified forms compared to the original In-
donesian PSC, Production Sharing has become a standardized
model for petroleum exploration around the world, and has domi-
nated start-up petroleum FDI for the past three decades.
Today, Indonesia's PSC model sets the standards for PSC
terms, at least for the developing nations and countries in the Asia-
Pacific region.133 The PSC may take thousands of hours of law-
yers' and executives' time, culminating in hundreds of pages of
documentation carefully drafted, reviewed, and negotiated. Or,
the domestic market?").
131 See, e.g., Two Indonesian Models of Production Sharing Contracts Between the
National Petroleum Company PERTAMINA and Foreign Investors, in 6 COLLECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONCESSIONS AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS 61 (Peter Fischer & Tho-
mas W. Waelde eds., 1985) (detailing model PSC contracts used by PERTAMINA,
Indonesia's state-owned oil company, for Production Sharing with foreign inves-
tors); Robert Fabrikant, Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum In-
dustry, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 303, 313 (1975) (describing "major" companies' reluc-
tance to accept Indonesia's "management" clause for government's benefit).
132 JOHNSTON, supra note 111.
133 KHONG CHO OON, THE POLITICS OF OIL IN INDONESIA: FOREIGN COMPANY-





the PSC may involve certain standard terms already incorporated
into the country's petroleum legislation, not subject to negotiation.
The National Association of International Petroleum Negotiators
("AIPN"), the networking group for IOGC upstream executives
and lawyers, has published its own recommended model PSC,
widely respected and observed in the industry. 34
Thus, the degree of negotiation in a PSC transaction depends
on whether the host country has a model contract, whether that
model contract is specifically part of the country's legislation, and
whether it is feasible for the IOGC to propose modifications, ex-
emptions or deviations from the model contract or the law. Even if
the local law allows modifications, the host government may, or
may not be willing to negotiate different terms, depending on the
leverages of the parties under the circumstances. Further, where
the model contract is part of the country's legislation, or where the
model contract does not exist, norms of practice or contractual
precedents from prior deals may provide the IOGC with the
framework for negotiating its proposed relationship with the gov-
ernment. In reality, a very poor country with a primitive legal and
fiscal regime would typically "negotiate" from an agreement
drafted by the IOGC's lawyer, with not much leverage for de-
manding any other specificity or supremacy, and would grant as
many of the IOGC's requests as needed to keep the IOGC inter-
ested.
Naturally, the IOGC's share of production must be sufficient
not only for it to recoup all costs, but also for it to make adequate
profit. The Profit Split, therefore, is among the key economic fac-
tors that drive negotiation. Other essential features of the Produc-
tion Sharing system include:
" Title to the hydrocarbons remains with the state, and no pri-
vate ownership is permitted, except for the share of produc-
tion granted to the contractor as its compensation.
" The state maintains overall control and the contractor is re-
sponsible for conducting Petroleum Activities.
" The IOGC-contractor submits Annual Exploration Work Pro-
grams and Budgets for scrutiny and approval by the state (typi-
cally defined terms in the PSC).
" The IOGC-contractor provides all financing and technology
and bears all risks.
134 Association of International Petroleum Negotiators ("AIPN") website, at
http://www.aipn.org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
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" The IOGC-contractor will be entitled to certain amounts of pe-
troleum discovered to recover its costs (Cost Recovery). After
Cost Recovery, the remaining production will be shared ac-
cording to the Profit Split.
" All equipment purchased or imported into the host country
will become the property of the state, except for leased equip-
ment or equipment provided by service subcontractors.
135
This is the direct result of state ownership over natural re-
sources and assets connected to Petroleum Activities.
3.1.3. The Dynamics of Negotiation in the PSC Regime and the
Role of Lawyers
The capital-intensive and high-risk nature of Upstream Trans-
actions, as well as their complexity, necessitates substantial lawyer
involvement. Preceding the actual contract negotiation is the proc-
ess of international tender and bidding, based on the government's
terms or requests for proposals, whereupon a contractor or consor-
tium of contractors is chosen to conduct Petroleum Activities.
Typically, the government enters into a PSC with an Oil and Gas
Contractor for a given Contract Area. A Contract Area that is the
subject of an IOGC's PSC with a host country may cover more than
one exploration Block. A Block is simply an area designated by the
government as the subject of a call for tender or bidding in order to
generate foreign investment interests. (An IOGC-contractor may
have an interest in a Block in the United Kingdom, which has a
Concessionary system, and another Block in Indonesia, which has
a PSC system.)
Even before the tender or bidding process, much time and ef-
fort may be spent in the examination and exchange of geological
data, the performance of various field trips and technical studies,
and various informal exploratory sessions and meetings between
government officials and representatives of the IOGC to explore
mutual interests and evaluate the potential of the project. During
these preliminary meetings, the IOGC may test the level of compe-
tition, and solicit or lobby for government support. In each step
preceding the contract award and the actual negotiation of the
PSC, lawyer involvement may be desired or required.
For the actual contract negotiation, the give-and-take depends
135 See, e.g., Stan Dur, Negotiating PSC Terms, PETROLEUM Accr. & FIN. MGMT.




on the overall objectives of both sides. In an ideal situation, host
governments desire capital investment and technology transfer
from IOGCs. IOGCs, on the other hand, require ready access to the
Contract Area, government approvals and support for Petroleum
Activities, and ultimately a share of production sufficient for the
companies to recoup all costs and achieve desired profit goals. In
principle, these two sets of interests are mutually complementary
to each other, leading to bargained-for positions. In an ideal
world, both sides do their job with the best intention and con-
science - governments duly safeguard the "people's" resources
and are inspired to use the proceeds of petroleum sales for the bet-
terment of their societies; IOGCs are respectful of the host coun-
try's environment, labor, natural resources, and cultural heritage,
and are willing to curtail excessive profit goals in the interest of the
host environment and local community in order to be competitive
and to fulfill corporate social responsibility. Conflicts, nonetheless,
occur when either party is motivated to alter the equilibrium of the
risk allocation dynamics so as to secure the maximum advantage
for itself, at the cost of the other side. In the worst-case scenario,
both sides neglect the public interest.
Specifically, potential conflicts over the dynamics of give-and-
take may occur in connection with the following seven legal and
business concepts essential to the PSC regime. I will explain these
concepts as the context within which to examine the current pat-
tern of global economic development, and to raise certain argu-
ments regarding its windfall or pitfall. The seven PSC legal and
business issues are:
(1) Operatorship;
(2) Participating Interest (or Joint Venture Interest, as the case may
be), and related issues of transferability;
(3) The "Carry" of costs and expenses;
(4) Contractor's Work Program or Minimum Work Commitment;
(5) Commerciality standards, the IOGC-contractor's Withdrawal
Rights, and other relevant economic judgments made by the
IOGC;
(6) The government's Fiscal Regime (consisting of elements such
as the Profit Split, Government Participation, and various re-
quirements for the payment of Bonuses, in addition to Tax
and Royalty);
(7) The IOGC's contractual devices to buffer itself against Politi-
cal Risks associated with the investment environment, in-
cluding the use of the Stabilization Clause.
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3.1.3.1. Operatorship
By virtue of an Operating Agreement or Joint Operating Agreement
("JOA") executed separately from the PSC, the IOGC-contractor
will assume the status of an Oil and Gas Operator, who will conduct
Petroleum Activities in the Contract Area. The Operator is the en-
tity that controls or monitors all technical and management issues
(subject to voting control by equity interest owners), and hence
drives the progress and success or failure of the Petroleum Opera-
tion. An upstream Production Sharing deal is often a twin-contract
deal -the PSC and the JOA together constitute the legal documents
describing the deal and the legal relationships created thereby.
136
While the PSC defines the rights and obligations of the IOGC as a
contractor and/or business partner of the host country (and hence
is sometimes referred to as the "host government contract"), the
JOA, on the other hand, defines the rights and obligations of all
project participants, including those non-government entities who
may share investment risks with the IOGC, as well as the commer-
cial arm of the host country serving as the IOGC's local partner.
The JOA establishes internal procedures and addresses manage-
ment, control, and operational issues. The PSC is prone to stan-
dardization by operation of local law because the state authority
that exercises sovereign power over the project is a contractual
party. The JOA, on the other hand, is generally not standardized
by operation of law, although it may still be subject to legal re-
quirements of the local jurisdiction. Obviously, the PSC and JOA
for a particular project must be coordinated and, quite often, are
negotiated concurrently.
3.1.3.2. Participating Interest, Joint Venture Interest, and
Transferability
The JOA operator and PSC contractor can either be a single
company, a Consortium of companies and interests, or a Joint Ven-
ture consisting of, at a minimum, two Joint Venture partners. A
Consortium or equivalent can be defined as an alliance of compa-
nies whose rights, obligations, and extent of cooperation are de-
termined solely by contract. Generally, the Consortium has no in-
dependent juridical status because it is not formed under any
136 This does not include various financing documents, legal agreements pre-
ceding the actual negotiation of PSC terms, or other legal agreements subsequent




system of national law, although the consortium formation agree-
ment may contain "choice-of-law" and "choice-of-forum" provi-
sions reflecting the consensus of the parties thereto in the event of
a contractual dispute. A Joint Venture, on the other hand, may be
incorporated or unincorporated, depending on the law of the place
where the Joint Venture is formed (lex situs).
Thus, under either a Concessionary system or a PSC system,
the Joint Venture form may be used to formalize the partnership
between the IOGC and the government, or a SOE of the host juris-
diction. (In the Vietnam Deal, PetroVietnam served a dual pur-
pose, as representative of the nation-state, and as an SOE acting as
the nation-state's commercial arm.) The business partnership
formed by the Joint Venture Contract creates joint venturers' obliga-
tions to share risk, equity, costs and expenditures, and enables joint
participation in management and operatorship. The host govern-
ment typically will prefer the Joint Venture form, because it allows
state-owned companies and governmental instrumentalities to re-
ceive technology transfers and training more directly and continu-
ously, and even to participate in project management and opera-
torship side by side with the technologically able foreign investor.
Where the local law requires such a Joint Venture to be incorpo-
rated, the result is the formation of a local company or juridical en-
tity established to conduct Petroleum Operation and Petroleum
Activities, of which both the IOCC and the SOE are functionally
shareholders.
If unincorporated, the Joint Venture is in essence a partnership as
that term is understood in U.S. law,137 but the unincorporated in-
ternational Joint Venture will be governed by the law stipulated in
the Joint Venture Contract's "choice-of-law" or "governing law"
provision. U.S. courts have defined an Unincorporated Joint Venture
as a partnership having a specific purpose, for a specific duration,
and designed for a specific project, although the Joint Venture Con-
tract may still contain disclaimer language alleviating joint and
several liability among joint venturers (except to the extent pro-
vided by the Joint Venture Contract).
138
137 See Int'l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 978 F.2d 1318, 1330-
33 (3d. Cir. 1992) (treating joint venture and partnerships similarly); In re Groff,
898 F.2d 1475, 1476 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying partnership law to the property of
the joint venture).
138 In re Groff, 898 F.2d at 1475 (holding that "the rules governing partners'
interests in partnership assets also apply to joint ventures").
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Where equity, risks, and costs are shared in an unincorporated
petroleum Joint Venture arrangement, the result is typically the
creation of "Participating Interests."139 A Participating Interest obli-
gates its holder to share in costs and expenses, and entitles him or
her to take a percentage in equity and profit. An Unincorporated
Joint Venture structure where the host government or its SOE
holds a Participating Interest in the project may also be described
as a "Government Participation" system. 40 Where there is Govern-
ment Participation, the JOA establishes the rights and obligations
of the government and the IOGC both as interest owners and busi-
ness partners, even though the IOGC may alone assume operator-
ship of the field due to its technical capabilities.
The Participating Interest held by the IOGC may be reduced af-
ter the PSC has been signed. This is because even though the
IOGC alone executes the PSC with the host government, it may
later decide to seek additional foreign investors to share risks and
costs by selling part of its Participating Interest to third parties. In
such a case, the "assignment," "transfer," or "assignability" clause
in the PSC becomes extremely important. The clause also provides
the legal mechanism for the IOGC to remove itself from the project
or escape further contractual obligations by transferring all of its
Participating Interest to a third-party assignee, who will take over
the IOGC's work commitments vis-a -vis the host government by
assuming the IOGC's Participating Interest. The PSC's "transfer"
clause will lead to the execution of a separate "Farm-in/Farm-out
Agreement" to effectuate the terms of the transfer (the transfer is a
Farm-in for the assignee-Farmee, and a Farm-out for the assignor-
Farmor).
If the transfer is completely made "offshore" away from the ju-
risdiction of the host country, the government will look solely to
the initial IOGC-contractor for all work commitments and obliga-
tions under the PSC. In most cases, the host government will not
want such secretive "offshore" transfer that manages to escape the
host country's jurisdiction or power to regulate. It will prefer to
preserve its right to approve or veto the IOGC's transfer or choice
of an assignee, or otherwise impose certain conditions upon such a
transfer. For example, the assignee may be required, as a matter of
139 If the joint venture is incorporated, the joint venturers' ownership interest
will be given the legal term accorded by the law of the place of incorporation (lex
situs).




standardized procedure, to establish its economic viability as an
enterprise, and/or its technical ability to perform under the PSC to
the satisfaction of the host government.
Whether or not the choice of an assignee remains the exclusive
domain of the IOGC, or is subject to the host government's ap-
proval (either pro forma or via ad hoc review), as a matter of prac-
tical economics, Farm-in candidates cannot just fall out of nowhere.
Farm-in companies are usually other IOGCs or state-owned com-
panies fully supported by neighboring countries having an eco-
nomic interest and political foothold in the region. These Farm-in
candidates must visibly and demonstrably measure up to the ca-
pabilities, resources, and stature of the original IOGC who exe-
cuted the PSC, and to whom the host government looks for the
completion of exploration Work Programs. These Farmees can ei-
ther be well-established independent oil producers, consortia
thereof, or, more typically, those MNCs with "brand-name" recog-
nition in the petroleum sector -only the giants who dominate the
industry can afford to take the risks and costs of international Pe-
troleum Operation. Naturally, the original IOGC will be looking
for Farm-in partners who share its business philosophy, who can
provide cost sharing and capital contribution, and who can form
substantial alliances with the original IOGC-contractor long-term.
The smaller entrepreneurs have little chance to gain an equity posi-
tion in such an environment of networks and alliances fortified by
the kind of financial backing and grouping that naturally defeat
competition from the lesser-equipped.
Farm-in/Farm-out arrangements are routinely done in the in-
dustry, amounting to an effective risk-spreading and business-
alliance framework. 141 In most cases, the host government gives
pro forma approval, requiring screening for, and proof of, financial
and technical capability. But in reality, the host government will
likely be making these approval decisions based on geopolitical
factors. A Farmee not favored by the government due to its activi-
ties elsewhere in the country or in the region will be unlikely to re-
ceive the host government's support. For example, in the Vietnam
Deal, the Vietnamese government would probably not approve a
Farmee who held a Participating Interest in another Contract Area
granted by the Chinese government, over which Contract Area
141 See, e.g., John S. Lowe, Recent Significant Cases Affecting Farmout Agree-
ments, 50 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 3-1 (1999) (analyzing Farmout Agree-
ments, including risk spreading through equity protection).
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Vietnam and other ASEAN nations each had asserted a competing
territorial claim. 42 Naturally, Vietnam would not favor such a
Farmee due to its national interest and resulting hostility toward
China. As another example, both the IOCC-contractor and the host
government may favor a Farmee who is already developing an ad-
jacent Contract Area, or who has already obtained rights of explo-
ration in several Contract Areas in the country or the region. Such
a Farmee may have greater economic incentives to acquire addi-
tional interests in adjacent areas in order to achieve economy of
scale in its overall development strategies. In summary, the choice
of a Farmee can be both geopolitical and economic.
If, however, the original IOGC manages to effectuate a Farm-
out completely "offshore," purely for purposes of cost and risk
sharing, while remaining the primary contractor in the host coun-
try, the IOGC may be able to avoid any geopolitical factors trig-
gered by the governmental approval process and, hence, will have
more flexibility in choosing a partner based solely on the IOGC's
internal economic needs. The choice, however, will still be bound
by the monopoly nature of the industry as a whole -only a hand-
ful of players can afford to assume the risks and costs associated
with petroleum ventures in the developing economies. The result
is that only a few dominant MNC players, locked together in Farm-
in/Farm-out positions and in original contractual arrangements
with governments, will "reign" over the economy of the entire
country or region, if and when petroleum is found. Overall, risk-
sharing alliances among IOGCs are often made subject to strict
confidentiality agreements. 143
While such confidential international Farm-in/Farm-out ar-
rangements may bear all the characteristics of large-scale acquisi-
tions, they may not be governed by any nation's anticompetitive
regulatory regime, let alone any regional oversight, for several rea-
sons. First, these Farm-in/Farm-out arrangements do not impli-
cate the IOGC's home jurisdiction's antitrust concerns or interest.
Second, the transitional economies may not have developed effec-
tive and sophisticated anticompetitive laws. Third, the speculative
nature of upstream endeavors-that prospective profit is rendered
uncertain by various geological Appraisal Risks -can make the
142 See Duong, supra note 49 (discussing territorial disputes in the South
China Sea).
143 AIPN Model Agreements are available at http://www.aipn.org/




gauging and assessment of anticompetitive effects either prema-
ture, speculative, impossible, or inappropriate. Farmors and Far-
mees are obligated to spend money before they can make money, if
they make money at all! In other words, due to the "hit-or-miss"
nature of exploration programs, all players, no matter how domi-
nant or monopolistic, may go home with losses rather than gains,
and this is the reality of the exploration business. Accordingly,
how can there be any anticompetitive effect on a market when, at
the end of the day, there may be no commodity and no market at
all? It is evident, however, that the intercorporate Farm-in/Farm-
out arrangements, as well as the MNC-government partnerships,
are all tightly negotiated partnerships, generally well-sealed from
the public light, motivated by the high-risk, high-cost transactional
dynamics between parties who control technology, capital, and ac-
cess to the uncovered "crown jewels," all in a less than ideally sta-
ble economy. The screening and approval of the host government
of Farm-in/Farm-out arrangements, which may amount to acquisi-
tion of enormous ownership interests of natural resources, often
falls short of any systematic anticompetitive regulatory framework,
and justifiably so. The result, nonetheless, is still the creation of de
facto cartels-a group of IOGCs joined together in consortia or
Farm-in/Farm-out arrangements, supported by host govern-
ments.'" The cartel dominates and shapes a transitional country's
petroleum industry, and hence its national economy. This domina-
tion has impact beyond the border and can reach regional or global
dimensions. The reality is that FDI in petroleum projects will con-
tinue, but only if the losses suffered by IOGCs in exploration en-
deavors, on balance, are outweighed by their gains in an environ-
ment with rapidly declining petroleum resources. More so than
ever, the capacity of small- or medium-sized independent produc-
ers is diminishing in an increasingly competitive global market.
An example of a business environment consisting of de facto
petroleum cartels is the oil development picture in poverty-
stricken Chad: all four IOGC giants (Exxon-Mobil, Chevron,
Conoco, and Shell), at various times have joined forces to develop
the industry there. Three out of the four are U.S.-based corporate
144 Commentators have long cautioned against the risk of global monopoly in
the new millennium. For the year 2000, worldwide mergers totaled nearly $3.5
trillion. McAdams, supra note 3, at 264; Ed Crooks, Deals Start to Dry Up After A
Record Year, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 2001, at 3. This figure does not include de facto
combinations of capital, such as the pattern discussed in this Article.
12312004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
giants, and although Shell is a Dutch company, it has substantial
producing subsidiaries or affiliates in the United States. 145 Critics
of MNCs may opine that a U.S.-based de facto cartel has positioned
itself to control Chad's national economy, and potentially of petro-
leum-producing Africa. On the other hand, the rational economist
may legitimately pose the following question: where will Chad be
some twenty years from now without the involvement, coopera-
tion, alliances, and resources of these "cartel" members who are
both financiers and technology specialists? The hope brought to
Chad by the monopolistic petroleum industry, no matter how thin
or how flawed, is still better than no hope at all.
The picture is clear: modem "monarchs" participate, cooperate
with, and support private de facto cartels, either as a matter of
choice or simply lack of choice. Due to the high-risk, capital-
intensive, and technically complex nature of upstream Petroleum
Activities (especially when the host country is in an economically
embryonic stage), these monopolistic partnerships effectively pre-
clude the development of a native or local entrepreneurial class ca-
pable of investing in, and benefiting directly from, the natural and
energy resources of their own homeland. When the modern "mon-
archs" shake hands with the MNC rainmakers, the door to true
capitalism is forever closed to the inhabitants of the transitional
economies, or the hopefully emerging entrepreneurial middle
class. The true owners of natural resources stand anonymously,
unobtrusively, and passively at the mercy of those in power and
control, who finalize the handshakes based on confidential nego-
tiations. There can never be, for the oil-producing countries that
remain poor, the jovial scene of the "Beverly Hillbillies" moving
their horse-carts merrily into their Beverly Hills mansion because
oil has been found on their land in Texas! The only hope for true
ownership of petroleum by the "people" is when the SOEs that are
the commercial arms of the host government (such as PetroViet-
nam in the Vietnam Deal) are eventually privatized, and shares are
offered to the public for direct purchase. In such a case, all
traumatic problems of the past chaotic experience with
privatization of the state-owned economy will be apt to re-occur, as
has been experienced in China, Germany, the former Soviet Union,
and Eastern Europe. 146 But even if this privatization scenario can
145 For information regarding Shell Oil Co. and its substantial operations in
the United States, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.




successfully materialize one day, the public at that time might still
be too poor and too sick to afford ownership of shares in a publicly
traded petroleum company! (Countries stricken with poverty such
as Nigeria and Chad suffer from high infant mortality and short
life expectancy, which together belie the hope for true prosperity or
improved standards of living.)14 7
3.1.3.3. The "Carry" of Costs and Expenses
Although holders of Participating Interests are required to con-
tribute equity and to bear their proportionate shares of costs, this
may not always mean that the Participating Interest holder will
have to contribute cash flow to support expensive exploration ac-
tivities. Where the host government or its SOE insists on holding a
Participating Interest in the project, such a Participating Interest
may be "carried" by other investors or participants all through the
various stages of Petroleum Activities. The "Carry" means that all
financial burdens and the risk of exploration failure are borne by
foreign investors, even though the host government is entitled to
hold a Participating Interest. If exploration fails, the host govern-
ment will not have to pay back the Carry.
nies in China, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301 (describing privatization in China); En-
rique R. Carrasco, Autocratic Transitions to Liberalism: A Comparison of Chilean and
Russian Structural Adjustment, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (1995) (de-
scribing transitions to a private economy); Richard K. Gordon, Privatization and
Legal Development, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 367 (1995) (suggesting that legal infrastructure
should carefully be developed in creating privatization vehicles); Kent Klaudt,
Hungary After the Revolution: Privatization, Economic Ideology and the False Promise of
the Free Market, 13 LAW & INEQ. 303 (1995) (describing the creation of inequality
following the 1989 market liberalization); Matthew J. Madalo, Comment, The Con-
troversial Land Code of the Russian Federation: A Balanced Approach to Resolving Rus-
sia's Land Reform Question and Encouraging Foreign Investment, 42 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 577 (2002) (discussing privatization issues in Russia with regard to land
ownership); Pankaj Tandon, Welfare Effects of Privatization: Some Evidence from Mex-
ico, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 329 (1995) (attacking the claim that public sector companies
are inefficient through an examination of empirical evidence); Introduction: Priva-
tization - The Global Scale-Back of Government Involvement in National Economics, 48
ADMIN. L. REV. 435 (1996) (citing privatization as the dominant international eco-
nomic trend); Alex Brummer, Avoiding the Pitfalls Privatisation Creates, THE AGE
(Melbourne), Apr. 22, 1994, at 21; James Dom, A New Mantra for China: Seek Truth
From Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 26, 2003, at 11 (describing problems
with China's economic liberalization); Privatisation in the Soviet Union, Fanning the
Spark of Capitalism, ECONOMIST, May 18, 1991, at 82 (describing the privatization of
a Soviet factory); see also Ronald A. Cass, The Optimal Pace of Privatization, 13 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 413 (1995) (suggesting a relatively fast pace for privatization).
147 See supra note 15 (discussing public data on the natural resources and liv-
ing conditions of Nigeria and Chad).
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Understandably, the Carry is the norm in the developing na-
tions. Typically, the IOGC-contractor will only carry the Partici-
pating Interest held by the host government or its SOE. (The
IOGC-contractor will not be looking to carry the interest of any of
its other partners, especially if the IOGC is counting on these part-
ners to share investment risks! In fact, most likely the IOGC-
contractor will be looking to other foreign partners to share its
Carry of the government.) The host government's economic de-
pendency upon the IOGC who carries the government's costs is in-
escapably evident, yet the party who is economically dependent is
also the party who plays the role of the sovereign regulator over-
seeing the IOGC's conduct in the country.
Quite often the IOGC's Carry obligation will be effective
through the Exploration phase, where risks of failure are the great-
est. Accordingly, during PSC negotiation, the IOGC's goal will be
to minimize its Carry obligations as much as possible, not to ex-
tend the Carry beyond the exploration period. After a Commercial
Discovery, the government or its SOE should be able to obtain fi-
nancing for its obligations via a pledge against its forthcoming
share of production. In other words, the government's carried in-
terest is typically a non-cost-bearing interest, which may be con-
verted into a cost-bearing interest upon production startup. The
IOGC will want to assure that all carried costs and expenses be ul-
timately reimbursed out of production. The contractual frame-
work under which carried costs and expenses are reimbursed is
part of the Cost Recovery terms.
3.1.3.4. The Work Program
The exploration program typically consists of kilometers of
seismic data, a definite number of wells to be drilled ("Obligatory
Wells"), and, in some cases, an additional number of optional wells
to be drilled ("Non-obligatory Wells"). These work commitments
constitute the IOGC-contractor's Work Program-a contractual un-
dertaking made to the host country in exchange for access to the
country's natural resources. This is why the IOGC-contractor finds
itself in the peculiar position of someone who promises to perform
work for free. The right to install and work a drilling rig on sover-
eign ground is literally the consideration in exchange for the
IOGC's Work Program!
The Work Program may even impose penalties for the contrac-
tor's non-performance, and can be secured by a Standby Letter of
1234 [Vol. 25:4
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Credit issued for the benefit of the host government, in order to
safeguard against the IOGC-contractor's default.148 If the IOGC-
contractor fails to finish the Work Program, the host government
can draw upon the Letter of Credit to make good its damages, and,
in addition, sue the IOGC-contractor for breach of contract in the
underlying PSC transaction. The role of the Standby Letter of
Credit can also be fulfilled by similar instruments such as a bank's
financial guarantee, a surety performance bond, and/or a "parent"
or "corporate" financial or performance guarantee provided by the
IOGC's parent holding company. 49 In summary, not only does an
IOGC-contractor do "work for free," but it may also be penalized
or made subject to further financial loss if it fails to perform or
complete the work.
One way for the IOGC to control financial risks is to put a
maximum limit or ceiling on the Work Program. This limit can ei-
ther be "money-driven," or "work-driven." If the Work Program limit
is "work-driven," the PSC may specify that the IOGC is required to
drill a specific number of wells, and that the wells meet certain cri-
teria or purpose. In a "money-driven" Work Program, the contrac-
tual commitment is typically to conduct exploration up to a maxi-
mum budgetary limit - a financial cap. When the ceiling is
reached, the IOGC-contractor has no obligation to perform addi-
tional exploration activities or spend more money. It may then
withdraw from the host country or otherwise validly abandon the
project.
Where there is a discovery of a reserve in the Contract Area,
two major issues will immediately arise. First, under most contrac-
tual arrangements, discovery of petroleum will entitle the contrac-
tor to the exclusive rights of exploitation. However, this may not
be a universal rule. Accordingly, a specific "exclusivity" provision
may become necessary in the underlying PSC. Without an express
"exclusivity" provision, the host government, due to geopolitical
148 See Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit,
Dec. 11, 1995, 2169 U.N.T.S. 190 (explanatory note by the UNCTRAL Secretariat)
(stating that the Convention is designed to facilitate the use of independent guar-
antees and standby letters of credit), available at http://www.uncitral.org; Roy
Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings in International Transactions, 22 BROOK. J.
INT'L. L. 1 (1996) (discussing the legal implications of abstract payment undertak-
ings such as Standby Letters of Credit); Egon Guttman, Bank Guarantees and
Standby Letters of Credit: Moving Toward a Uniform Approach, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 167
(1990) (remarking that unknown credit standing of purchasers has led to the de-
velopment of standby letters of credit).
149 See, e.g., Goode, supra note 148.
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factors, may require the IOGC to take on an equity partner after the
reserve has been found, thereby interfering with project manage-
ment and limiting the IOGC's chance for maximizing profit. To the
extent the country's law requires certain procedural prerequisites,
the IOGC-contractor must make sure it complies with and per-
forms all such requirements in order to secure exclusivity.
Second, the IOGC-contractor will have to determine whether
the reserve is substantial enough for the IOGC to proceed to the
subsequent phases of Development and Production. If the reserve
is substantial enough to justify the costs, it may be found to be
"Commercial." This determination may necessitate certain govern-
mental action, because the government, either by law or contract,
may have reserved licensing or approval authority for itself with
respect to each and every step of Petroleum Activities. This ap-
proval authority is even more crucial with respect to a declaration
of "Commercial Discovery," as will be explained below.
3.1.3.5. Standards of Commerciality and Contractor's
Withdrawal Rights
The nature of exploration work is such that the more explora-
tory activities are conducted in the Contract Area, the more likely
the investor may discover petroleum if the Contract Area indeed
has reserves. The logic is simple: the contractor will need to drill
as much as possible, as long-term as possible, in order to "hit that
stream." The more wells are drilled, the more chance there is for
the IOGC-contractor to make a Commercial Discovery.
The limit set on the Work Program forces the IOGC to perform
"educated guesswork" by estimating future costs and the work in-
volved to secure the maximum chance for a Commercial Discov-
ery. This guesswork has to be done in an environment full of un-
certainty and variants, even with the most sophisticated geological
sampling and technical analysis. To deal with Appraisal Risks, the
IOGC-contractor may have to secure for itself a "Withdrawal Right,"
or the right to disengage from future obligations, in order to bring
the investment or project to the conclusion when it determines that
further work and expenditures contradict sound economic judg-
ment. The host government, on the other hand, may insist on the
opposite course of action -it wants to reserve for itself the right to
call for a higher commitment than originally contemplated, either
in terms of monetary spending or the drilling of additional wells.




tained by negotiation in order to achieve the compromised mixture
of "give-and-take."
It follows, therefore, that a decision by the IOGC to withdraw
from the project does not necessarily mean that the Contract Area
is devoid of deposits. Instead, it is the IOGC's economic judgment
whether the finds are Commercial enough to be worth the costs of
developing them. Accordingly, critical to an exploration contract is
the "Commerciality" Clause, which sets the standards for determin-
ing whether a petroleum discovery is economically feasible and
appropriate for development (as opposed to being abandoned).
Commerciality is the legal concept that, if triggered, will allow
the IOGC the right to exit the project based on its economic judg-
ment, in order to "cut its losses and go home" without further ob-
ligations to the host government. The concept thus conditions con-
tractual obligations upon the viability and profitability of a
project.150 In the ideal negotiating situation, the 10GC-contractor
will want total final discretion over the legal definition of Com-
merciality. It wants to control its right to proceed and invest more
money, or simply withdraw from the project in order to prevent an
economically losing proposition. The determination may even de-
pend on external factors such as high production costs in an envi-
ronment of declining oil price, or whether a marginal reserve can
be jointly developed with another substantial reserve in order to
achieve economy of scale. At times, the IOGC may procure a
"claw-back" right to return to the project after it has withdrawn for
lack of Commerciality, as economic viability may be a fluid judg-
ment depending on both external and internal factors or changed
circumstances.
150 As a legal concept, "Commerciality" may occur in contexts other than pe-
troleum exploration. For example, in a construction project concerning a produc-
tion or manufacturing facility, Commerciality may mean whether the income-
producing plant is able to perform up to specified capacity. In the construction
process, "Mechanical Completion" alone is not sufficient; the plant must also be ca-
pable of "Commercial Operation." These are often legal terms defined in the con-
tract to help determine whether the design-construction contractor has satisfacto-
rily fulfilled its obligations to the owner-developer of the facility. Typically such
Commercial Operation standards are determined and certified by the owner-
developer as well as by the host government. If the plant does not meet the test
for Commercial Operation, the contractor is not discharged from performance ob-
ligations and may have to pay liquidated damages. The risk resulting from the
plant not meeting Commerciality criteria, therefore, can be shifted entirely to the
construction contractor. See, e.g., Duong, supra note 38 (manuscript Section 3.2)
(discussing Case Two, the Midstream Transaction); John G. Mauel, Common Con-
tractual Risk Allocations in International Power Projects, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 37.
12372004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int 7 Econ. L.
In contrast, the host country will also want to have the discre-
tion to declare whether a discovery is Commercial, as such a decla-
ration will mark the end of the Exploration phase and the begin-
ning of the Development phase, which may ultimately lead to
petroleum production that can change the future of a country.
Here, conflicts may arise and intense negotiation may result. At
best, the government will want to put the burden of proving non-
Commerciality upon the IOGC-contractor, and will want to scruti-
nize and have approval or veto authority over the IOGC-
contractor's determination of Commerciality. Realistically, for na-
tional interest reasons, no government will want to yield such ab-
solute discretion to the foreign investor. Quite often, Commerci-
ality determination becomes a joint decision by the IOGC and the
host government. Where the scale tips will depend on leverage
and bargaining power under the circumstances.
Likewise, as an extension of the Commerciality concept, the
IOGC-contractor may want to protect its power of control by con-
tractually dividing the exploration work commitment into sub-
phases. It may want to retain the right to evaluate and withdraw
at the end of each sub-phase, thereby maintaining its discretionary
flexibility whether to renew or extend the time duration for explo-
ration. It may also want the discretion to reduce or expand the
Contract Area. (This flexibility is even more critical in case of a gas
discovery (rather than an oil discovery), because the development
of a gas discovery will depend on possibilities of long-term gas
sales contracts in the region, or other acceptable marketing
schemes.) At the other end of the spectrum, the host government
will also want to maintain its power to approve or disapprove each
of the contractor's decisions and, in general, will want the contrac-
tor to prolong or expand exploration work in hopes of future finds
for development.
3.1.3.6. The Host Country's Fiscal Regime and Bonus
Requirements
Despite the differences in legal systems, an economist may be
able to chart precisely the economic consequences for either party
by scrutinizing the terms of the PSC. In other words, in any legal
system, it is possible to calculate and figure the percentage of the
"Government Take" versus the "Contractor Take" out of the produc-
tion of petroleum found in a Contract Area. The Government Take




Participation claimed by the host country or its SOE, plus any pay-
ment of bonuses asked of the IOGC-contractor at various points
during the contract's life. All these elements together constitute
the host government's petroleum Fiscal Regime. The Contractor
Take, on the other hand, refers to the after-tax, after-cost share of
petroleum (or fees paid, depending on the legal system) to which
the contractor is entitled.
151
From a macroeconomic standpoint, a petroleum-exporting
country's Fiscal Regime is the legal and economic mechanism by
which Economic Rent is captured via the Government Take, in order
for the country to maximize its wealth. Various Economic Rent
theories explain the government's Fiscal Regime, and may provide
insight into the conflict, as well as justify the balance, between the
economic interests of host governments versus those of IOGC-
contractors. Under these theories, Economic Rent is the difference
between the value of petroleum and the costs to extract it.152 In
economic terms, "costs" consist of not only the expenses of Petro-
leum Activities, but also the profit claimed by the contractor. Ac-
cordingly, Economic Rent is the same as Excess Profit available for
grab by either party, after IOGCs have recouped all of their expen-
ditures and captured their desired profit:
Value of Petroleum - (Expenses + Profit) = Economic Rent
= Excess Profit
Governments, in the role of resource owners analogous to land-
lords, will attempt to capture as much Economic Rent as possible
through taxation, royalties, share of production, and required bo-
nuses. IOGCs, on the other hand, will want to maximize profit to
the farthest-reaching limit, whenever possible. In other words,
IOGCs want to claim Excess Profit, if the fiscal and legal regimes so
allow. The Government Take, therefore, serves to curtail IOGCs'
Excess Profit.
Among the elements constituting the Government Take, tax
and royalties may be set by national legislation and, hence, can
151 JOHNSTON, supra note 111, at 9-15.
152 Id. at 6; see ZUHAYIR MIKDASHI, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF NATURAL
RESOURCES (1976) (discussing businesses that exploit natural resources); RICARDO,
supra note 71, at 33-45 (discussing economic concepts of "rent"); Paul Davidson et
al., The Relation of Economic Rents and Price Incentives to Oil and Gas Supplies, in
STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY 115 (Gerard M. Brannon ed., 1975) (discussing the
supply of oil and gas Economic Rents).
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rarely be negotiated. The IOGC, however, can negotiate within the
range of royalty rates provided by law, and/or it can negotiate or
apply for tax holidays or exemptions, or a ceiling limit upon busi-
ness income tax (at times called profit tax). Typically, royalty rates
have not exceeded fifteen percent of the value of production.153 As
to income tax, quite often, governments or their contracting SOEs
have been willing to pay for the IOGC-contractor's tax out of the
government's share of production, and then provide the IOGC a
receipt to enable it to seek income tax credit back home, especially
when, as in the case of the United States, the home jurisdiction
taxes worldwide income and then provides the taxpayer with a
credit for the amount of income taxes paid to foreign governments
in order to avoid double taxation. 54
Where the host government or its SOE absorbs the IOGC's in-
come tax obligations (as described above), naturally the IOGC-
contractor will have to accede to a higher production share for the
government, since such production share must encompass the
payment of the IOGC's income tax to the host jurisdiction. For the
IOGC-contractor, the benefit of having the governmental entity as-
sume the IOGC's local tax burden is merely the streamlining of
paperwork created by the enforcement of the host government's
taxation scheme - the foreign investor does not have to worry
about it, since the SOE, a governmental instrumentality, will then
be paying taxes on the IOGC's behalf. This arrangement may also
serve as de facto indemnity or assurance, protecting the IOGC
against further tax underpayment or deficiency assessed by the
host government, since tax liability has been paid by the govern-
ment's very own SOE or instrumentality.
153 See JOHNSTON, supra note 111, at 54 ("Anything above 15% is getting exces-
sive.").
154 Depending on the terms of the PSC, if the income tax charged by the host
country meets certain criteria set by the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, the U.S.-
based IOGC-contractor will receive an income tax credit toward the taxation of its
worldwide income levied by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. See 26 U.S.C. §§
27, 901, 902, 904, 960 (2003); Rev. Rul. 78-222, 1978-1 C.B. 232 (1978); Internal
Revenue Service, Topic 503- Deductible Taxes, at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/
tc503.htm1 (last visited Nov. 15, 2004); see also Terrence R. Chorvat, Ending the
Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 ARIz. L. REV. 835, 840 (2000) (favoring an ex-
emption taxation system for foreign-sourced income); Joseph Isenbergh, The For-
eign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable Taxes, 39 TAx L. REV. 227, 248-49,
251-52 (1984) (noting that the foreign tax credit prevents double taxation of over-
seas businesses). The use of "double taxation treaties" as bilateral agreements be-
tween sovereigns to avoid double taxation of corporate and individual residents is




Government Participation can be another bite of production
added to the Government Take. (There are jurisdictions that opt
not to charge a royalty and, instead, focus on Government Partici-
pation or Production Sharing.) Government Participation can also
guarantee certain rights of control for the host government or its
SOE with respect to the management and operation of Petroleum
Activities. Excessive Government Participation, therefore, can be a
disincentive to the IOGC's decision to invest.
Negotiation thus centers around balancing the Contractor Take
against the Government Take -both sides want the biggest bite of
Economic Rent. Ideally, the government's goals are to design a
Fiscal Regime that: (1) provides a fair return to the nation-state as
well as to private industry (otherwise, no foreign investor would
invest); (2) avoids undue speculation or unpredictability (which
would dissuade foreign investment); (3) limits undue administra-
tive burden upon the government as well as foreign participants
(which would also dissuade investment); (4) provides sufficient
flexibility to cope with the country's changing needs; and (5) cre-
ates healthy competition and market efficiency.
55
In reality, due to unequal bargaining powers, their desperate
need for technology and foreign capital, and their inexperience, the
lesser-developed transitional economies stand to give up more
than they gain in the negotiation process. Accordingly, the goals
set forth above can be purely aspirational. For example, the exclu-
sivity of the "MNCs and Friends Club" may negate the goal of fos-
tering healthy competition or stimulating entrepreneurship in the
host country. (The only group of "entrepreneurs" that may benefit
from training and technology transfer is the contracting SOE, con-
trolled and selected by the government.) Accordingly, various
measures by which a government captures Economic Rent become
the sovereign's tools to correct the imbalanced pendulum. Yet, as
explained below, these measures themselves may also become the
seeds of vice.
Specifically, since tax and royalties are typically set by law, and
production shares or Government Participation are carefully nego-
tiated via contracts, the payment of bonuses to governments as re-
155 JOHNSTON, supra note 111, at 17; see REX BOSSON & BENSION VARON, THE
MINING INDUSTRY AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (1977); FRANK M. BURKE &
RICHARD D. DOLE, BUSINESS ASPECTS OF PETROLEUM EXPLORATION IN NON-
TRADITIONAL AREAS (1991); Alfred J. Boulos, How a Domestic Oil Company Goes
International: A Strategy for Success, Production Sharing Contracts Conference
Proceedings, AIC Conference (Mar. 1994).
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source owners becomes the only flexible mechanism for the host
government to capture Economic Rent. In other words, where ap-
propriately administered, required bonuses paid by an IOGC-
contractor to the host government are proper ways for the gov-
ernment to minimize or eliminate the IOGC-contractor's Excess
Profit. Accordingly, contractual terms such as "Signature Bonus"
(payable to the host government upon contract execution) and
"Production Bonus" (payable to the host government upon produc-
tion startup) have become acceptable norms of the international
petroleum industry. The host government may decide to award
the PSC to the IOGC-contractor who can voluntarily minimize its
profit margin by offering to pay the highest bonuses to the host
country. The company does not have to do this unless it voluntar-
ily offers to do so, or unless the host government mandates bo-
nuses as a bidding requirement. Hence, not all PSCs have bonus
provisions, although bonuses have provided the competitive edge
and increasingly become the norm for PSCs around the world.
Bonuses thus increase the Government Take, and can be pay-
able in cash, or as equipment, supplies, social programs, or tech-
nology transfer. From the perspective of the investor, Production
Bonuses are better deals than Signature Bonuses-at the time of
production startup, Appraisal Risks regarding exploration failure
have practically been eliminated, as a Commercial reserve has been
found. If there is no Commercial reserve discovered, Signature
Bonuses already paid are considered part of the IOGC's investment
losses.
In reality, the Government Take (achieved through the devel-
oping nation's petroleum Fiscal Regime) does not always result in
wealth and well-being for the nation-state or its populace. This is
particularly true in countries with a bad reputation for corruption
and dictatorship, but this fact can also be the mere result of gov-
ernments' incompetence, mismanagement, and other macroeco-
nomic errors. Bonuses thus become the vulnerable places where
abuse of governmental power can occur. The inverse movement
and disparity between a hefty Government Take in petroleum Fis-
cal Regimes and the progress or sustained development for the na-
tion-state and its populace can best be illustrated in an analysis of
the bonus system, as detailed below.
Bonuses, when payable in cash, can be a direct source of hard
currencies to the host government. The import of hard currencies -
meaning currencies of the economically strong industrialized na-




weaker currencies may be pegged - can help solve a developing
country's "balance of trade" or "balance of payment" problems, which
can jeopardize the country's good standing in the international
monetary system administered by the IMF.156 A good supply or
surge of hard currency imports may restore a country's economy
and its place in the international monetary system. Yet, in a perva-
sively corrupt country where bribery is received at the very top
levels of government, hard currencies poured into the country can
also become illicit contributions to the "bloated Swiss bank ac-
counts" of corrupt government officials. 157 A recent scandal and
federal anti-bribery investigation initiated by the U.S. Department
of Justice involved finder's fees and acquisition payments made by
the defunct Mobil Corporation (now Exxon-Mobil by virtue of cor-
porate merger).158 The payments were made to a U.S. citizen and
owner of a merchant bank, who allegedly acted as agent for the
government of Kazakhstan. These payments (in the millions) were
allegedly made in connection with Mobil's acquisition of, and de-
velopment activities in, the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan. According
to U.S. prosecutors, these payments were eventually channeled
into private bank accounts allegedly owned or controlled by the
156 Hans Genberg, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: ITS
INSTITUTIONS AND ITS FUTURE 1 (Hans Genberg ed., 1995); JOSEPH GOLD,
INTERPRETATION: THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1996); cf. Anne Bichsel, The
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund from the Perspective of the Executive
Directors from Developing Countries, 28 J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1994, at 141.
Balance of trade problems refer to the surplus or deficit that results from
comparing a country's expenditures spent on imports to receipts derived from its
exports. Balance of payments, of which balance of trade is a component, refers to
the tabulation of a country's credit and debit transactions with other countries and
international institutions. Healthy volumes of exports payable to the exporting
countries in hard currencies, and abundant in-bound flows of foreign capital into
the country, will supply the country with surplus hard currencies sufficient to
make the economy strong. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, SEPTEMBER 2002: TRADE AND FINANCE, ch. 2 (2002) (discussing
vulnerabilities in the world economy including global external imbalances and
corporate finance in emerging markets), available at http://www.imf.org/
extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2002/0 2/.
157 See, e.g., Bhala, supra note 27, at 118 (examining the "Doha Development
Agenda" of the new WTO trade round and discussing issues of poverty in the Is-
lamic World and the "Third World"); Charles E. Mueller, Why Are Some Countries
So Poor? The Dead Hand of Corruption and Monopoly, 31 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV.
1, 1 (2002) (discussing the worldwide growth of poverty); Nanda, supra note 27, at
B7 (discussing the collapse of the "Doha Round" negotiations).
158 Gerth, supra note 14, at A10 (corrupting oil production in Kazakhstan);
John Tagliabue, Kazakhstan is Suspected of Oil Bribes in the Millions, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 2000, at A5.
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President of the Republic. 159 Similar bribery allegations have been
made against the giant international construction company, Halli-
burton, with respect to its work in Nigeria. 160
A press release issued by Transparency International ("TI") (an
NGO specializing in international anti-corruption campaigns),
which accompanied TI's 1997 Corruption Perception Index
("CPI"), alerted the public that there was a direct link between lev-
els of corruption in the developing economies and FDI. The CPI
compilers concluded that a large share of corruption was the ex-
plicit product of MNCs, headquartered in leading industrialized
nations, using large-scale bribery and kick-backs to obtain con-
tracts in the developing world and in countries in transition.161
Other anti-corruption activists outside of the TI's network have
also argued that "[a] country becomes or remains poor in accor-
dance with a familiar formula: Its corrupt government -intent on
maximizing the Swiss bank-accounts of its leaders -routinely
'sells' the national economy to a group of cronies who... pay rich
bribes for the guaranteed right to monopolize their respective sec-
tors" 162 in the local and regional market. If this allegation can em-
pirically and consistently be proven, the "development" model of
global economics is an abject failure. With the web of corruption in
place as a way of life, there is no way for the "rich" democracies to
help the approximately three billion people who are citizens of
some one hundred impoverished nations, unless the flow of capital
and resources can get to the people who need them. But is this
web of corruption perpetuated by MNCs, and which one comes
first, the chicken or the egg? 63 Serious attention, therefore, must
159 See Tagliabue, supra note 158, at A5 (freezing accounts belonging to Ka-
zakh president Nursultan A. Nazarbayev).
160 Nigeria in Probe of Halliburton, supra note 14, at A3; Gold & Wilke, supra
note 14, at A6 (inquiring under the FCPA); see also Dow Jones Newswires, supra
note 14 (alleging a corruption scandal between Nigerian officials and Halliburton
subsidiary for a gas plant contract).
161 See Press Release, Transparency Int'l, Transparency International Pub-
lishes 1997 Corruption Perception Index (July 31, 1997) (surveying business peo-
ple, political analysts, and the public on their perception of corruption in fifty-two
countries), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/1997/cpi1997.pdf. The
adequacy, completeness, and neutrality of the Corruption Perception Index
("CPI"), and its conclusions, may be challenged, but at a minimum, its efforts
raise public awareness, catching the attention of policymakers, as well as spurring
studies and research by institutional experts.
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be given to the empirical patterns of relationships between FDI
capital, the current status of anti-corruption law, trends of interna-
tional legal cooperation, and the poverty statistics of the develop-
ing world.'"
Following the release of the 1997 CPI, in December 1997, after
much debate and controversy, an anti-bribery international con-
vention was signed, joining together all members of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), and
three other non-member-states in a global combat against corrup-
tion.165 The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Transactions of 1998 ("OECD Con-
vention") entered into force within a year of signature and, as of
April 2003, had been ratified by thirty four nation-states. 66 In the
United States, on November 10, 1998, President Clinton signed into
law the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act, im-
plementing the OECD Convention.
67
The OECD Convention obligates its signatories to enact na-
tional legislation prohibiting international briberies. Most devel-
oping nations (commonly lumped together as the "bribe-receiving"
nations) are not members of the OECD and, hence, are not bound
by the OECD Convention's mandates. It is ironic, however, that
several "bribe-receiving" nations have always had either policy
164 See generally Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International
Codes of Conduct: A Study of the Relationship between International Legal Cooperation
and Economic Development, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 1275 (1995).
For a view exploring the correlation between corruption and "Third World"
economic development, see Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Prog-
eny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 689 (2000) (outlining issues in the
fight against international corruption and bribery in the twenty-first century).
The Author argued that the FCPA and its progeny are not moral imperialism but
a product of economic forces. The view expressed by Professor Shaw, however, is
not a case study, but only a scholarly proposition to advocate the utility of univer-
sal business ethics standards for internationalism.
165 See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions, Nov. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Con-
vention] (resolving to take measures to combat corruption), available at http://
www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/LinkTo/daffe-ime-br(97)20.
166 See Jeremy Carver, Combating Corruption: the Emergence of New International
Law, 5 INT'L L.F. DU DROIT INT'L 119 (May 2003) (discussing the OECD Conven-
tion).
167 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-1 to -3 (1998) (amending the FCPA and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934); Business Laws, Inc. Editorial Staff, International Business Ethics, 13 INT'L Q.
31 (2001) (advocating the incorporation of such laws in a code of conduct for
MNCs).
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statements or written laws condemning and sanctioning briberies
of their officials, long before the OECD Convention came into be-
ing. For example, in Vietnam, Communist Party leaders officially
stressed the fact that corruption offended the nation's cultural val-
ues, as well as the communist model of rigid party disciplines, 168
yet the principles stated by national leadership contradicts the re-
alty of life on the street. The question in "Third World" real-life is
whether, in a country such as Vietnam, where government bureau-
crats typically earn approximately U.S. $30-50 a month, and where
the colloquial expressions of "jungle's law" made by "sleeping law-
makers" are used by commoners to refer to the nation's legal sys-
tem, those anti-corruption laws and policies exist on paper only.169
One can argue that in practice, the OECD Convention was not
designed to improve the morals, ethics, or reality of the developing
world for the benefit of its inhabitants. The Convention was
viewed as the direct result of the United States' international lob-
bying efforts to persuade the Western industrialized nations to
adopt anti-corruption laws analogous to the U.S. anti-bribery legis-
lation, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA" or "the Act")170
The U.S. objective was to put its business executives on par with
their counterparts from other OECD nations. If the signatories to
the OECD Convention, bound by its mandates, enact anti-bribery
national laws, U.S. businesses will no longer be disadvantaged in
168 For a report on governmental salaries, criminal sanctions, and real-life en-
forcement cases giving death sentences to corrupt and drug-trafficking officials in
the Social Republic of Vietnam in the early and mid-1990s, when FDI in Vietnam
was gradually increasing to its peak (prior to the Asian currency crisis), see
WILLIAM A.W. NEILSON ET AL., VIETNAM INVESTMENT MANUAL 42-43 (Frederick
Burke ed., 1995) (discussing the prosecution of corrupt government officials in
passing as part of an international law firm's country report); ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: INDOCHINA: VIETNAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA 15,
(4th Quarter 1993) (waging anti-corruption campaigns); see also Resolution Issued by
the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee's Sixth Plenum (Voice of Vietnam
radio broadcast, Feb. 24, 1999) (authorizing the Politburo to undertake research to
meet the need to increase the fight against corruption, stating further that party
officials at all levels should be made responsible for "anticorruption activity"),
available at http://w-ww.undp.org.vn/mlist/develvn/O21999/post21.htm.
For another example of national anti-bribery criminal law in Asia, see
Teodoro Kalaw IV, Anti-Corruption Laws and Regulations in the Philippines, 37 ASIA
Bus. L. REV. 45 (2002) (surveying the Philippines' anti-bribery criminal sanctions
imposed both upon the giver and the receiver of bribes).
169 Duong, supra note 52, at 295.
170 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (amending the FCPA and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934).
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"bribe-receiving" countries, simply because U.S. businessmen are
governed by the FCPA while their competitors from other "bribe-
giving" countries are not. For years, U.S. businesses have de-
manded a level playing field.171 The Convention thus represents a
victory for U.S. companies, especially when other industrialized
nations have quickly taken action to comply with the mandates of
the OECD Convention.172
In addition to the OECD Convention, regional efforts also evi-
dence the ongoing international campaign against bribery. The
Organization of American States ("OAS") was instrumental in
bringing about the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
of 1996 (the "Inter-American Convention"). 173 The Organization of
African Unity ("OAU") and the Global Coalition for Africa
("GCA") have unsuccessfully spearheaded efforts toward a similar
convention for African countries. a74 Similarly, the Paris-based In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") has also initiated ef-
forts to invite companies worldwide to adopt rules of conduct de-
signed to combat extortion and bribery in international trade.175
In the world of scholarly idealism, the OECD Convention can
be viewed as a representative and inspiring statement of universal
business ethics. As such, the Convention is an example of how "in-
ternational legalization," rather than interest-based bargaining, can
advance normative values.176 Historically, the philosophical de-
171 For a public statement regarding the United States' international lobbying
and anti-corruption policies in partnership with the private sector, see U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, FIGHTING GLOBAL CORRUPTION: BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (2000)
(statement released by the U.S. Department of State in consultation with the U.S.
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and Treasury, the U.S. Office of Government
Ethics, and the U.S. Agency for International Development).
172 See, e.g., Martijn Wilder & Michael Ahrens, Australia's Implementation of the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, 2 MELB. J. INT'L L. 568, 586 (2001) ("The introduction
of Australia's anti-bribery offence clearly brings Australia into line with the
United States ... ").
173 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
724 (1996).
174 See, e.g., Alhaji B.M. Marong, Toward a Normative Consensus Against Corrup-
tion: Legal Effects of the Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 99, 100 (2001) ("[A] specific African discourse on corruption is identifi-
able, taking place under the auspices of the GCA ... ").
175 Press Release, International Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 21, 1996) (on file
with author).
176 See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 141 (developing "a simple
model of the interaction of 'value' and 'interest' actors" and analyzing the devel-
opment of the OECD Convention from the interplay thereof); see also Shaw, supra
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bates concerning international law and international relations fluc-
tuate on a spectrum between the "value" model and the "interest"
model. 177 Normative and constructivist scholars see international
law as an expression of morally driven norms (the "value" model);
rational choice scholars understand law to be a creature of interest-
based bargaining or other incentives based on the "logic of conse-
quences" (the "interest" model).178 Commentators have referred to
the formulation of international law to effectuate both the "value"
and "interest" models as the "legalization" movement. 79 In its
best defense, the OECD Convention is an example that both mod-
els can co-exist, serving as the showcase for this "legalization"
movement.180
However, a careful look at the current norm of bonus payment
in the petroleum sector may pose some legitimate doubt as to
whether systematic efforts of "legalization" at the international
level may effectively cure the root cause of poverty or its cousin-
the vice of governmental corruption-in the developing world. A
misused bonus payment in the millions of dollars paid under a ne-
gotiated PSC scheme may constitute a "legitimate" bribe under the
FCPA, which has tactfully been used as model anti-bribery legisla-
tion for nation-states acting under the mandates of the OECD Con-
vention.181 Enacted in response to the Lockheed scandal in Saudi
note 164, at 692-93 (advancing the moral character of anti-bribery laws with ar-
guments based on economic forces-bribery boosts prices unjustifiably, encour-
ages poor management, endangers freedom of economic choices, increases trans-
actional costs, reduces state revenues, increases public expenditures, and burdens
consumers).
177 See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 141-42 n.2 (distinguishing
"value" from "interest" models with citations to "influential examples" of the dia-
logs between proponents of these models).
178 Id. at 145-47.
179 Id.; see also Kenneth W. Abbott, The Many Faces of International Legalization,
92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 57, 57 (1998) ("The legalization of international rela-
tions is a highly variable phenomenon.").
180 For a "moral" defense of the FCPA, see, for example, Shaw, supra note 164,
at 689 (relating values and economic interests).
181 See OECD Directorate for Fin., Fiscal and Enterprise Aff., Report by the
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Implementation
of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation (stating that FCPA serves the
goals of reducing bribery and improving the integrity of the financial reporting
system), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/59/2087917.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 16, 2004).
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Arabia in the 1970s,182 the FCPA does not prohibit bribes qua
bribes, because what is considered a bribe in one culture may not
constitute a bribe in another culture. The FCPA only prohibits
payments that qualify as "corrupt payments" under statutory ele-
ments specified in the Act.183 One such element is the requirement
that in order for the payment to be illegal, it must be made to a re-
cipient who is a "foreign official." 184 Payment made to the treasury
allegedly for the "people," as in the case of bargained-for Signature
or Production Bonuses, does not meet this criterion and hence falls
outside the prohibition of the FCPA.185 Further, to be liable under
the Act, the company making the bribe must act with a "knowing"
state of mind. 86 "Knowing" is defined to include awareness of a
"high probability of the existence of [certain] circumstances [re-
quired for the offense]."187 The legislative history indicates that a
deliberate "burial of one's head under the sand" 188 to refute knowl-
edge will not eliminate liability under the Act, so long as knowl-
edge of the predicate circumstances can be proven or estab-
lished. 189  Thus, concepts such as "conscious disregard,"
"deliberate ignorance," or "willful blindness" are meant by the leg-
182 Larry Martz et al., Payoffs: The Growing Scandal, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1976,
at 26.
183 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§
78dd-l(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2000).
184 The term 'foreign official' statutorily means "any officer or employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a
public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or
on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or
for or on behalf of any such public international organization." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-
1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
185 Under the current interpretation of the FCPA, if payment is not made to a
foreign official, but rather, is made to the people, the corporate payor may not be
prosecuted. Where corrupt payment is traced to a foreign official, courts have
read into the FCPA a legislative intent to exempt the foreign official from prosecu-
tion and, instead, to scrutinize and deter only the conduct of the corporate payor.
United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1991).
186 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3), -3(a)(3).
187 Id. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(B).
188 The phrase "burying one's head in the sand" has become the colloquial
expression used by industry professionals and international business lawyers to
denote the type of deliberate ignorance of corruption that may constitute a viola-
tion of the FCPA or U.S. export control law.
189 ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISION STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR Acrs OF THIRD PARTIES
(AGENTS), H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 919-21 (1988), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
1953.
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islature to be part of the statutory definition of "knowing." 190
While such "knowing" standard should be the widest net to catch
all sins, in the case of petroleum bonuses, the difficulty of proof be-
comes the obstacle against effective enforcement of the law. How
does the prosecutor prove deliberate blindness as to where a cash
bonus payment goes after it reaches the nation's treasury, espe-
cially when such bonus payment is formally required by bidding
or tender, or otherwise negotiated as payment allegedly for the
benefit of the "people"?
In principle, the country's leaders should be able to prefer or
require cash payments in order to accumulate hard currencies for
the Treasury, for use in various legitimate macroeconomic or na-
tion-building purposes. In reality, in a pervasively corrupt coun-
try, such huge cash amounts may enrich some high officials' Swiss
accounts, yet the IOGC may now legitimately "bury its head in the
sand," and decline to inquire or investigate further. In fact, it will
make sure that documents exist to prove the company does not
need to, and cannot inquire further. The PSC itself negates the
MNC's specific intent or knowledge of corrupt usage or purpose
on the part of the host government's individual leaders. How cash
bonuses or payments are used may disingenuously be legitimized
as part of the host government's exercise of its "sovereign power,"
at least on paper or at the surface. Leaning upon the legitimacy of
such "sovereign power," the IOGC thus can rightfully disregard
any concern it may have about how bonus money is going to be
used, or where it is going. The IOGC may lawfully label such mys-
terious use as exclusive sovereign domain, and not of any concern
to the payor. Consequently, the very nature of, and mechanism es-
tablished for, the payment of cash bonuses in PSC schemes be-
comes the very defense companies will rely on to negate FCPA im-
plications. FCPA accountability, therefore, stops at the border,
where money changes hands.
The only safeguard left lies in the home jurisdiction's corporate
or securities law governing mandatory public disclosures-how
cash payments are documented and classified on the books and re-
cords of the IOGC according to applicable accounting and auditing
standards governing publicly traded corporations. Violations of
190 Id.; see also United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976) ("knowing" includes both positive knowledge and state





accounting or auditing requirements with respect to the documen-
tation and explanation of payments made in connection with inter-
national business activities may become separate violations of the
FCPA.' 91 (The FCPA consists of two statutory components: the
anti-bribery provisions and the accounting/reporting provisions.)
The accounting and auditing requirements of the FCPA are part of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act governing, in general, public
companies that are issuer-registrants under U.S. securities law.
1 92
Under these legal standards, "reasonableness" rather than "mate-
riality" constitutes the threshold that triggers the company's re-
sponsibility to keep books, records, and accounts, which must "ac-
curately and fairly reflect" the transaction and disposition of the
issuer's assets. 93 "Reasonableness" and "accurate and fair reflec-
tion" can easily be met with respect to the bonus payments, 94 since
all the issuer-company needs to do is to document, in reasonable
detail, that the payment was a bonus payment payable to the
Treasury of a foreign country, using the executed PSC as evidence
and support. The FCPA does not require the IOGC to investigate
the actual use and disbursements of bonus payments. Nor does
the Act require the IOGC to trace the final recipients of these bo-
nuses, unless the IOGC has reason to believe that (i) there exists a
corrupt intent on the part of the recipient to misappropriate and
transfer the bonuses to the pocket of a foreign official, or (ii) there
exists a reasonable likelihood that bonus payments are funneled to
private accounts. 95 Even when the IOGC may have reasons to
know such unique circumstances, it is difficult for the prosecution
to ascertain statutorily what the law requires the IOGC to do to
prevent bonus money from turning into a bribe under the law. The
IOGC can effectively clean its hands and legitimately walk away,
leaving what occurs behind closed doors in governmental offices of
the host country within the exclusive province of sovereignty.
96
If indeed bonuses or any type of cash payments are meant for
191 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000).
192 Id. § 78m(b)(2).
193 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
194 See, e.g., DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT § 6.6 (2003) (discussing the legality of donations or concessions
made to governmental entities).
195 Id.
196 Cf. Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International
Business, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 757-62 (1996) (discussing FCPA require-
ments regarding bribery of foreign officials).
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the benefit of the "people", anti-bribery law enforcement with re-
spect to the use and disbursement of multimillion-dollar cash
payments to foreign governments should not stop at the border
where money changes hands. Nor should it stop with the home
jurisdiction's internal audit or accounting requirements, whose fo-
cus is on the shareholder public back home and not on citizens of
the "Third World." Here is a perfect example where the interest of
the shareholder public and "Third World" inhabitants can coin-
cide- shareholders do not want exorbitant foreign bribes to cut
into the maximum return on their investment, and "Third World"
inhabitants do not want the money to end up in the unclean hands
of their corrupt leaders.
Imposition of stricter due diligence duties upon the IOGCs,
which are in the best position to conduct such due diligence,
should be considered part of the spirit and objective of interna-
tional anti-bribery campaigns and of the "legalization" doctrine
that has led to bodies of international law such as the OECD Con-
vention and the Inter-American Convention. Obviously, serious
policy arguments may be raised as to whether IOGCs should be
required to conduct due diligence and to obtain assurances from
the host jurisdiction with respect to the use and disbursement of
cash bonus payments allegedly for the "people's" interest. Similar
policy arguments can also be made as to (i) the realistic effective-
ness of such due diligence requirements, and (ii) the extent to
which the due diligence should be conducted before their addi-
tional costs pose economic concern for the shareholder public back
home.
In any event, the necessity of requiring further due diligence
for each and every cash bonus made can be rendered moot if the
IOGC community will use its leverage to replace cash bonus offers
or requirements with bonuses in kind, aimed specifically at serving
the "people's" interest and contributing directly to the local com-
munity. For example, instead of complying with cash bonus re-
quirements or offering to pay them, during negotiation IOGCs may
suggest bonuses strictly in the form of IOGC-sponsored social or
training programs for the local community; the construction, train-
ing and staffing of educational, medical, or community facilities
and research centers; the construction of various industrial or tech-
nological infrastructures; the sponsoring of starving local artists
and writers; the funding of University scholarships and grants;
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and/or other social programs similar to efforts normally under-
taken by corporate citizens of the developed nations.197 As a condi-
tion precedent to payment, cash bonuses, if any, should be ear-
marked for the funding of independent local or international
NGOs, local or international educational or medical institutions,
and similar non-profit organizations operating in the host jurisdic-
tion.198 If administered via an NGO, the use and disbursement of
bonuses can be monitored via NGOs' programmatic reports to
safeguard against funding abuse or mismanagement. Short of a
better alternative, if all members of the "MNC-IOGC cartel" will,
by consensus, raise this suggestion to the host countries, govern-
ments will eventually be forced to (i) minimize or alleviate cash
bonus requirements (other than those earmarked cash payments
exemplified above), or (ii) otherwise replace cash payments with
social programs. Any concern regarding the potential misuse of
197 See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 589-90 (N.J. 1953) (ar-
ticulating the doctrine of corporate social responsibility as a rationale for state leg-
islature allowing corporations to make charitable contributions for public welfare,
scientific, or educational purposes); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 3.02(13)
(2002); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1049,
1050 (1931) (discussing public policy considerations underlying "the law govern-
ing every corporate power"); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Mhom Are Corporate Manag-
ers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1154 (1932) (remarks of Owen D. Young,
Chairman of General Electric); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial
Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REv. 579, 588 (1997)
(indicating that while cash is the "most popular currency" for corporate contribu-
tions, donation of products, property, and equipment also occur). Compare War-
ren E. Buffet el al., Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS 10, 14 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) (quoting
panelist Warren E. Buffett as saying that "not one CEO has reached in his pocket
and pulled out 10 bucks of his own to give to this marvelous charity"), with Mil-
ton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine - The Social Responsibility of Business Is to In-
crease Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32, 126 ("[Tlhe doctrine
of 'social responsibility' ... . [is] a 'fundamentally subversive doctrine' in a free
society, and [I have said that in such a society, 'there is one and only one social
responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed
to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game .. '").
198 Political contributions made abroad by U.S. companies are subject to
FCPA implications. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3), -3(a)(3) (2000). In contrast,
the OECD Convention does not mandate national laws addressing corrupt politi-
cal contributions. OECD Convention, supra note 165. The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that corporate entities are entitled to constitutional protection with re-
spect to both commercial speech and political speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 20-21 (1976); see also Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 1243, 1246 (1999) (discussing domestic political control by corporations in
early twentieth century America). The curtailing of political contributions made
to foreign candidates and political parties abroad does raise perplexing constitu-
tional and social policy issues, and will be topics of discussion for another day.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
cash bonuses for corrupt purposes will practically be rendered
moot. The tremendous leverage and bargaining power that the
MNC-IOGC community has over host governments should be ex-
ercised and put to use in accordance with a systematic "public
interest" and "social responsibility" objective. This objective can
only be accomplished if the MNC-IOGC community is governed
by a "self-enforced regulation" model, which encourages the
MNC-IOGC community to provide voluntary response to constant
public scrutiny.199
The substitution of cash bonuses with social programs funded
by MNC-IOGCs is also consistent with the IMF's austerity meas-
ures imposed upon nation-loan recipients to steer them away from
conducting themselves as the "welfare states." Commentators
have observed that the Bretton Woods institutions often advocate
shrinking governments, social programs restrictions, higher inter-
est rates, reduction of subsidies for basic goods, and elimination of
tariffs as some of the free-market direction required of loan recipi-
ents.200 World Bank and IMF officials have reportedly claimed that
resistance to open markets, such as the antagonism exhibited by
Latin America and Africa, accounted for economic inequality and
stagnation in those regions. 201 In addition to deterring greed and
preventing potential abuse of power within national bureaucracies,
shifting the funding of social programs to the private sector and
the MNC-IOGC community (with the involvement of locally
formed or locally operating NGOs) may help the developing na-
tions conform their national policies to IMF or World Bank fiscal
philosophies.
3.1.3.7. The Management of Risks and Its Impact Upon Legal
Issues in MNC-Government Partnerships
The discussion so far reinforces one conclusion that requires no
empirical validation: where the "Third World" government is not
199 See Duong, supra note 38 (manuscript nn.412-13 & n.421) (discussing au-
thorities for management-based regulations); supra note 40 and accompanying
text. For a scholarly survey of transnational corporations' existing self-regulations
programs, see Ans Kolk et al., International Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Can Transnational Corporations Regulate Themselves?, 8 TRANSNAT'L
CoRPs. 143, (1999).
200 McAdams, supra note 3, at 252.
201 Id. at 253 n.97 (citing IMF Staff, Debt Relief Globalization, and IMF Reform:
Some Questions and Answers, IMF IssuEs BRIEF 2000, at http://www.imf.org/




acting in the best interest of its people and is itself committing "bad
acts," naturally the government's alliance with an MNC and the
monopolistic, close-knit nature of their partnership can cause an-
other layer of havoc for the country and its inhabitants. While this
point may first seem obvious, its full implication can best be illus-
trated by scrutinizing how an MNC-IOGC seeks to allocate and
manage various types of investment risks.
Principally, an IOGC must face two types of investment risks.
The risks of not finding a Commercial reserve in a Contract Area
are part of "Appraisal Risks," dependent upon geological factors.
These Appraisal Risks are distinguishable from "Political Risks,"
which, despite their volatile and undeterminable nature, can rela-
tively be assessed and controlled. Acts of government constituting
force majeure 202 are typically lumped together under the rubric of
Political Risks. Legal risks -the risks of changing laws, new legis-
lation, or adverse judicial or governmental agency rulings - are
part of Political Risks.
From the perspective of the foreign investor, Political Risks are
part of project risks, encompassing all material hostile acts by gov-
ernments, the assessment of which is more an art than an exact sci-
ence.203 In an investment contract, hostile acts by governments
202 See, e.g., Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht, 1 All E.R. 161, 161-
62 (Eng. C.A. 1963) (holding that a delay resulting from a ship charterer's decision
to proceed into a war zone was insufficient grounds to invoke the frustration of
contracts doctrine); UNCITRAL, DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NATION
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, art. 79, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/79 (2004) (identifying liability for failure to per-
form on an agreement), available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/V04/554/12/PDF/V0455612.pdf?OpenElement; JOHN 0. HONNOLD,
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 477-80 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the appli-
cability of the UCC's force majeure principles to the international sales of goods);
Barry Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.N. Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 5-1, 5-4 (Nina
M. Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984) (discussing shortcomings in Article 79 of the
Convention, which exempts a party from liability for failures [of performance] ...
due to "impediment beyond his control"); Joseph M. Perillo, Force Majeure and
Hardship Under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 5
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5 (1997) (discussing the implications of force majeure and
hardship doctrines in international commercial contract law); Michael G. Rapso-
manikis, Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative Law, 18
DuQ. L. REV. 551 (1980) (discussing how different contract regimes deal with the
frustration of contracts theory).
203 MIKESELL, supra note 118, at 39-40; Hallmark, Political Risks: Assessing Dan-
gers in International Exploration and Development, OFFSHORE, May 1991, at 27-34;
Hook, Sovereign Risk and the Resource Industries, PETROMIN,, Apr. 1992, at 39-45.
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may be included in the legal definition of force majeure, or may oc-
casion other force majeure events beyond a party's control such as
transportation interruption, shortage of supplies, or failure of de-
livery. The worst Political Risk that has been experienced with for-
eign investment in countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, and Li-
bya is the nationalization or expropriation of foreign investors'
assets due to regime changes and revolutions. Today's global
economy and the interlocking financial markets make individual
governmental acts of nationalization and expropriation less likely,
unless it is part of a drastic regime change or military coup.
The least obvious and least drastic Political Risk, but equally
significant, is an across-the-board policy shift, or gradual material
adverse governmental action ("MAGA") that may occur per pro-
ject, under the same regime that has approved the investment.
MAGA can amount to "creeping nationalization or expropria-
tion," 204 which refers to the gradual process of a state's acquisition
of control over foreign businesses within its borders, such that the
foreign investor's economic interest is materially impaired and
jeopardized over time.205 While creeping governmental action may
be characteristic of Political Risks in the developing nations, policy
shifts are not unique to any part of the world. In the United States,
policy shifts may occur with every election.
An IOGC's Appraisal Risk assessment and Political Risk as-
sessment may be inter-dependent. Petroleum Activities are long-
term endeavors-the production period can be twenty or thirty
years long.20 6 Exploration (quite often an initial five-year commit-
ment) may involve very high risks of failure-for years, the con-
ventional explorationist often commented that out of ten ventures,
at least nine were unsuccessful -although recent technological ad-
vances - particularly 3-D seismic technology - may have increased
the probability of exploration success to a percentage much higher
than the dismal ten percent of traditionalist thinking. Within the
corporate culture of IOGCs, only upstream professionals and ex-
plorationists are able to expend huge budgets without the kind of
profit-making accountability usually expected of other income-
204 See, e.g., Burns H. Weston, "Constructive Takings" Under International Law:
A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping Expropriation," 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103,
107 (1975) (discussing the fallout that can occur when national governments
gradually expropriate private corporate resources).
205 Id.




producing units. All of this speculation, educated guesswork, and
scientific geological evaluation lead to one conclusion: when the
venture is successful, the IOGC must capture sufficient profit to ac-
commodate failures elsewhere.
Further, since the industry is so capital-intensive, top-tier
IOGCs typically will not invest in a potential reserve unless the ar-
eas are capable of a significant volume of oil or natural gas.207 In
other words, the Commercial Discovery must be of a substantial
quantity for profit to be realized in such a high-cost investment.
Likewise, in order to achieve high profit, IOGCs will naturally fa-
vor acquisition of very substantial Participating Interests and will
not welcome governmental Fiscal Regimes that keep the IOGC-
contractor's Participating Interest to a minimal percentage.
It follows, therefore, that Appraisal Risks and Political Risks
may move inversely against each other. The IOGC's decision to
invest in a country means that, in its judgment, Appraisal Risks
must have been outweighed by the projection of huge profit in a
success case. The higher the Appraisal Risks are, the higher the
level of capital investment is going to be, leading naturally to a
much higher expectation of profit. The higher the profit margin is,
the more motivated the IOGC will be in lowering Political Risks
with a corporate strategy that helps maintain the political power
base of the incumbent government with which the IOGC has
signed a contract. It is in the interest of the IOGC if the incumbent
government continues its strong political footing in the country
and the region, thereby providing a stable environment for the
IOGC to achieve steadily high returns on its huge, long-term in-
vestment.
Notwithstanding the "social responsibility" doctrine, 2 8 the cur-
rent Anglo-American corporate law regime does not compel cor-
porate entities to concern themselves with human rights. Rather,
the emphasis is on shareholder primacy, financial accountability to
207 Wood, Appraisal of Economic Performance of Global Exploration Contracts, OIL
& GA J., Oct. 29, 1990 (two-part series). For an economic analysis of oil explora-
tion risk and reserve analysis, see Michael J.K. Craig & Steven T. Hyde, Deepwater
Gulf of Mexico More Profitable than Previously Thought, DRILLING OIL & GAS J., Mar.
10, 1997 (detailing the basis of revised profitability estimates for a particular ex-
ploration area); John D. Grace, Resource Data Provide Insights Into U.S. Exploration
Risk, EXPLORATION OIL & GAS J., Apr. 28, 1997 (concluding that the probability of
success in a new field of wildcat oil drilling, as opposed to natural gas, has de-
clined in the United States).
208 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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investors, or, at best, the provision of a "voice" forum for other
stakeholders such as employees or creditors. 2 9 Even in the United
States' "shareholder primacy" corporate model, the voice of non-
controlling minority shareholders in public companies has typi-
cally been limited to a window-dressing opportunity to submit
proposals or raise objections to management's policy and direction
under stringent procedural limitations. 210 Thus, the human rights
agenda has basically been left to the voluntary models of "in-
spired" corporate conduct in response to public opinion. The
"home" jurisdiction's oversight over corporate "offshore" conduct,
or the extraterritorial reach of the home jurisdiction's mandatory
law, becomes the most concrete tool with the sharpest teeth to po-
lice MNCs' conduct. But the rigor of this policing and oversight
depends on the geopolitical dynamics of the home jurisdiction and
the political agenda of its lawmakers. The fact that geopolitical
dynamics drive the effectiveness of enforcement, or lack thereof, is
a reality of the global community. It is precisely because of this
209 See Engle, supra note 24, at 117 ("[M]ost efforts ... [at reforming U.S. secu-
rity law to promote corporate attention to human rights issues] have focused...
on shareholders' rights to propose resolutions for adoption by the company.");
Paul Redmond, Sanctioning Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights, 27
ALTERNATIVE. L. J. 23, 23 (2002) ("Corporate law['s]... concerns are with financial
accountability to investors, not accountability for human rights standards.").
210 See, e.g., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 513 (3d Cir. 1947)
(considering Lewis Gilbert's shareholder proposal that shareholders, rather than
directors, select company's auditors); McDonald's Corp., Notice of McDonald's
Corporation 2001 Annual Shareholder's Meeting and Proxy Statement, Item 4
(recommending a vote against a shareholder proposal addressing human rights
for Chinese workers), available at http://www.shareholder.com/Comnon/
Edgar/63908/950131-01-500546/01-00.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004); DAVID
BOLLIER, CITIZEN ACTION AND OTHER BIG IDEAS, A HISTORY OF RALPH NADER AND
THE MODERN CONSUMER MOVEMENT, ch. 1 (recounting Nader's "Campaign GM"
during which he helped push through a new federal auto safety law in the 1970s),
available at http://www.nader.org/history/bollierchapterl.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2004). Proxy fights by insurgents are expensive, and SEC Rule 14a-8
requires that shareholder proposals be limited to 500 words. However, the SEC
has proposed changes to current Rule 14a-8 for the benefit of shareholders. 15
U.S.C. § 78a (1999); 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2001); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2001) [hereinafter
Rule 14a-8] (addressing procedures and requirements for shareholders' proposals
and their inclusion in a company's proxy statement), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40018.htrn; see also Amendments to Rules on
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39093 ("We propose to recast
rule 14a-8 into a Question & Answer format that both shareholders and
companies should find easier to follow, and to modify the rule to address
concerns raised by both shareholders and companies."), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-39093.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
For more recent SEC proposals to amend Rule 14a-8, see supra note 53.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
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reason that public international and humanitarian law has often
been criticized as inspirational law or "soft" law, without enforcing
teeth.211
Accordingly, the due diligence that IOGCs usually perform as
part of their Political Risk management does not have to include a
moral due diligence with respect to democratic or human rights
values. 212 Once the investment contract has been signed with the
incumbent government, issues of politics within the country and
relations between the incumbent government and its people be-
come irrelevant to the IOGC's corporate strategy. Part of the
IOGC's overall and long-term business goal is to gain the support
of, and split profit with, the incumbent government, no matter how
unpopular or tyrannical the regime may seem. Once fully invested
in the country, IOGCs are naturally long-term supporters of the in-
cumbent governments and are most likely to help minimize any
political instability associated with the region or locale. Likewise,
the incumbent government will have all the incentives in the world
to keep its business partners in active business and in prosperity.
Both sides are now fully imbedded in the self-interest structure. In
the words of the cynical critic, the two partners are "married" for a
long time.
What's more, in planning its partnership with the government,
the IOGC can also turn to other risk-management alternatives. For
example, it may seek Political Risk insurance protection, and in
such a case the international community and the full faith and
credit of the United States may come to its assistance. For the right
project, the MNC-government partnership will have full multilat-
eral or bilateral support from governments of the developed na-
tions available to it. Among the agencies providing Political Risk
insurance and investment guarantees are the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guaranty Agency ("MIGA"), a World Bank affiliate, the U.S.
Export-Import Bank ("ExIm"), and the U.S. Overseas Private In-
211 Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance
vs. Sovereignty, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 779, 780-81 (2002) (discussing "soft law" versus
"hard law" on issues of global governance).
212 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, U.N. Doc. TD/UNCTAD/
ITE/IIT/Misc. 21 (1999) (advocating that, in an age of increasing globalization,
transnational corporations must have a social duty to do more than maximize
shareholder value), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiitm21.en.
pdf.
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vestment Corporation ("OPIC).213 So long as the United States has
213 Political risk insurance and investment guarantees are provided by the
following institutions, two of which, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
("OPIC") and the Export-Import Bank ("ExIm"), are bilateral Export Credit Agen-
cies ("ECA") formed by the United States:
1) MIGA: Partly funded by the World Bank, MIGA provides insurance to all
World Bank members that have ratified the Convention Establishing MIGA- the
insured must be a national of a member country. In most cases, guarantees by
MIGA must also be approved by the host country. MIGA also partners with pri-
vate insurers through co-insurance and re-insurance programs. Noncommercial
risks covered by MIGA include currency transfer restrictions, expropriation,
breach of contract, and war and civil disturbance. Should it pay a claim, MIGA
would succeed, by way of subrogation, to the right of the investor against the host
country. See MULTILATERAL INV. GUAR. AGENCY, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1997) (dis-
cussing growth in FDI); Multilateral Inv. Guar. Agency, About MIGA (discussing
MIGA's mission to promote FDI into developing countries), at
http://www.miga.org/screens/about/about.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
2) OPIC: Political risk insurance and investment guarantees can also be ob-
tained by U.S. nationals from OPIC. As a U.S. government agency, OPIC has as
its goal the promotion of America's best economic and global strategic interests.
A product of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, OPIC is limited by statute to in-
sure projects only in the developing economies. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200b (2004).
With an annual reserve of approximately $4 billion, OPIC provides both insurance
and, to a more limited extent, financing so long as there is a government-to-
government (bilateral) agreement that sets out OPIC's rights of subrogation.
OPIC operates at no costs to U.S. taxpayers due to user fees charged by the
agency. With 29 years of claim history, OPIC insurance programs have been ex-
tended to some 140 developing markets, and are backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States. See Overseas Private Inv. Corp., The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) (providing an overview of the organization), at
http:// www.opic.gov (last modified Nov. 10, 2004); see also Randi S. Cohen,
OPIC Insures Investment in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, 1 NEW
EUR. L. REV. 95, 121-23 (1992) (discussing the growing role of OPIC in insuring
private investors in the former Soviet Union).
3) ExIm: First created in 1934, but not formally established until 1945, ExIm
also absorbs, in the interest of U.S. producers and importers, credit risks that are
typically beyond the reach of the private sector by providing both financing and
investment guarantees. Initially, ExIm's goals were to foster trade between the
U.S. and the Soviet and Eastern blocs. Later, ExIm extended its scope to service
the reconstruction of both Europe and Asia. Its objective is to supplement, but not
to compete against sources of private capital. ExIm's history shows a deliberate
effort not to engage in turf battle with the World Bank or the IMF. Principally,
ExIm guarantees working capital loans to U.S. exporters, and provides export
credit insurance to protect U.S. exporters against foreign buyers' failure to pay
their credit obligations. It also lends money to foreign purchasers of U.S. exports,
and provides guarantees to commercial lenders for repayment protection of their
private loans. U.S. providers of the petroleum industry's goods and services may
benefit from ExIm assistance, provided that ExIm has assessed and approved the
project, based on conditions such as reasonable assurance of repayment, and
whether a transaction would have adverse economic impact on U.S. production
and employment. See Export-Import Bank of the United States, Export-Import Bank
of the United States (providing an overview of the organization), at http://www.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
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not embargoed a country, or otherwise set limits on trade or in-
vestment, U.S.-based IOGCs are free to partner with "Third
World" governments regardless of their reputation or practices,
subject only to the IOGCs' risk assessment and evaluation of po-
tential profit.
Even modern trends in international economic law can serve as
a double-edged sword. Among the various widely accepted Politi-
cal Risk management techniques are (1) the "internationalization"
doctrine, and (2) the Stabilization Clause, both of which render sta-
bility and standardization to an otherwise unstable investment en-
vironment in the transitional economies.2 14 However, if the host
government is a dictatorship, or otherwise grossly corrupt and in-
competent, these very same risk-management techniques can help
keep such incumbent government in power by fortifying the busi-
ness partnerships it has formed with powerful and economically
able MNCs. These techniques lock the incumbent government into
exim.gov/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
In addition to export financing and bilateral credit support provided by the
U.S., other industrialized nations may set up bilateral agencies of their own. For
example, member states within the OECD have their own bilateral export agen-
cies and programs. One such country is Japan, which provides assistance through
the Export-Import Bank of Japan ("JExIm"), part of the Ministry of Finance. See
Ministry of Fin. Japan, Ministry of Finance, at http://www.mof.go.jp/ (last visited
Oct. 29, 2004) (providing an overview of the organization). All such bilateral
agencies have their own criteria for Project Financing to facilitate "Third World"
economic development.
The above-mentioned financing arms should be distinguished from grants,
which may be construed as public aid, such as those provided by the U.S. Trade &
Development Agency ("TDA") (for more information on the TDA, please visit
http://www.tda.gov), or long-term interest-free loans provided by the Interna-
tional Development Association ("IDA"), a World Bank affiliate. See David Blu-
mental, Sources of Funds and Risk Management for International Energy Projects, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 267, 269 (1998) (examining how energy companies can operate
in emerging economies through various funding strategies available through mul-
tilateral and bilateral institutions); see also U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., U.S. Agency
for International Development (providing an overview of the organization), at
http://www.usaid.gov/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
214 See, e.g., Margarita T.B. Coale, Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum
Transactions, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 217, 224 (2002) (discussing the "interna-
tionalization" of contractual terms in petroleum transactions through the use of
stability clauses); Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the International Law Governing
Concession Agreements, 6 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAw 54, 65 n.48 (1988) (discussing AGIP
S.p.A. v. People's Republic of the Congo, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 306 (1993), 21 I.L.M. 726
(1982), where arbitrators allowed for broad alienation of sovereignty through in-
ternational agreements with private companies); see also Texaco Overseas Petro-
leum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389, 511 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1977) (estab-
lishing and legitimizing the use of the Stabilization Clause).
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commitments that curtail the sovereign power of the country for
the benefit of the foreign investor, thereby functioning as the type
of "back-scratching" arrangements that serve the parties' mutual
self-interest.
3.1.3.7.1. The "Internationalization" Doctrine
Conflicts of law (or "private international law," as that term is
used in Europe)215 can present the most haunting and perplexing
issues for lawyers and academics, 216 yet they constitute the least
significant issues for business executives. There is justification for
the executive's indifference to the "governing law" provision in an
investment contract because disputes are routinely resolved and
compromises reached based on relationships and bottom-line eco-
nomic considerations, rather than as a result of intense legal inter-
pretation. In most upstream petroleum contracts, since drilling
takes place on the host country's territory, it is almost impossible to
avoid the application of the local law (lex loci; lex situs). Savvy ne-
gotiators will not spend much time demanding the application of a
neutral law other than lex loci or lex situs in contracts with the host
government, although lawyers often explore, where possible, ex-
emption or waiver from particular local legal requirements where
needed.
The real efforts, however, are spent on the "internationaliza-
tion" of the contract as a doctrinal approach to IBTs.217 In its ulti-
215 See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
art. 15, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34 (using the phrase "private international law" to describe
what United States lawyers know as "conflicts of law").
216 See, e.g., P. M. NORTH, CoNTRAcr CONFLICTS 9, 17, 297 (1982); Stephen B.
Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via
Media?, Papers Presented at the Conference on Transatlantic Business Transac-
tions: Choice of Law, Jurisdiction and Judgments (June 1-3, 2003) (considering fo-
rum non conveniens and lis pendens from an American perspective); Symeon C.,
Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1995: A Year in Review, 44 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 181 (1996); see also DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS
466-72 (1986) (exploring choice of law in contracts, one of the most confusing ar-
eas of conflicts of law, and presenting possible solutions to the confusion); Carlo
Croff, The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Con-
flict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L LAW. 613 (1982) (discussing whether arbitrators
should choose the applicable law to an international contract via the use of a pri-
vate international law rule).
217 See supra note 213 (discussing international political risk insurance enti-
ties); see also FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 15-20
(1992) (comparing the example of a medieval law merchant to the present-day
concept of lex mercatoria); John Hononold, The Influence of the Law of International
1262 [Vol. 25:4
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mate objective, the doctrine calls for the universal incorporation
into the local law of all those industry norms or practices that are
so well-established they become part of modern lex mercatoria, or,
more broadly speaking, international economic law.218 The doc-
trine establishes that interpretation of a cross-border investment
contract cannot be dictated solely by varying local norms and
rules. Consistency can only be achieved through the application of
universally accepted international rules and standards. The doc-
trine thus creates a superior layer of "legalization" that limits or
minimizes the adverse effect of local law for the sake of fostering
international commerce. The doctrine transforms the investment
contract from a local law contract to an international contract,
bringing the project to international and industry standards, not-
withstanding its local situs.219
Trade on the Development and Character of English and American Commercial Law, in
THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 70-71 (C. Schmitthoff ed., 1964);
JANIS, supra note 20, at 289-91 (discussing, inter alia, how bilateral treaties facilitate
international economic cooperation); Morais, supra note 211, at 790-805 (discuss-
ing ongoing efforts by global work groups to achieve internationalization of legal
standards applicable to global governance, as well as to the evolution of, and bal-
ancing between, "soft" and "hard" international law).
218 See, e.g., supra notes 23-24 (explaining the term lex mercatoria). The phrase
"international economic law" has broader implication than "international com-
mercial law," which refers to the bodies of law governing international sales, in-
ternational shipments of goods, and export-import transactions.
219 Ironically, although the international legal community pushes for, and has
been successful in the internationalization of legal standards, living conditions
have never been standardized. Global distribution of technology and consumer
products are likewise non-standardized. Activists charge that manufacturers of-
ten transfer obsolete technology and a lesser grade of consumer products to the
"Third World" as a dumping ground of consumerism. In the era of free trade, the
"Third World" often exports the best of its products in order to compete globally
and to generate hard currencies as revenues. When this trend is observed in agri-
cultural products, it means that the poor of the "Third World" "starve" in order to
supply the best products for the "First" and "Second World," and to enable their
country to accumulate hard currencies via export to satisfy international debt ob-
ligations. The result is a "Third World" standard of living that can shock the con-
science of, or quite often can remain unknown to, inhabitants of the developed
nations. The by-product of these substandard living conditions is a "Third
World"-localized standard of morality, ethics, and behaviors incomprehensible to
the developed nations, who ironically are often the driving force in the standardi-
zation of normative legal behaviors essential to the development of the interna-
tional rule of law. The issue of moral decisions made in poverty perhaps is not a
consideration in law-making, but has long been a topic of exposition for creative
artists. See generally VICrOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES (Charles E. Wilbour trans.,
1862) (a novel, popularized in American pop culture by way of a Broadway pro-
duction almost a hundred years after author Hugo's death, is an example of such
moral decisions). Globalization, in its most efficient and noblest form, should
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From a broader perspective, the "internationalization" doctrine
evolves as part of the international legal community's efforts to
eliminate or minimize the Political Risks often associated with do-
ing business in the developing economies. "Internationalization"
gives the investment environment predictability through the stan-
dardization of legal behaviors. But the doctrine is not anything
new; rather, it is simply an effort at "codifying" what has taken
place in real-life deal negotiation. For decades, lawyers' efforts
have been spent securing specific sovereign actions incorporating
international norms into the local law. The lobbying for such sov-
ereign action may be part of the due diligence necessary for Politi-
cal Risk assessment before the IOGC invests in the country. The
desired sovereign actions may include specific constitutional proc-
lamation or ratification of international treaties and conventions,
specific legislative or administrative measures, or contractually de-
signed sovereign guarantees executed by the government on an ad
hoc basis.220 If any such specific sovereign action cannot be ob-
tained, principles constituting lex mercatoria for the international
petroleum or energy sector must be provided in specific contract
provisions, or otherwise expressly incorporated into the contract's
"governing law" or "choice-of-law" clause.2 1
3.1.3.7.2. The Stabilization Clause as Protection Against
Political Risks
The "internationalization" doctrine has precedential support
from a long line of confidential arbitration decisions.222 These deci-
serve to equalize these inequities and differences.
220 See, e.g., Trans Commodities Inc. v. Kaz. Trading House, No. 96 Civ. 9782
(BSJ), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23906, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1997) (holding that
foreign sovereign guarantee sufficed as evidence for "Commercial Activities Ex-
ception" undermining protection of the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act); see
also Jonathan Inman, Government Guarantees for Infrastructure Projects, 68 PROJECT
FIN. INT'L 36 (1995) (discussing various types of government guarantees).
221 See, e.g., Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirm-
ing "choice-of-forum" and "choice-of-law" provisions in international agree-
ments); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcTS OF LAW § 187 (1971) (stating that
"choice-of-law" provisions are enforceable).
222 See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389,
391 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1977) (holding that the contract provisions and resulting arbi-
tration at issue were subject to international law for interpretation, not Libyan
law); see also Lena Goldfields Arbitration, 5 Ann. Dig. 3 (P.C.I.J. 1930) (holding
that "the proper law of contract" was international, not Russian law); Saudi Ara-
bia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117, 153-72 (Arb. Trib. 1958) (holding that
while parts of the contract were governed by Saudi Arabian law, other parts were
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sions support the arbitrators' view that certain contracts are, by
their very nature, internationalized and thus subject to interna-
tional law and standards, especially if the parties by negotiation
have consensually waived restrictions of local law.223 One such ex-
ample of mutual consent and waiver is the Stabilization Clause (at
times referred to as the "Stability Clause" or "Equilibrium Clause").
In various forms, the Clause restricts the host jurisdiction's exercise
of "permanent sovereignty" by contractually preventing the na-
tion-state from subsequently modifying the governing law of the
investment contract.224
Permanent sovereignty signifies the "permanent" nature of the
territorial state's power to protect its territory and to maximize its
resources, 225 including the power to exclude unwanted foreign in-
vestment via the licensing process.226 The notion, however, should
to be governed by international law if no law was expressly chosen by the par-
ties); Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 175 (Int'l
Arb. Trib. 1963) (holding that the parties deliberately excluded the application of
Iranian law and, therefore, submitted contract interpretation and performance "to
the principles of law generally recognized by civilized nations"); BP Exploration
Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297, 329 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1973) (holding that
general principles of law should be applied, including those which may be ap-
plied by international tribunals); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 62
I.L.R. 140, 171 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1977) (holding that when a contract involves two
foreign countries, because their legal systems are dissimilar, the applicable law
should be the general principles governing conflicts of law in private international
law); AGIP S.p.A. v. People's Republic of the Congo, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 306 (1993), 21
I.L.M. 726 (1982) (holding that international law principles can "supplement" any
gap in Congolese law or whenever international law is necessary for dispute reso-
lution).
2n See Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd., 35 I.L.R. at 175.
224 See Coale, supra note 214, at 222-26 (describing various types of Stabiliza-
tion Clauses, their purposes and their application); see also WORLD BANK LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, VOLUME 1: SURVEY OF
EXISTING INSTRUMENTS (1992) (discussing "stability of contract" clauses).
225 See Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875
(1981) (awarding only limited damages to an American litigant suing over Cuban
expropriation of American property in Cuba); G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th
Sess., 1194th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223
(1963) (declaring that the "right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources" must be exercised in the peoples' inter-
est); G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., 2229th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3201 (1974) (declaring that the vestiges of colonialism impede some na-
tion-states' realization of full sovereignty); Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Substratum of the Seoul Declaration, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 59 (Paul de Waart et al. eds., 1988);
Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463, 465-66 (1963).
226 See Nolan, supra note 25 (discussing aspects of state licensing as expres-
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receive a broader connotation than just in the context of territory or
property rights. Permanent sovereignty also empowers the gov-
ernment of a country to make law and proscribe conduct within its
territory, and thus should be co-extensive or synonymous with the
government's "jurisdiction to prescribe" (as opposed to "jurisdiction
to adjudicate," which is traditionally a judiciary function within a
government).227 Private international law (commonly known in
the United States as principles of conflicts of law), has long pro-
vided the complex framework for deciphering this "jurisdiction to
prescribe" by establishing legal boundaries for the exercise of na-
tional jurisdiction.22
8
sion of sovereign power in a case study on Laotian law).
227 See generally VAGTS, supra note 216; Thomas Burgenthal & Harold G. Maier,
Public International Law in a Nutshell (2d ed. 1990); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402-404 (1987) (codifying the phrase "jurisdiction to
prescribe"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402-04 (1987) (stat-
ing that a government can use national interest to justify its gatekeeping of par-
ticular industries).
228 A nation's "jurisdiction to prescribe" does not necessarily stop at the
physical borders, although its extraterritorial reach must be supported by a valid
exercise of sovereign power rooted in customary international law. This means
that a certain nexus must exist to support the extraterritorial extension of national
jurisdiction. The nexus can be:
1) Territory (a sovereignty can proscribe conduct occurring within its bor-
ders);
2) Nationality (a sovereignty can proscribe conduct of its nationals);
3) Comity, reasonableness, or sovereign consent (two states can agree to allow
each other prescriptive authority within each other's borders or upon each other's
nationals, or one state may refrain from exercising its prescriptive authority be-
yond its borders in order to show respect or deference to, or otherwise avoid rela-
tional conflicts with, another state); or
4) Effects of conduct (the "effect" test): a sovereignty can proscribe conduct
that produces an effect within its territory. The "effect" principle is best illus-
trated in the expansive reach of the U.S. antitrust law to even conduct of foreign-
ers in other countries. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 765
(1993) (expanding U.S. antitrust jurisdiction and reducing the likelihood of U.S.
courts invoking comity to decline jurisdiction over foreign acts causing substantial
effect in the United States despite conflicts with foreign law).
See also VAGTS, supra note 216, at 3-29 (explaining the basic foundations of in-
ternational law); David Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets as a Chal-
lenge to National Regulatory Systems, Paper presented at the Conference on
Transnational Business Transactions sponsored by the Association of American
Law Schools and the European Law Faculties Association (June 1-3, 2003) (on file
with author) (discussing how global markets challenge current international ju-
risdictional legal doctrines).
Commentators have also noted that the size and attractiveness of the U.S.
market, as well as the United States' enormous political and economic power, ac-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
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In order to preserve the sanctity of "statehood" -that a sover-
eign nation consists of (i) people, (ii) a government, and (iii) terri-
tory229 - the notion of permanent sovereignty must be unassailable,
inviolate, and incapable of being contracted away to a foreign in-
terest; otherwise, a government could just "sell" or "pawn" a na-
tion-state, its people, and its natural resources to a private party
and waive sovereign power altogether.230 In this line of logic, the
nation-state should not lose its sovereign capacity to change the
status or method of regulating the extractive or exploitive industry
(with respect to natural resources), regardless of any previous con-
tractual arrangement that the nation-state may have made in its
commercial capacity. Likewise, a sovereignty can never waive its
jurisdiction to proscribe conduct of private actors, unless it has un-
dertaken an international obligation to restrain itself by way of
treaty or reciprocity among nation-states in order to maintain in-
ternational comity.
Yet, the "internationalization" doctrine practically serves to
curtail the effect of a nation-state's "jurisdiction to prescribe" in the
broader interest of international commerce. The Stabilization
Clause can be looked at, in part, as a direct application of the "in-
ternationalization" doctrine. The Clause thus becomes the proper
context for examining conflicts between the "internationalization"
doctrine and notions of permanent sovereignty or "national juris-
diction to prescribe," because enforcement of the Clause amounts
to an erosion of the territorial state's "permanent" power to legis-
late.
In one of its popular forms, the Stabilization Clause creates a
contractual commitment by the host government to "freeze" the
local law applicable to the petroleum investment contract. For ex-
ample, the Clause may provide that the PSC will be construed in
accordance with the governing local law as it is in force on the date of
contract execution. (The Clause may further impose a good-faith
count for the geopolitical expansion of the U.S. prescriptive authority notwith-
standing objections from other countries. Id.
229 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (4th ed.
1990) (discussing concepts of territory and sovereignty); JANIS, supra note 20, at
174-80 (discussing arms control and disarmament and the "return to restraint by
the sovereign states"); Duong, supra note 38 (manuscript n.457).
230 "Third World" culturalists have used the term "culture brokers" in native
literatures (originated during eras of colonialism) to refer to the collaborating na-
tives who facilitated the extraction of natural resources and the solidification of
the colonial bureaucracy in exchange for personal financial benefits.
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duty upon the host government to take all steps necessary to en-
sure the contractor's rights are not altered by subsequent govern-
mental action without the mutual consent of the parties.) The key
element of the Clause, therefore, is the removal of the govern-
ment's right to unilaterally alter the investor's rights by changing
its municipal law or promulgating new implementing regulations
subsequent to contract execution.
231
International arbitrators have construed the Stabilization
Clause more narrowly: the Clause is the nation-state's specific and
express promise not to unilaterally change the contract.232 As such,
the Clause safeguards the IOGC's investment in the politically un-
stable developing economies, especially in nation-states that do not
follow Western legal traditions.233 At the same time, the Clause has
been considered in the larger context: it is viewed as evidence of a
sovereign nation's right to waive its sovereign law-making author-
ity.234 For example, the arbitration tribunal in Texaco Overseas v.
231 Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 62 I.L.R. 140, 170 (Int'l Arb.
Trib. 1977) (noting that "[a]ny such alteration or abrogation of concession agree-
ments should be made by mutual consent of the parties").
232 See supra notes 214, 222-224 (discussing instances in which the applicable
law was international rather than local).
233 Id. The Vietnam Deal offers an opportunity to illustrate discord between
Western legal traditions and legal traditions premised upon a different cultural
heritage. An Eastern culture such as Vietnam views contractual execution as the
beginning of a business and legal relationship rather than the conclusion of a finite
set of legal obligations. The tendency of Eastern parties and their legal regulators,
therefore, is to favor more amendments than their Western counterparts because
of the Eastern cultural view that the business relationship should amply be ad-
justed as it progresses. See, e.g., Ordinance On Economic Contracts (Vietnam), art.
21 (allowing for a right to amend after contract execution to "give details" and
"make concrete" the provisions of an economic contract); Ordinance On Civil
Contracts (Vietnam), art. 26 (acknowledging a right to amend, open to negotia-
tion); Wendy Duong, Overview of the Institutional and Legal Framework, The
Petroleum Law, and Relevant Legal Matters in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
(November 1994) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for Mobil Eastern Explora-
tion and Development, Inc., cited with client's permission) (on file with author); cf.
Unkovic, supra note 8, at 205 (commenting on the flexibility of China's economic
contract law-that a contract may be changed or cancelled if impossible to fulfill
or if breached by a party; contrasting this flexibility against the rigidity in specific
performance and a strong emphasis on penalty, rather than exploring or respect-
ing parties' expressed freedom of contract). Further, in a culture with a hybrid
legal history such as Vietnam, frequent legislative changes to meet the need of the
transitional economy are viewed with more tolerance by and, in fact, are expected
of, country leaders. Finally, custom has higher societal precedential value than
the written law in the "relational" cultures of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
compared to the "individualistic" cultures of the West.
234 See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
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Libyan Arab Republic235 stated that "[n]othing can prevent a State, in
the exercise of its sovereignty, from binding itself irrevocably by
the provisions of a concession and from granting to the conces-
sionaire irretractable rights." 236 According to the tribunal, in grant-
ing concessions to IOGCs, Libya did not alienate but, instead, fully
exercised its sovereign power to contract.2 37 To the extent interna-
tional arbitral decisions constitute modem lex mercatoria, it can be
said that Stabilization Clauses are valid under international law.
238
In various forms, the Clause has increasingly become standard
practice in most PSCs executed with "Third World" countries.
239
477 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1977) (holding that the arbitration is subject to international,
not Libyan law).
235 Id. Dispute resolution in IBTs has traditionally been handled via final and
binding arbitration, as may be recognized by state-signatories to the 1958 U.N.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
"New York Convention"). See Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 5, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 12
(recognizing the need for "greater uniformity of national laws on arbitration").
Accordingly, there has been no court case addressing the validity of the Stabiliza-
tion Clause in the international context.
236 See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., 53 I.L.R. at 474 (citing the reasoning
of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117, 168 (Arb. Trib. 1958)).
237 Id. at 477; see also Kimmo Mettala, Governing-Law Clauses of Loan Agree-
ments in International Project Financing, 20 INT'L LAW. 219 (1986) (addressing
"choice-of-law" issue for loan agreements).
2m See James L. McCulloch & Christina M. Abascal Deboben, The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act and Other Legal Considerations Relevant to the Oil and Gas Industry
in Latin America, 77 TuL. L. REV. 1075, 1087 (2003) (recognizing the popularity and
necessity of Stabilization Clauses in Latin America's foreign investment contracts,
noting that in "traditional stabilization clauses, a government is contractually
prohibited from enacting legislation that is inconsistent with the original con-
tract") (quoting Michelle Flores, comment, A Practical Approach to Allocating Envi-
ronmental Liability and Stabilizing Foreign Investment in the Energy Sectors of Develop-
ing Countries, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 141, 161 (2002)).
239 If sovereignty rights over natural resources and territory can be waived in
private transactions with "outsiders" and, hence, are not "permanent," then a
government's sovereign power to proscribe conduct of its citizens by way of in-
humane regulatory measures affecting the peoples' liberty interests should like-
wise be less than "permanent" and, hence, can similarly be circumvented by acts
of outsiders premised upon international humanitarian laws. Such humanitarian
laws should suffice to curtail a government's power to proscribe conduct of its
own citizens, if such power is exercised in a way that offends universal liberty in-
terests. Yet, in Doe I v. UNOCAL Corp., No. 00-56603, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), the court barred Burmese villagers' claims against the
military government of Myanmar and a U.S. oil company, using the "Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine" codified in U.S. statutory law. See Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-07 (2000) (codifying a foreign state's immunity from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless the challenged act of such foreign state falls
under statutory exceptions laid out in §§ 1605-07). The UNOCAL case has been
........................... Tv
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When carefully drafted and broadly applied, the Stabilization
Clause can shield the investment from new taxes, new legislation,
new regulations, decrees of nationalization or expropriation, or
any other form of a MAGA that may make the investment less
economically whole. For example, if a country's petroleum law
(which may include environmental and safety standards), effective
at the time of contract execution, later needs to be changed, the Sta-
bilization Clause can estop the host government from applying the
new law and new standards to the IOGC's long-term project, in the
absence of the IOGC's consent or some other renegotiated, mu-
tually acceptable conditions. In other words, while the rest of the
country may be governed by a newer version of the law, the
IOGC's investment, secured by the Stabilization Clause, will be
governed by an outdated version of the applicable law. This is po-
tentially a much more pervasive application and interpretation of
the Stabilization Clause than mere prevention of the retroactive
application of a new legislation.
The Stabilization Clause's validity and effectiveness may be
questioned based on six conceptual premises (the "Six Premises"),
as explained below.
3.1.3.7.3. Challenging and Reexamining the Popular
Stabilization Clause - the Six Premises
3.1.3.7.3.1. The First Premise: The Rationale of Texaco
v. Libyan Arab Republic and Similar
Decisions Upholding the Stabilization Clause
can be Challenged
The sovereignty may have entered into a contract via its com-
mercial arm or in its commercial capacity, but not in its capacity as
the law-making body charged with the responsibility to safeguard
the country's public interest.240 This is the gist of permanent sover-
set for an en banc rehearing before the Ninth Circuit. Doe I v. UNOCAL Corp.,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003); see also the analysis under
the Fifth Premise discussed in this Section (demonstrating the incoherent and self-
conflicting nature of the Stabilization Clause).
240 See, e.g., Settebello Ltd. v. Banco Totta & Acores, 1W.L.R. 1050 (Eng. C.A.
1985) (hearing a case where the dispute involved a sovereign act of the Portuguese
government when it intervened through legislation and altered the penalty provi-




PAR TNERSHIPS WITH MONARCHS
eignty. In fact, this sovereign power constitutes the type of macro-
and microeconomic oversight critical to nation-building as well as
to the building of an efficient world economy. U.S. courts have
recognized permanent sovereignty as an "inalienable right"
uniquely applicable to a nation-state's control power over its natu-
ral resources and economic activities, and, as such, permanent sov-
ereignty cannot be waived. 241 If the reverse scenario had been pre-
sented to the American public and its court system -that a non-
U.S. investor wanted a political subdivision or branch of the U.S.
government to waive the United States' rights to enact new legisla-
tion or promulgate new regulations affecting the investor's project,
the public outcry in response to such request (from the steps of
Capitol Hill to the average American household's television set)
would have killed the Stabilization Clause much quicker than the
time it took the investor to table it for discussion.
3.1.3.7.3.2. The Second Premise: Popularized as a Risk-
Management Device, the Stabilization
Clause, Nonetheless, is not an Effective Tool
for the Management of Political Risks
As a practical matter, the Stabilization Clause does not protect
the investment contract against a change in regime. If a govern-
ment is toppled or denounced as illegitimate, one of the three ele-
ments of "statehood" (territory, people, government)242 becomes
missing. Therefore, a contract executed by a defunct or illegitimate
government, which never had the recognition of the "people," is
not binding upon a nation.243 If this notion falls short of the dignity
of an international legal theory, it at least reflects the undeniable
reality of the global political economy -what keeps governmental
contractual obligations intact after a change of regime is the new
241 See Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 889
(2d Cir. 1981) (citing a U.N. General Assembly resolution emphasizing permanent
sovereignty over natural resources).
242 See supra notes 64, 228 (discussing elements of "statehood").
243 See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE
THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165 (1991) ("If a despotic power incurs a
debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to strengthen its despotic
regime, to repress the population that fights against it etc., this debt is odious for
the population of the State.") (quoting ALEXANDER SACK, LES EFFETS DES
TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS
FINANCItRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR PUBLIC DEFTS AND
OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] (1927)).
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regime's voluntary compliance, instigated by the military and in-
ternational pressure from the community of nations at large, rather
than by any aspirational goals of the international rule of law. Ac-
cordingly, a commercial transaction negotiated and executed with
a foreign government always carries a risk of being dishonored or
renegotiated after a coup d'6tat or revolution uprooting the current
political or legal foundation.244 But even if the new regime is ame-
nable to establishing itself as part of the international investment
community, and hence is willing to honor existing contracts, the
state authority once in charge of the investment project may have
been restructured or repealed entirely, presenting practical prob-
lems in contract enforcement and performance. This point, again,
demonstrates the intimate correlation between (i) the IOGC's
commercial relationship with an incumbent regime, and (ii) the
IOGC's incentive to support the incumbent regime long-term, in an
effort to control and minimize Political Risks.
3.1.3.7.3.3. The Third Premise: The Host Government or
Its Successors May View the Stabilization
Clause as an Expression of the Foreign
Investor's Skepticism Toward the Country or
the Regime's Legitimacy and Reliability
Herein lies the paradox: if the foreign investor is already
haunted by such skepticism, such that she has to insist on a Stabili-
zation Clause, why is she entering into a binding contract recogniz-
ing the legitimacy or stability of such a political regime in the first
244 See Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th
Cir. 1982) (noting that the new regime after the Iranian revolution in the 1970s re-
fused to honor contracts executed between U.S. companies and the former gov-
ernment); accord Am. Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); M.
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1994). Another
example of this situation is the contract for the construction of nuclear electricity-
generating plants in the Philippines, to be operated on islands with active volca-
noes. The contract was allegedly obtained through improper means under the
Marcos government and subsequently rescinded by the incoming government.
Press Release, Patricia Adams, Probe International, Philippine Government to
Dismantle Marcos Nuclear Plant (Feb. 28, 2000), at http://www.odiousdebts.org/
odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentD=9; see also Maristella Cardenas,
Freedom from Debt Coalition: Philippines, ECAs in the Philippine Power Sector and
the Continuing Debt Problem (Dec. 12, 2003) (arguing that a new government is not
obliged to honor existing contracts that hurt the interest of the people), at
http://www.jubileesouth.org/news/EpZyVyuAVISMRrFluL.shtml. Likewise,
the validity of contracts made in Namibia under regimes controlled by South Af-




place? What, then, has happened to the foreign investor's sound
business judgment and careful assessment of Political Risks-an
element that should, at all times, be part of its accountability to its
home country's shareholder public?
By its very nature, the Stabilization Clause acknowledges that a
sovereignty may wear two hats: (i) as contracting party to a com-
mercial transaction, and (ii) as sovereign regulator of economic be-
haviors, exercising its "jurisdiction to prescribe." By conducting
itself in the second capacity, the sovereignty in effect breaches the
contract it enters into in the first capacity. The Stabilization Clause
thus becomes a tool of anticipating, minimizing, or eliminating
risks of investment loss due to foreseeable breach. The irony re-
mains: if the sanctity and freedom of contract is the principle gov-
erning the parties' transaction (as both parties will want to argue),
one party-the more economically powerful-is also anticipating
and trying to render predictable the possibility of breach by the
economically weaker party. If the Stabilization Clause is an en-
forceable promise (as the MNC will try to argue), it is also a signal
of lack of trust, demonstrating the need for additional safeguards
against potential breach or default.245 The Clause in itself is proof
of the high Political Risks inherent in the investment environment.
Investor skepticism may have negative impact on negotiations, or
may even be found offensive to the host culture. Yet, perhaps due
to lack of leverage, or otherwise prompted by the need to please its
wealthy business ally, the host government must live with the
Clause. Aware of this subtle erosion of trust or cultural clash, if the
IOGC decides to forego the Clause in exchange for goodwill, from
a corporate policy standpoint, this omission in itself may indicate
that the negotiation team has not buffered the contract effectively
against Political Risks. For an IOGC's lawyer, such an omission
may arguably raise a claim of professional malpractice.
245 Cf Menachem Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is so Prob-
lematic in the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 545 (2002) (questioning objective approaches, such as "the eco-
nomic man," to contract interpretation; analyzing the role of culture in contract
formation; arguing that contract-making is the functional equivalent of "trust" be-
cause actual knowledge of whether a promissor can keep his word will render ei-
ther contract-making or trust unnecessary; viewing contract as either "profes-
sional" script or "lay" script, and lawyers as translators of such script).
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3.1.3.7.3.4. The Fourth Premise: Principles Respecting
the Sanctity of Contract are Part of
International Law, Starting With the Law of
Treaties246
Likewise, among those principles of contract law that should
constitute the "general principles common to the major legal sys-
tems" 247 as a source of customary international law is another legal
concept called voluntary assumption of risk.248 Where the legal
and political environment of the host country is extremely volatile,
the IOGC willingly assumes such risk when it makes a decision to
invest there. Apparently, its profit incentive to do business in such
a volatile environment outweighs its preinvestment Political Risk
assessment. If that is the case, why should the IOGC benefit from a
negotiated Stabilization Clause that in effect erodes the host coun-
try's sovereignty, due clearly to the IOGC's enormous leverage
power exercised during the contracting process?
The next logical inquiry is whether the Stabilization Clause will
apply if and when the host nation's new legislative or policy
246 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331; Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (interpreting the
bilateral Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty between the United States
and Japan); see also Ayelet Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, The Constitution and Con-
flict-of-Laws Treaties: Upgrading the International Comity, 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 1 (2003) (underscoring the importance of international comity to resolve is-
sues arising under conflict-of-law treaties and domestic constitutional commit-
ments); Hans Blix, Developing International Law and Inducing Compliance, Ad-
dress at the Friedman Award (Apr. 11, 2002), in 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(2002) (discussing the manner in which binding rules emerge and induce compli-
ance in the international community of independent states based on principles of
treaty laws).
247 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987); accord Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3
Bevans 1153, 1187 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
248 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 496C (1965) (discussing the
concept of implied assumption of risk in American law: a plaintiff who fully un-
derstands a risk of harm to himself or his things caused by the defendant's con-
duct or by the condition of the defendant's land or chattels, and who nevertheless
voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or to permit his things to enter or remain
within the area of that risk, under circumstances that manifest his willingness to
accept it, is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk); Deena B. Bothello,
Note, An Unequal Balance: Repudiation and Restitution in Mobil Oil Exploration &
Producing Southeast Inc., v. United States, 80 OR. L. REV. 1469 (2001) (criticizing
the Court's holding allowing an oil company to recoup its loss as upsetting prin-
ciples of voluntary assumption of risks undertaken by the oil company when it




measures improve, rather than jeopardizing, the investor's bar-
gained-for position under the investment contract. As a practical
solution, the clever IOGC lawyer will then carefully draft the
Clause such that it will shield her client only from the negative ef-
fect, and not the positive effect, of future legislation or sovereign
action. Again, this selective enforcement is clear evidence of the
IOGC's exercise of its powerful negotiation leverage.
The sliding scale reflecting this leverage varies from deal to
deal, depending on the country, the government, and the project.
Within this sliding scale, three scenarios may arise when a host
government must consider a proposed Stabilization Clause.
(1) Other investors will insist upon a similar Stabilization
Clause for each and every foreign investment project in the coun-
try. The more economically powerful and better-known investors
will get their way; the smaller- or medium-sized entrepreneurs will
have a lesser chance of getting their way, or no chance at all. The
MNCs who join forces to propose the broadest Stabilization Clause
as a group effort vis A vis the host government will get the broadest
protection from such a standardized, jointly negotiated, and coor-
dinated Stabilization Clause. The smaller investor who is not part
of any "joined forces" or "de facto cartels" will not get such broad
protection;
(2) If the government is desperate for foreign investments, it
may just allow a commercial instrumentality to waive the essence
of governmental existence -the ability of a sovereignty to legislate.
This may occur for only one project, for many projects, for only a
particular kind of investor or certain tier of investors, or only for a
particular kind of industry.
(3) Where the disparity of bargaining power is not too severe, a
compromised Stabilization Clause may (i) require the host gov-
ernment to make its best efforts to maintain or restore the foreign
investor's economic position in the event of a subsequent legisla-
tive change, no more no less; or, (ii) impose only a mutual obliga-
tion upon the parties to renegotiate the contract, in good faith, in
the event of new legislation or regulations. 249
249 The "Renegotiation Clause" may be considered a species of the Stabilization
Clause, or it can be viewed as a broader clause that serves purposes other than
just stabilizing the contractual environment. For example, a "Gas Clause" in a pe-
troleum contract is usually a Renegotiation Clause, whereupon the parties agree
to further negotiate fiscal terms in the event of a commercial gas discovery. Since
gas development projects are full of uncertainty, the parties cannot define contrac-
tual obligations unless and until the gas discovery is evaluated, and economic
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3.1.3.7.3.5. The Fifth Premise: The Natural Result of the
First Four Premises - Capacity to Contract
and Negotiating Objectives
It follows, therefore, that as a legal concept, the Stabilization
Clause is inherently problematic. The incoherent and self-
conflicting nature of the Stabilization Clause can further be illus-
trated by examining (1) the contracting capacity of the host govern-
ment or its agent in the deal-making process; and (2) the negotiation
objective of a U.S.-based IOGC in structuring the host government's
warranty or representation of its legal capacity to contract with the
IOGC.
(1) Host Government's Capacity to Contract. Of critical impor-
tance in the contracting process is the issue of who can bind the na-
tion-state.250 The "double hat" nature of the government's role as a
contracting party -either as sovereign state or in its commercial ca-
pacity or both-can be very delicate and complex. Under the
"statehood" analysis, several issues arise as to which entity or
agency can legitimately represent and bind the government. (Very
seldom will a private investment contract be entered into in the
name of the nation itself, as in the case of a treaty, although such
practice may perhaps be the ultimate goal of the foreign investor,
seeking to eliminate all kinds of ambiguous legal issues regarding
capacity to contract, as explained below.)
Since international cooperation and foreign investments often
are among the most lucrative areas of the national economy (and a
substantial, if not the only, source of foreign currency revenues),
various state instrumentalities will compete against one another to
occupy some role in these "glamorous" areas. (Of course, the more
benefits ascertained based on the characteristics of the gas found. A "Review
Clause," however, imposes an obligation upon the parties to review contractual
terms in the event of change in circumstances, or to meet and formulate a new fis-
cal system to return the IOGC to its original economic position. See generally An-
drew B. Derman, International Oil and Gas Joint Ventures: A Discussion with Associ-
ated Form Agreements 70 (Natural Resource Law Section, American Bar Association
Monograph Series No. 16, 1992); see also McCulloch & Abascal Deboben, supra
note 238 (recognizing the Renegotiation Clause as a hybrid Stabilization Clause);
Gaetan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic Envi-
ronmental Policies: Striking A "Reasonable" Balance between Stability and Change, 29 L.
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 451 (1998) (citing modern contractual practice of moving from
traditional Stabilization Clauses to preferred renegotiation clauses).
250 In the Vietnam Deal, PetroVietnam wore two hats: first, as a representa-
tive of the sovereignty; and, second, as an SOE/commercial entity doing business




economically powerful the MNC is, the more chance it will have in
getting to negotiate with the very top echelon of the government,
thereby avoiding the headache of being caught in the lower eche-
lon's competition.)
In addition, if the host country is a federation, a number of ad-
ditional complications may arise under lex loci, whether or not no-
tions of federalism are clear or well-developed in the country's
laws. The division of authority between the federation and its con-
stituent units may be ambiguous. The constituent states may,
within their authority, introduce specific regulations affecting the
project, and provincial authorities may insist on enforcing local
regulations that are inconsistent with federal regulations. Accord-
ingly, it is not unusual in a developing nation for various govern-
ment instrumentalities or constituencies to claim the same author-
ity over an investment project, resulting in internal political fights
that can discourage the foreign investor or even immobilize the
project, at least during the period of political in-fighting. Likewise,
it is not unheard of for the actual practice to differ from the written
rules.251
Within its commercial capacity, the nation-state may also have
many faces. It may exercise choices in selecting an instrumentality
through which the state can do business -either through one of its
agencies, ministries, provinces, or through an SOE (which is akin
to a corporation in which the government is the sole or controlling
shareholder). The crucial difference attached to any of these
choices is the degree of the host government's liability for the obli-
gations assumed by its instrumentality or SOE under the country's
law or prevailing custom. (Again, lex loci or lex situs may be am-
biguous or non-existent on these critical legal issues.)
Where the host government has designated an SOE to serve as
the contracting party (as with the role of PetroVietnam in the Viet-
nam Deal), both the SOE's capacity to represent the state and the
SOE's own commercial capacity must be ascertained. For example,
under the local law, an SOE may or may not have a "corporate
veil." 252 It may or may not have corporate assets, if it does, its
251 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 105 (evaluating the unwritten "Operation
Code" of transitional economies).
252 Such is the case in the Russian Federation. If a "corporate veil" is granted,
the state is not liable for the obligations of the SOE. If, however, the SOE has no
"corporate veil," the state is fully liable for the obligations of the enterprise it
owns, especially when the assets operated by such enterprise are not sufficient to
satisfy all claims. See Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK RF], arts. 114, 115, translated in
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rights to corporate assets may be limited and asset disposition may
require higher state approval.2 3 In any event, the IOGC-contractor
will want to establish the SOE as an instrumentality or agency of
the state, with the capacity both to bind the government and to exe-
cute business transactions for itself, as well as on behalf of the
state, all at the same time. In summary, the IOGC wants the best of
all worlds. If applicable lex loci or lex situs is neither clear nor in ex-
istence, the clever IOGC lawyer will use her client's enormous eco-
nomic power to write these advantageous "legal capacity represen-
tation and warranty" provisions into the investment contract, at
least as a starting point.
But that is not all. As the ultimate risk control measure, MNCs
may attempt to get parliamentary approval of their contracts, in-
cluding the Stabilization Clauses aided by all the "legal capacity"
provisions discussed above. In some legal systems, an agreement
of the executive branch or its agency to "freeze" the applicable law
may not be effective without legislative approval. In such a case,
legislative approval of the investment contract is mandatory.
Where parliamentary approval is not mandatory, it still provides
additional assurance at the highest level and bolsters the validity of
all contractual mechanisms. This is often done when the develop-
ing country's law governing a sector or an industry has not been
enacted or is in an embryonic state.
In reality, parliamentary approval may carry its own draw-
backs. The process can delay the project and increase bureaucratic
hurdles, subjecting the investment to more local political pressure,
or, for the following reasons, the process may serve only psycho-
logical and goodwill purposes, instead of creating legal precedents.
First, a right granted by the legislature can be taken away by the
legislature. Second, legislative approval of the contract only serves
to demonstrate the commitment of the current legislature, not any
future regime or a newly elected body. Third, legislative approval
of a contract does not necessarily change such contract into law,
since an agreement is not a statute. Fourth, if the contract becomes
CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: PARTS ONE, TWO, AND THREE 55-56 (Wil-
liam E. Butler ed. and trans., 2002). On the other hand, SOEs in the Russian Fed-
eration may have limited rights to corporate assets. Quasi-ownership rights, such
as economic and operational management rights, may or may not allow SOEs to
encumber or dispose of corporate assets without the prior consent of the state.






law, then implicitly any amendment of the contract may have the
effect of law as well, thereby changing private contractual negotia-
tions into a legislative process. Fifth, even where the contract be-
comes or has the effect of law, conflicts may arise between the con-
tract and any other existing or subsequent laws that have effect
beyond the specific industry to which the investment project be-
longs. Finally, a question may arise as to whether provisions of the
contract are binding on regulatory authorities other than the au-
thority represented by the governmental instrumentality or SOE
(for example, whether PetroVietnam in the Vietnam Deal had the
authority to bind the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank). For
example, the PSC often addresses other matters such as customs,
export-import of goods and services, labor, taxes, and environ-
mental and workforce safety, many of which are beyond the regu-
latory power of petroleum authorities. Legislative approval of the
PSC may affirm the petroleum authorities' power, but not neces-
sarily its application to other divisions of the government.
In practical terms, legislative approval of an investment con-
tract that contains a Stabilization Clause may reinforce the con-
tract's validity as a binding obligation on the nation-state. As such,
the Clause can deter and make it more difficult for the host gov-
ernment to breach, repudiate, or otherwise disregard contractual
obligations. However, under traditional notions of sovereignty, it
is inconceivable that a nation-state's Parliament or Congress, its
taxing, Treasury, or Central Bank authorities would turn their law-
making and rule-making authority over to an SOE or any other
governmental instrumentality, allowing such agency or instrumen-
tality, in the conduct of commerce, to waive the legislative or regu-
latory power of the nation. Yet, practically, this type of power
transfer may be the most far-reaching effect of the Stabilization
Clause. When upheld as binding upon the nation-state, the Clause
amounts to tacit admission that the SOE that enters into the con-
tract has more authority than the country's legislators, or at least
has the authority to speak for them. Consequently, the enforce-
ment of the Stabilization Clause may have great political implica-
tions for a nation, which go well past the four corners of the in-
vestment contract.
In the past few decades, MNCs have tried, and have succeeded,
in obtaining parliamentary approval of their investment contracts
executed by a host country's executive branch. This success dem-
onstrates once more the vast clout, powerful leverage, and superior
bargaining power of the MNC-investor in a developing econ-
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omy. 254 Either the country is so poorly situated that it has to waive
its sovereign power for the sake of attracting investment, or, be-
cause of the close-fitting nature of the MNC's partnership with the
government, the government is willing to forego its supreme
power to proscribe conduct and abandon its responsibility to act in
the national interest, simply to support a long-term business part-
ner. In either case, the MNC's interests can dilute or replace the
national interests. The Stabilization Clause illustrates not only the
host government's willingness to bend and accommodate, but also
the enormous political power and negotiation leverage that cloaks
a particular IOGC, or a consortium of IOGCs, as the desired part-
ner of the host government.
(2) The Paradoxical Negotiating Objective of the IOGC Investor. It
follows from the discussion above that the MNC-IOGC's objectives
are two-fold: to bind the host government (i) both in its sovereign
capacity; and (ii) in its commercial capacity, in the same contract.
Such a posture may be viewed by legal scholars as inherently
paradoxical; yet it has been done as a practical matter to facilitate
"Third World" economic development, and, with respect to U.S.-
based MNC-IOGCs, as a necessary strategic measure to accommo-
date the current status of U.S. law, as explained below. Again, the
success of MNC-IOGCs in accomplishing such a paradoxical nego-
tiating objective illustrates, once more, the willingness to accom-
modate, as well as the inferior bargaining power of today's poor or
lesser-developed "monarchs." 255
To serve its purpose, the Stabilization Clause must be inter-
preted as a sovereign promise not to alter the legal environment
governing the investment contract. At the same time and in the
same contract, the IOGC must establish the host government's
commercial capacity, since the "monarch" is also acting as a private
party contracting for profit in the deal. If the "monarch" fails to
abide by these commercial obligations, it may be committing, and,
hence, may be sued for, breach of contract, the same way a private
party can be held liable for breach. One capacity may undermine
or undercut the other, and this becomes the challenge of the inter-
national business lawyer representing MNC-IOGCs.
254 See generally OECD, ASSESSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN ECONOMIES IN
TRANSITION 11 (1994).
255 At least one commentator has noted that in these partnerships, govern-
ments are often fearful of angering MNCs, lest they leave and take their capital




This paradoxical negotiating objective is necessitated by the
current state of U.S. laws and similar legal theories recognized in
other developed jurisdictions. In a dispute resolution proceeding
arising out of the investment contract (whether arbitral or judicial,
or both, as when an arbitral award must be enforced in the United
States), the host government or the SOE acting on the govern-
ment's behalf may attempt to assert two defenses: (i) the jurisdic-
tional defense of Sovereign Immunity, now codified in the U.S.
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA")256 (the "Sovereign Immu-
nity Doctrine"); and (ii) an affirmative defense that the govern-
ment's act challenged by the IOGC is an "Act-of-State" not subject
to review by the U.S. judiciary (the "Act-of-State Doctrine").
257
Both the Sovereign Immunity and Act-of-State Doctrines have
firm roots in U.S. laws. The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine compels
federal courts to relinquish subject-matter jurisdiction over an ac-
tion against a foreign state, in due respect for principles of comity
rooted in customary international law,258 unless certain statutory
exceptions are met under U.S. law.259 The Act-of-State Doctrine, on
the other hand, is the exercise of judicial restraint or abstention
based on principles of "separation of power" or the "political ques-
tion" doctrine in U.S. constitutional law.260 Under the Act-of-State
Doctrine, a U.S. court should not "sit in judgment" of another
country's sovereign act "within its own territory," 261 because the
substitution of judgment would infringe upon an executive func-
tion, causing sovereign embarrassment or discord in international
relations, and undermining the "separation of power" bedrock of
256 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1607 (2000).
257 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990);
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), reversed by 757 F.2d 516,
520 (2d Cir. 1985); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443
(1987) (recognizing the Act-of-State Doctrine as a limited exception to the duty of
U.S. courts to adjudicate and make judgment regarding the validity of a foreign
sovereign act).
258 Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
259 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1607 (2000).
260 For judicial discussion of the "political question" doctrine that renders a
matter non-justiciable, see generally, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
261 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign
state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of an-
other done within its own territory.").
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the U.S. governmental structure. The Act-of-State Doctrine has
been applied by U.S. courts to accord validity to the expropriation
of U.S. investors' property, even though the doctrine caused detri-
ment to an aggrieved U.S. investor.262 The doctrine has developed
slowly, partly due to the scarcity of caselaw on such a complex and
antiquated doctrine rooted in, according to the U.S. Supreme
Court, "constitutional underpinnings." 263 These "constitutional
underpinnings" conceptually distinguish the Act-of-State Doctrine
from Sovereign Immunity, rendering "Act-of-State" a domestic
rule part of lex fori, rather than a rule of international law. Similar
doctrines have been recognized and applied in many countries be-
sides the United States.264 Commentators, however, have noted the
decline in the use and invocation of the doctrine in past decades. 265
In practical terms, the Act-of-State Doctrine functions as a con-
262 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-39 (holding that the Act-of-State Doctrine barred
plaintiff's challenge of a Cuban expropriation decree in U.S. court).
263 In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Act-of-State
Doctrine may have its roots in principles of sovereign immunity. Instead, the
Court held that, although it is not constitutionally required, the doctrine has "con-
stitutional underpinnings" rooted in the "basic relationships among branches of
government in a system of separation of powers." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
264 See also Sociedad Minera El Teniente S.A. v. A.G. Norddeutsche Affinerie,
19 Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs- Beraters [AID] 163, 12 I.L.M. 251 (1963)
(F.R.G.); A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co. [1921] 3 K.B. 532, 548 (Eng.); Donald T.
Kramer, Annotation, Modern Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R. 707, 715
(1972) (citing examples of distinguishing Act-of-State Doctrine from Sovereign
Immunity in other countries). But see F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
374 n.7 (1973) (noting that outside Anglo-American and Dutch law, the Act-of-
State Doctrine has no support in the judicial system of other countries). In com-
parison, civil law countries employ the private international law concept of ordre
publique, which, in effect, favors the application of lex fori. Under the civil law's
notion of ordre publique, a national court may refuse to give effect to a law or act of
a foreign state if doing otherwise will offend the public policy or basic values of the
forum state. RICHARD PLENDER & MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, THE EUROPEAN CONTRACTS
CONVENTION: THE ROME CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS 276 (2001); Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions opened for signature, June 19, 1980, art. 16, 1980 O.J. (L 266); see also George
Chifor, Caveat Emptor: Developing International Disciplines for Deterring Third Party
Investment in Unlawfully Expropriated Property, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 179, 254
(2002).
265 Paul N. Filzer, The Continued Viability of the Act of State Doctrine in Foreign
Branch Bank Expropriation Cases, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 99, 108 (1988); Chifor,
supra note 264, at 254, 262 (2002); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics
Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (Act-of-State Doctrine does not preclude United States
courts from adjudicating cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign gov-
ernments, but merely requires that acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their
own jurisdictions be deemed valid).
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flict-of-law principle and, in this regard, does not advance the in-
terest of the MNC-IOGC. The doctrine establishes that the law of
the forum (lexfori), as in the case of the United States, creates a pre-
sumption of validity accorded a sovereign act, thereby shielding it
from scrutiny by the courts of the forum applying the conflict-of-
law rule of lexfori. The doctrine's practical impact lies in the con-
sequence of its application: only lex loci or lex situs provides the
source of law under which the validity of a sovereign action can be
assessed. This is precisely the kind of localized anomaly that the
"internationalization" doctrine purports to eradicate.
Under U.S. law, two exceptions to the Sovereign Immunity and
Act-of-State defenses have been carved out by statute, caselaw, or
both. In general, either doctrine can be defeated and the host gov-
ernment, or parties acting on its behalf, can still be sued if (1) the
sovereign act constitutes a "taking" of an investor's property "in
violation of international law" (the "International Law Exception");
266
and/or if (2) the sovereign act in question constitutes a "commer-
cial activity" (the "Commercial Activity Exception ").
2 67
(1) The International Law Exception. To qualify for this exception,
the IOGC will have to establish that in breaching the Stabilization
Clause, the host government has committed an "illegal taking" of
the IOGC's property in violation of international law. Such an ac-
tion by the government must be a sovereign act. This explains
why, inter alia, it is crucially important that the investment con-
tract binds the host government in its sovereign capacity. It is pre-
dicted that the International Law Exception will gradually gain
more vitality and popularity, as U.S. courts will increasingly come
to face international law principles as a result of "globalization."
This prospect, however, is not without challenge. The preliminary
inquiry of whether the sovereign "taking" violates international
law already raises complex and unresolved legal issues because the
standards of what constitutes an "illegal taking" under interna-
tional law are unresolved, representing a serious split of view-
266 28 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(3) (2000); cf. Hickenlooper Amendment to Foreign As-
sistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2004) [hereinafter Hickenlooper Amendment]
(explaining the International Law Exception to the judge-made Act-of-State Doc-
trine); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980) (interpreting and applying the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment).
267 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000); see also MICHAEL W. GORDON, FOREIGN STATE
IMMUNITY IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1991) (discussing, inter alia, the Com-
mercial Activity Exception to sovereign immunity).
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points in the ongoing North-South dialogue since the day of the
Cuban Revolution and throughout the 1970s and 1980s.268 Further,
with respect to the Sovereign Immunity defense, assuming that the
IOGC could successfully persuade a court that an "illegal taking"
of its property had taken place in violation of international law, the
petroleum investment and assets -all located in the host country -
or the activities of the SOE or governmental instrumentality that
served as the contracting party must somehow be traceable to U.S.
territory in order to justify federal court subject matter jurisdic-
tion.269 Under the FSIA, without such territorial nexus to the
United States, the International Law Exception does not apply.270
268 See, e.g., MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE
OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 119, 231 (1976) (describing differing viewpoints re-
garding legality of nationalization or expropriation under international law); cf
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975)
(recognizing nation-states' rights of exploitation over their natural resources); Dec-
laration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201,
U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted
in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974) (recognizing "[full] permanent sovereignty of every State
over its natural resources and all economic activities"); Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15,
U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963); see also Oscar Schachter,
Editorial Comment, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1984)
(debating standard for compensation by a government when foreign property is
expropriated).
269 U.S.C. § 1605(a), (a)(3) (2000) ("A foreign state shall not be immune from
the jurisdiction of courts of the United States of the States in any case.., in which
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or that property ... is owned or operated by an agency or in-
strumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in
a commercial activity in the United States .... ) (emphasis added).
270 Id. With respect to the Act-of-State Doctrine, the International Law Excep-
tion took the form of a statutory amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (the
"Second Hickenlooper Amendment" or "Sabbatino Exception," enacted to overturn the
Sabbatino decision and to overcome the Sabbatino presumption that the adjudica-
tion of the act of the foreign state would embarrass the executive branch). 22
U.S.C. § 2307(e)(2); see also 108 CONG. REC. 7,893 (1962). In Sabbatino, the U.S. Su-
preme Court applied the Act-of-State Doctrine to avoid review of Cuba's taking of
U.S. investors' property. Under the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, in gen-
eral, the Act-of-State Doctrine does not apply to a foreign taking of U.S. investor's
property in violation of international law, thereby narrowing the scope of the Act-
of-State-doctrine for the benefit and in the interest of U.S. investors. The Amend-
ment thus created the International Law Exception to the Act-of-State Doctrine,
equivalent to the "International Law" statutory exception under the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act. U.S. courts have not been receptive, and have generally
preserved the application of the Act-of-State Doctrine unless a case "precisely" fits
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/2
PARTNERSHIPS WITH MONARCHS
The International Law Exception remains an ineffective safe-
guard against host governments' bad acts, unless and until the di-
vergence of viewpoints in the North-South dialogue is resolved.
So long as the divergence of opinion persists, any proposed rule of
law will fall short of the status of customary international law be-
cause the disagreement defeats the notion of consensus accorded to
universally accepted custom. 271 If a court cannot determine
whether the foreign sovereign act in question constitutes a viola-
tion of international law because it is unsure as to what the stan-
dards under international law are, it cannot apply the exception
with certainty and intellectual comfort.
(2) The Commercial Activity Exception. In contrast, no such territorial
nexus to the United States is needed for the Commercial Activity
Exception to apply in order to defeat the host government's claim
of Sovereign Immunity. In general, compared to the statutory In-
ternational Law Exception, the Commercial Activity Exception
may be an easier test for U.S. investors to meet under the FSIA, be-
cause the exception involves less legal uncertainty and requires a
lesser degree of exposure to international law on the part of the
U.S. domestic forum that must interpret and resolve questions of
international law.
The Commercial Activity Exception illustrates the "defensive"
application of the United States' "extraterritorial jurisdiction to
the legislative exception. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331
F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972); French v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 242 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1968).
Another exception to the Act-of-State Doctrine is the Bernstein Exception,
made available through caselaw as a natural result of the "separation of power"
constitutional doctrine upon which the Act-of-State protection is based. Bernstein
v. United States, 195 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1952). The Bernstein Exception was prem-
ised upon a letter written to the court by the Secretary of State, in a case involving
Mr. Bernstein, a German national who was aggrieved by the Nazi government's
taking of his property during World War II. Id. Because courts recognized that
the Act-of-State Doctrine was premised upon the "political question" doctrine, the
executive branch could initiate a "Bernstein" letter, advising the court to go
ahead, or to abstain from hearing the aggrieved investor's claim. Id. Courts have
opined, however, that the judicial branch is not obliged to follow the advice of the
"Bernstein" letter because the exercise of judicial abstention is totally within the
discretion of the federal court. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565 (2d
Cir. 1956).
271 Custom, as a source of international law, is created through the practice
and opinion (opinio juris sive necessitates) of states, and by a state's behavior when
it acts out of a sense of legal obligation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 102(1)-(2)(1987); REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9,
15 (2d ed. 1992).
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prescribe." Instead of reaching out extraterritorially to regulate
foreign conduct beyond its border, the United States is "fencing
off" the sanctity of a foreign sovereign act when it is made applica-
ble to U.S. nationals based on their conduct outside the United
States. To support this "fencing off" posture, the FSIA resorts to
the "effect" test to justify subject matter jurisdiction for the federal
court. Under this "effect" principle, the IOGC can sue the host
government in the United States if the cause of action is based on
"an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere (including its own
territory) ... and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
272
"Commercial Activity" is statutorily defined as "either a regu-
lar course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act."273 The FSIA clarifies that the commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
"nature" of the transaction or act, rather than by its "purpose." 274
Since the host government's violation of the Stabilization Clause
may constitute a breach of the investment contract, the "nature" of
such breach may render the sovereign act "commercial," even
though the breach was occasioned by enactment of a legislation
whose "purpose" is to regulate an industry across the board. Thus,
by carefully drafting and phrasing the Stabilization Clause as well
as various "legal capacity" provisions, the IOGC stands a good
chance of making a strong case for the application of the Commer-
cial Activity Exception, using the contractual language and the in-
vestment contract itself to characterize the government's breach as
a Commercial Activity. Where a host government breaches an in-
vestment contract that generates a Profit Split and a Participating
Interest held by the sovereignty in addition to tax and royalty, the
sovereign act begins to take on the nature of a commercial dealing,
rather than the legislative act of a sovereignty. By statutory defini-
tion, it is the nature of the act (the entering into a commercial deal
and subsequent displacement of a business partner's economic
rights) and not its purpose (the enactment of law regulating the in-
dustry) that determines the act's "commercial" character.
In summary, the Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign
Immunity is statutorily pronounced and defined in the FSIA. This
272 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).





Exception exists to the advantage of the MNC-IOGC. In contrast,
the existence, extent, or elements of a Commercial Activity Excep-
tion is not yet clear under U.S. caselaw interpreting the judge-made
Act-of-State Doctrine, including Supreme Court jurisprudence. 275
The ambiguity haunting the scope, availability, and vitality of this
Exception under the Act-of-State Doctrine makes it more difficult
for the IOGC's lawyer to draft and negotiate express contractual
language establishing the host government's commercial capacity
in the investment. Furthermore, compared to Sovereign Immunity,
which must be applied based on interpretation of the FSIA's statu-
tory elements, the judge-made Act-of-State Doctrine results from
case-by-case judicial balancing of factors that may warrant absten-
tion.276 Accordingly, from a risk-management standpoint, the
probability of success or outcome of an Act-of-State Doctrine de-
fense in litigation may be much harder to assess. The doctrine car-
ries more risk and less certainty, and hence poses a graver concern
to the IOGC and its lawyers.
In any event, both the Sovereign Immunity and Act-of-State
Doctrines confirm the privilege of monarchy - the queen will judge
herself! Her sovereign neighbors should stay at bay and play
"hands off" in all due respect to her decisions! If permanent sover-
eignty attaches to the queen's Act-of-State, as it should, the queen
will change her law as she sees fit at any point in time into the in-
definite future, even though she might have transacted business
with traveling merchants in the past, and has made all kinds of
commercial promises to them! All these principles are well and
good if the queen watches out for her subjects, but not if the queen
275 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (deciding that pure commercial obligations of a foreign gov-
ernment were not within the Act-of-State protection). The part of the opinion out-
lining the Commercial Activity Exception was agreed to by only four of the nine
justices and hence continues to be of doubtful, or less significant, precedential
value). Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (deciding in
favor of judicial abstinence due to foreign policy considerations and avoiding de-
tailed analysis of the Act-of-State Doctrine). But see Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550
F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing Commercial Activity Exception to Act-of-State
Doctrine as viable law); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp.,
493 U.S. 400 (1990) (holding that the Act-of-State Doctrine did not apply where
there was no issue of validity of sovereign action before the court; instead the act
in question involved foreign officials' corruption pattern).
276 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 ("[R]ather than laying down... [an] all-
encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the [Judicial Branch] will not
examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
sovereign government ....").
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is "pawning" her subjects for the benefit of the throne! When serv-
ing as a permanent shield for the "bad acts" of a corrupt, incompe-
tent, and recalcitrant government, both the Sovereign Immunity
and Act-of-State Doctrines can become an accomplice to a pattern
that obstructs, instead of furthers, the social goals underlying the
"development" model when it reaches the "Third World."
From a policy perspective, Sovereign Immunity and Act-of-
State are legal theories that restrict economic globalization. At
least one commentator has opined that traditional concepts of
"sovereignty" central to international relations and international
law are outdated and should be reassessed and modernized to ac-
commodate today's reality of economic interdependence. 277 None-
theless, these doctrines have evolved and have sustained their vi-
ability in a common-law system such as the United States, as
certain aspects of sovereign powers essential to nationalism and in-
ternationalism must remain intact in order for concepts of "state-
hood" to endure. In international "breach of contract" disputes,
these doctrines create unnecessary hurdles that undermine the
sanctity of international contracts and render tools such as the Sta-
bilization Clause or other risk-allocation mechanisms less effective
and less predictable. If the Stabilization Clause is here to stay, it
should be allowed to function as a true risk management tech-
nique, free from obstacles arising out of antiquated legal theo-
ries.278 Furthermore, in commercial deals, governments should ul-
timately be held liable to their peoples, and in the appropriate
cases should be made accountable to the global market for failure
to conform with their contractual obligations. This accountability
should serve as a deterrent against governmental "bad acts" or
mismanagement of national affairs. Private judgments, therefore,
carry their own weight in facilitating policy choices.
In summary, from the perspective of the IOGC, not only does
the Stabilization Clause achieve relative predictability where there
is an environment of political instability, but it also boosts a case
for the Commercial Activity Exception under the FSIA, if and
when the IOGC must bring the host government or its SOE to a
277 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Con-
cept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 785 (2003) ("[Tlhe rethinking of 'sovereignty' is neces-
sary to escape the traps of use or misuse of older sovereignty thinking .... ).
278 McAdams, supra note 3, at 241, citing KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE
NATION STATE, at viii (1995) (suggesting that the practice of liberal democracy in





U.S. forum that applies lex fori's jurisdictional principles to the ad-
judication of the IOGC's breach of contract claim, or to the IOGC's
request for the enforcement of a favorable arbitral award.279 The
Stabilization Clause, bolstered by various "sovereign capacity" and
"commercial capacity" warranty and representation provisions in
the investment contract, can become a pivotal part of the MNC-
IOGC's risk management and anticipatory litigation management
strategies.
3.1.3.7.3.6. The Sixth Premise: Remedies Available for a
Breach of the Stabilization Clause
If the host government violates the Clause, and such violation
falls under a Commercial Activity Exception to any national law
doctrine protecting the sovereign action, what is the foreign inves-
tor's remedy? This question strikes at the core of the Stabilization
Clause and reveals a dangerous pitfall for foreign investors seeking
to enforce it as part of a petroleum exploration contract.
As already discussed, the IOGC typically assumes all Appraisal
Risks associated with exploration. If no petroleum is found, the
IOGC will have done drilling work for free. Consequently, if, dur-
ing the exploration program, subsequent legislation substantially
changes the terms of the contract or renders them uneconomic, a
remedy such as restitution would give a virtual windfall to the
IOGC-contractor. Restitution would make the company whole
notwithstanding the potential losses it might have endured due en-
tirely to Appraisal Risks. Restitution would also rescue the com-
pany from financial losses resulting from entering into an impru-
dent commercial deal in which the IOGC has apparently
misevaluated Political Risks. Restitution operates as a punishment
to the host country (as the repudiating party) and its people for
having enacted new legislation and implementing it. When used
to claim restitution, the Stabilization Clause not only redistributes
wealth among contractual parties who already do not have equal
279 Lower courts have held that overcoming the Sovereign Immunity jurisdic-
tional defense does not necessarily establish in personam jurisdiction over the sov-
ereignty under the standards of Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See, e.g., Carey v. Nat'l Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dismiss-
ing claim against Libya's National Oil Corporation on ground that the discon-
tinuation of oil shipments to the U.S. plaintiff's Bahamian subsidiaries did not
cause a "direct effect in the United States," and therefore did not provide the
"minimum contacts" necessary to give the court personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant).
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bargaining power, but also alters the nature of sovereignty. "Third
World" governments can exercise and enforce their sovereign
power against their entire "Third World" populations, but if such a
government wants to enforce the same power against a particular
foreign investor, the nation-state must pay for the enforcement at a
price that assumes the investment has no Appraisal Risks. If up-
held as a method of seeking restitution for the benefit of the IOGC,
the Stabilization Clause will become more and more a "pro-
corporate/pro-MNC" device, and not simply a means of Political
Risk balancing aimed to facilitate and foster global economic de-
velopment.
Unfortunately, illustrative of this "pro-corporate" tendency,
U.S. domestic caselaw has shown an increasingly pronounced
preference for the protection of large-scale corporate financial in-
terests. In Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United
States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court granted the eq-
uitable remedy of restitution to the oil company and restored al-
most entirely its status quo prior to the execution of a domestic pe-
troleum exploration contract.280 In order to secure a mineral lease
to explore for oil off the North Carolina coast, Mobil had paid an
upfront cash bonus of $156 million in addition to annual rentals.
28l
Analogous to a Signature Bonus in an international petroleum
deal, the $156 million bonus was part of the company's investment
in the Contract Area, whereupon the company spent front money
in order to secure the right of access to explore for oil. The chance
for success would depend on Mobil's evaluation of geological Ap-
praisal Risks. If, during the term of the contract, the company did
not find a Commercial reserve, it would have to abandon drilling
and the cash bonus would be a lost investment. Likewise, if new
legislation rendered the project futile, the company would also lose
the investment.
When the Department of the Interior refused to approve the
project based on new legislation,282 the lower court ordered restitu-
tion, allowing the company to recoup its initial investment.283 The
Supreme Court held that because the government repudiated the
contract and impaired its economic value, the refund of the cash
280 Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States, 530
U.S. 604, 624 (2000).
281 Id. at 609.
282 Id. at 611-13.




bonus to the company was appropriate, whether or not the con-
tract would have ultimately proved to be profitable to the com-
pany.284 Where the government was a contracting party, the en-
actment of new legislation impairing the project constituted a
"statement" from the promissor to the promissee unequivocally
repudiating the promissor's obligations to uphold the economic
value of the contract. 285 Such a statement is the government's "in-
dividualized speech" in the commercial context, and not just an
exercise of sovereign power.286 The Court analogized the refund of
the cash bonus to a refund given to the purchaser of a lottery ticket
not received, even if the ticket might have been a losing one.
287
At least one commentator has severely criticized the Mobil deci-
sion as over-broadly redefining contractual relationships and ex-
panding contract law for the benefit of big businesses simply be-
cause the United States is a contracting party.288 The decision
increases the risk the government must bear in an otherwise arms-
length, fully informed business transaction, allowing the costs of
Political Risks to be shifted from the contractor to the government,
simply because the government was in the best position to control
or eliminate Political Risks. The commentator also criticized the
Court's "lottery ticket" analogy as inappropriate, because the pur-
chase of a lottery ticket for a chance to win was strikingly different
from the right for access to mineral resources.289 A Stabilization
Clause, in the commentator's view, penalizes the government for
exercising its legitimate sovereign power and hence creates discon-
certing implications regarding the role of the government.290 When
legislation is regarded as "individualized speech," the nature of
law changes from that of a function of order and justice to a means
284 Id. at 608 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373, cmt a, illus. 1
(1979), which provides an example calling for full restitution on a seller's breach
of contract for a sale of land at a price higher than its market value). A sale of
land, however, is entirely different from a contract from access rights to explore
for oil, after which both landowner and operator will share in production and the
profit resulting therefrom.
285 Id. at 619-20 ("[I]f legislation passed by Congress and signed by the Presi-
dent is not a 'statement by the obligor,' it is difficult to imagine what would con-
stitute such a statement.").
286 Id. at 607 (citing United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996)).
287 Id. at 624.
288 Bothello, supra note 248.
289 Id. at 1483.
290 Id. at 1484-85.
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of facilitating transactions and their commercial ends. Public gov-
ernance as a governmental function thus becomes a financially mo-
tivated bargaining tool, with the balance of power shifting to the
cash-rich party.
291
It is saddening to realize that these policy concerns, vigorously
expressed by the commentator in the context of a domestic deal,
have long been the tenor of international petroleum transactions
and "Third World" economic development for decades preceding
the Mobil decision. It is obvious, then, that issues surrounding the
Stabilization Clause in the international arena prove once more the
following disconcerting fact: for the MNC-IOGC, much of project
or investment risks can be lessened or avoided by contractual
planning and negotiation, taking full advantage of (i) the develop-
ing economy's needs for foreign investment and technologies, and
(ii) the host government's desire to form and nurture a self-interest
structure that encompasses the two sources of power -the ruling
power of poverty-stricken societies, and the deep-pocket power of
the affluent world. In such a system, the strong bargaining chip is
in the hand of the economically and politically advantaged.
My purpose of presenting the above Six Premises is neither to
condemn nor defend the Stabilization Clause. I neither wish to ad-
vocate for its utility, nor its abolition. In fact, I believe that the
Clause supplies the psychological comfort needed for the closure
of high-risk international deals.292 Without it, corporate actors and
their employees will be incapacitated by the fear and anxiety often
associated with risk assessment and profit/loss projection in deal-
ing with the indeterminate future in an alien investment environ-
ment. In multimillion-dollar MNC-IOGC-"Third World" govern-
ment partnerships, the Stabilization Clause has constituted a legal
norm and standard business practice, such that, in the absence of
extraordinary and peculiar circumstances, a lawyer's failure to
propose or include the Clause in a large-scale investment contract
may arguably subject her to professional malpractice exposure, or
at a minimum, severe criticism by management, due to the foresee-
able political instability of the "Third World." For the cautious
291 Id. at 1485-86.
292 See Gatan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on
Domestic Environmental Policies: Striking A "Reasonable" Balance between Stability and
Change, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 451 (1998) (recognizing the functional value of a





IOGC lawyer, the Stabilization Clause is like the American Express
card - don't leave home without it!
My Six Premises serve only to call the attention of the legal
community to the inherent imperfection of the Clause as a legal
tool. 293 Yet, such an imperfect legal tool has gained the type of
popularity and widespread use that constitutes the force behind
the formation of modem lex mercatoria for the important petroleum
industry and energy sector of the global economy. As such, the
Clause's popularity should create a frown or, at a minimum, a
sense of ambivalence for the prudent scholar. The Six Premises ana-
lyzed above are intended to expose the dynamic, intricate, intense,
and at times disturbing nature of MNC-government confidential
partnership negotiation. Considering the imbalance of economic
power, as well as the pattern of feeding self-interests, these part-
nerships can turn into fruits laden with a juice that can be poison-
ous to the "people" invisible at the negotiation table. Invisible as
they are, they will be tasting those fruits because, from a policy-
making standpoint, those fruits are supposedly planted for them!
Yet, one should not make the overbroad generalization that all
such fruits are poisonous, in the absence of concrete evidence or
empirical data specifically relevant to a decipherable trend within
an industry, a government, a country, or a region. In fact, I do be-
lieve that any such unproven generalization may constitute the
type of corporate and government "bashing" that will undermine
the critic's credibility. But this is not to say that we should ignore
the chance that the poison may exist.
All I am pointing out is that the potential for the poisonous
juice is latently there in those partnerships by virtue of "Third
World" realities and the negotiation process itself. The chance for
the poison to accumulate may exist in the roots of the fruit tree
and, hence, it may taint the tree's newly grown buds, especially
when the process of pruning the fruit is completely outside the
293 See id. at 455-56 ("Doctrinal polemics on... stabilization clauses have cen-
tered around ... their validity under international law."); see also Thomas W.
Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: Interna-
tional Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215, 243 (1996) ("A care-
ful analysis. .. reveals that the.., precise status and effect of the [S]tabilization
[C]lause under international law is by no means clearly settled."); cf WOLFGANG
PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS 136-37 (1986) (presenting a "typology" of Stabilization Clauses). The
issue has not been confronted or resolved by a national court in the context of an
international transaction.
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check-and-balance arm of a public interest watchdog representing
a concerned international humanitarian community. As the trend
for the globalization and "internationalization" of law is calling for
various transnational work groups to sit down together and look at
the foundation for modern lex mercatoria, new procedures and
methods to install this check-and-balance watchdog function
should be a priority for modern international jurists. No mutually
acceptable solution can emerge overnight, let alone a perfect one,
but the deliberative efforts and the thinking process must com-
mence now. Some imperfect solution, no matter how drastic it may
seem, is better than no solution at all.
In summary, current scholarly discussions may have provided
a battleground for competing philosophies and political debates on
globalization. The ultimate hope is that the new millennium will
bring about a new world order and a new outlook on globalization,
wherein true equalization of resources, development of infrastruc-
ture, and distributive education will eradicate poverty in every
corner of the world. In reality, for years the nature of partnerships
between the "Third World" nation-state and the MNC private de-
veloper- the apparatus for the realization of this noble goal-has
not changed. In fact, the pattern has simply been solidified and re-
inforced with the opposite result, especially when the interests of
the inhabitants of the host country are taken into consideration.
The well-formed patterns of these exclusive and confidential part-
nerships are seemingly inevitable and exceedingly unsatisfactory,
yet extremely difficult to change.
So far, I hope to have provided a detailed description of the
structure of petroleum development transactions, both with the de-
tachment of a researcher and the clear stand of a social advocate.
My thesis points to the following conclusion: when MNC-IOGCs
enter into natural resources development projects with many of the
lesser-developed countries, the economics of these development
projects combined with the politics of the host country almost in-
exorably leave out those who should be among the primary benefi-
ciaries-namely, the ordinary citizens and small business enter-
prises of the host country. The economic forces in these projects
inevitably lead to the creation of bilateral cartels, with groups of
large corporations on the one side and, on the other side, a singular




forces of "free enterprise" competition have no play, particularly in
countries with less-developed political systems, where the check-
and-balance political process of a true democracy may not be
available. As I have stated, when the modern "monarchs" shake
hands with the MNC rainmakers, the door to true capitalism is for-
ever closed to the inhabitants of the transitional economies.
The development of international economic law has done little
to help correct the imbalance, partly due to the "Catch-22" position
created by the very process through which modern international
economic law is formed over time. These exclusive monarch-
investor partnerships in the petroleum sector help create modem
lex mercatoria governing the industry, with MNCs' well-trained
lawyers actively participating in the process. The lawyer, when
structuring and drafting client-protection devices in these interna-
tional development projects, is in effect writing law that will gov-
ern the lives of millions of people whom that lawyer may never
know and for whom no legal recourse will ever exist to guard
against the lawyer's excesses or over-zealous conduct, all in the in-
terest of a powerful client occupying a superior position in a less-
than-arms-length negotiation. Further, disputes are typically re-
solved not in public tribunals but within the confines of confiden-
tial arbitrations, whose results in turn contribute substantially to
the development of modem international economic law. In the
eyes of the critical legal theorists, such modem international eco-
nomic law has been created by elites in their own image in order to
serve their own purpose. The losers are those billions who can
never be part of the negotiation.
In the next case study ("Case Two") to be published in the en-
suing issue of this Journal, I will go on to describe the next step of
the Vietnam Deal, in a scenario where the natural gas discovered
and developed from successful exploration off the Vietnamese
coast will be used onshore as fuel supply for the generation of elec-
tricity to serve the host country and region. In Case Two, I will
identify the necessary complicity of international organizations
such as the World Bank and IMF, as well as the private interna-
tional banking sector as financiers. At the end of the analysis of
Case Two, I will offer some suggestions and conclusions that will
hopefully remedy the ills this "twin series" Article (taken together)
has, and will have, identified.
(to be continued)
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